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ABSTRACT

The five articles in this report explore issues of rural and urban development, formal and nonformal education, and local and national needs in Africa. "Partnership for Productivity" (PFP) and "Brigades in Botswana: Their National Impact" focus on the development of managerial and nonagricultural vocational skills in rural areas. In the case of PFP the target group is adult business men in Kenya's Western Province who receive advisory and training services. The Brigades are self-sustaining skill training programs for primary school leavers in Botswana. The programs cover operation costs through their own labor. "Tutume Community College" describes the efforts of a formal institution to develop nonformal education programs for rural development and community service. "The Development Orientation in Rural Ethiopia" summarizes a study that investigates the wants of local communities. "Educational Opportunities for Rural and Urban Communities in Kenya" demonstrates the effect of financing, staffing, and equipping inequities on the school examination results. Each of the articles attends to the relationships between local, grass roots, self-help efforts and national interventionist efforts and, after analyzing a situation or program, makes suggestions or draws conclusions about the future in relation to the analysis. (Author/JH)

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Road to the Village

Case Studies in African Community Development

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"While other countries aim to reach the moon, we must
aim. . . to reach the village."

Julius Nyerere
President
Tanzania

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INTRODUCTION

Despite the dramatic growth of industrialization and urbanization in Africa, the majority of Africans will continue to live in rural areas for many years. The improvement of agricultural productivity and other aspects of rural development have increasingly absorbed the attention of Governments and Aid Agencies as the gap between the modern wage sector and rural environment in which most Africans live has become larger. Many countries have discovered that rapid rates of economic growth do not necessarily increase the wage labor force, and that with the exponential growth of formal schooling, aspirations grow much faster than economic opportunities.

It was out of a growing concern that formal schooling was not effectively meeting the needs of the majority of the people in Africa that the African-American Institute conducted the survey that was published in 1972, Non-Formal Education in African Development. That study drew attention to the wide range of education and training opportunities which lie outside of the formal schools and direct their focus on the nearly 90 per cent of the population who receive little or no formal schooling in most African countries. Among the report's findings were that, despite the existence of some effective, low-cost alternatives to formal schooling, most non-formal education programs were merely "micro-solutions to macro-problems"...drops in the bucket.

While the survey drew attention to the extent to which the training needs of adults and out-of-school youth have generally been neglected in favor of the fortunate minority who complete secondary school, we did not find any support for "deschooling" as some critics of formal schools have advocated. Despite their problems, formal schools are not only seen as the primary instrument of economic and social progress in Africa, but they are often the only "modern" institution in remote rural areas. Thus to ignore formal schools or to view them simply in terms of their orientation towards urban "elite" occupations would be foolish.

With some notable exceptions, formal schools tend to be standardized on a national scale by a system of syllabi, examinations, teacher training, etc., and non-formal education tends to be geared to local ecological and labor market factors. Neither system by itself can cope with the enormous problems of upgrading the knowledge, skills and attitudes of the entire population, but non-formal education must be planned as a supplement to formal schooling in an integrated program of human resource development.

In rural areas of Africa, these problems are often most acute as the incentive structure draws people towards greater opportunities in towns and cities. For this reason, training programs which ignore the questions of demand for the skills they are producing and the opportunities to apply these skills are doomed to failure. Formal schools have traditionally concentrated on supplying manpower with the assumption that demand exists or will be created. Non-formal education usually operating at the local level, must be more sensitive to the local demand.

The five articles which follow explore the issues of rural and urban development, formal and non-formal education, and local and national needs. They were not intended to be a representative sample of issues, projects or regions in Africa, but were selected primarily on pragmatic grounds.

Partnership for Productivity (PFP) in Kenya and the Brigades in Botswana were identified in AAI's recently published Non-Formal Education Survey as having great potential for the development of managerial and vocational skills respectively. Both case studies focus on the development of non-agricultural skills in rural areas; in the case of PFP the target group is adult businessmen while the Brigades provide training for primary school leavers.

Tutume Community College was chosen because, as the only modern institution in a remote area of Botswana, it is an interesting case of a formal school trying to develop non-formal education programs, for rural development and extensive community services. The African-American Institute has had a particular interest in Tutume since it interested the Neil A. McConnell Foundation in assisting the government of Botswana to take over the school and to develop its special orientation towards the rural community in which it is located.

The study of the orientation of some 1,200 rural people in Ethiopia towards development issues was undertaken in consultation with officials in the Ministry of Education and Fine Arts in an effort to find out what local communities wanted. By shifting our focus from institutions to the people they are intended to serve, we hoped to provide useful information to persons responsible for planning rural training programs. In taking this village-level perspective, we sought to identify the balance between the traditional "top-down," technical assistance model of development and the self-help orientation sometimes characterized as "development from below."

Kabiru Kinyanjui's study of the regional disparities between urban and rural areas of Kenya is an analysis of local differences within a national framework. Kinyanjui traces the historical forces that contributed to present patterns of inequity in the financing, staffing and equipping of schools in Kenya and demonstrates how these inequities are translated into qualitative factors such as examination results.

Despite their differences in purpose and methodology, all five case studies focus considerable attention on the relationships between local, grass roots, self-help efforts and rational, interventionist forces. While we do not attempt to generalize or to draw conclusions based on the five case studies, the issues raised within each local or national setting can be found in various degrees throughout Africa and we hope that these studies will help to shed further light on issues of fundamental importance in developing countries.

Acknowledgements: The funds which enabled us to carry out these case studies came from a number of sources. The overall effort fell under the auspices of the Program Advisor in Education which was supported by AAI and the Carnegie Corporation of New York. Albert H. Barclay, Jr.'s expenses were reimbursed by Partnership for Productivity under a grant from the Agency for International Development. The Center for Education in Africa at Teachers College, Columbia University, with support from The Ford Foundation, supported some of Kabiru Kinyanjui's and my expenses, and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University paid for part of Gardiner P. Pearson's expenses. While we are grateful for the generous assistance of these institutions and to the many persons who helped in our efforts, the views contained in the case studies are not necessarily the views of the supporting institutions.

James R. Sheffield
August, 1974

ABSTRACT

In the following study, Albert H. Barclay details the complex web of interpersonal ties, particularly those of kinship, that can affect the success of development programs. Focusing on Partnerships for Productivity (PFP), a Kenyan pilot program sponsored by the East African Yearly Meeting of Friends and Quaker organizations throughout the world, Barclay suggests that increased sensitivity to the methods and concepts of social anthropology could enhance PFP's effectiveness. PFP's goals, he writes, are to bring technical and management skills, as well as loan capital, to entrepreneurs in rural Western Kenya.

Barclay begins by reviewing the setting, Kenya's Western Province, discussing its economy and describing its work force. He also discusses the major factors that have thus far hindered emergence of African-owned enterprises in rural Kenya, analyzes PFP's loan applications, and describes other sources of loan capital within the province.

The study then focuses on PFP's advisory and training services, describing how PFP runs business clinics, provides services to a village polytechnic institute, conducts special courses, offers legal services and operates a team project to develop commercial and industrial enterprises at a rural market. In each case, he offers recommendations for improving program effectiveness.

After examining liaison and staffing patterns of the program, Barclay turns his attention to three case studies--an effort to reestablish a defunct enterprise whose ownership was disputed by several claimants; a garage owned by three men; and the activities of two brothers who are partners in a complex enterprise that begins with a retail shop and branches out into maize trading.

Barclay sums up by noting, among other things, that the primary goal of potential entrepreneurs in rural Kenya is the establishment of a secure economic base and that in Western Province such a base is most often found in land ownership.

PARTNERSHIP FOR PRODUCTIVITY

by

Albert H. Barclay, Jr.

PART I.

The Social and Economic Context

This report analyzes findings from three months of field research on problems of entrepreneurship in Western Kenya during the summer of 1972.[1] During that period, I was employed as a resident evaluator by a privately sponsored development project, Partnership for Productivity Service Foundation (PFP), based in the town of Kakamega. PFP is a pilot project sponsored by the East African Yearly Meeting of Friends and Quaker organizations in the United States and throughout the world. Its aim is to promote African enterprise in the rural economy.

PFP began operations in October, 1970, with the arrival in Kenya of a business and management advisor from the United States. Subsequently, the staff grew to 11 (six expatriates and five Kenyans). In addition to its advisory services, PFP set up a loan fund in mid-1971, which was registered with the Kenya Government as West Kenya Productivity Investments, Ltd. Overseas financial support has continued from Quaker groups, the Methodist Church, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, and Barclays Bank International, Ltd. The project also receives grants from the U. S. Agency for International Development and the Government of Kenya. AID supports PFP's efforts to aid rural industries in the Vihiga Division of the Kakamega District, in conjunction with the Special Rural Development Program operating in that area. The Kenya Government grant enabled PFP to hire a cloth-printing and dyeing specialist for the Provincial Vocational Rehabilitation Center at Kakamega.

The PFP concept developed in the late 1960's out of discussions between Kenyan members of the East African Yearly Meeting of Friends and Quakers in the United States and Britain. The result was a plan to bring technical and management skills, as well as loan capital, to entrepreneurs in rural Western Kenya. Operating from Kakamega, the principal town of Western Province, PFP was designed to serve a broad economic region reaching outside the precise administrative boundaries of the province. In practice, however, assistance is concentrated on client enterprises within the province, particularly within Kakamega District, in part because a visit to clients outside the district might entail a round trip of 50 miles or more, an extravagant use of travel and staff time when compared with other activities closer to Kakamega.

The Setting: Enterprise in Western Province

Kenya's Western Province borders on Uganda and extends from the slopes of Mount Elgon in the north to a southern boundary between 10 and 20 miles from Lake Victoria. The province is the homeland of the Abaluhya, Kenya's third largest ethnic group, which is made up of 17 "sub-tribes." Kakamega District comprises slightly less than half of the area of Western Province and is adjoined by Busia District on the west and Bungoma District on the north. In the 1969 Kenya Census, Kakamega District had a population of 782,586, and Western Province had 1,328,298 inhabitants (see Table 1).

Western Province is predominantly agricultural; maize, grown for sale and subsistence, is the principal crop. Millet, sugar cane, bananas, and beans are the main subsidiary crops in the province's central and northern areas. Because of the general fertility of the region and an annual rainfall averaging more than 40 inches in most areas, and more than 60 inches in the southern and eastern parts of Kakamega District, there are two maize harvests each year in the more densely populated areas, where subsistence needs are highest. Maize yields per acre may exceed 20 bags (of 90 kilograms each) in the rare cases where hybrid seed and fertilizers are used. The more common yield of seven to 10 bags per acre produces little more than family subsistence requirements.

For several decades, Abaluhya males have migrated to other parts of Kenya and East Africa in search of work. During the 1930's and 1940's, a small-scale gold rush attracted many European prospectors to the area around Kakamega. In 1934, some 6,360 African laborers were employed at the newly excavated mines. But since the closing of these mines in 1947, there has been no comparable industrial scheme within Western Province, and migrant laborers in large numbers have gone to work in the towns and cities. Figures in Table 1 reflect the absence of a significant proportion of adult males from their home areas in Western Province:

TABLE 1

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Adult*</u> <u>Males</u>	<u>Adult*</u> <u>Females</u>	<u>Area in</u> <u>Sq. Km.</u>	<u>Population</u> <u>Density/</u> <u>Sq. Km.</u>
Western Province	1,328,298	274,650	326,685	8,276	161
Kakamega District	782,586	153,218	192,201	3,558	220
West Bunyore Location	53,485	10,546	13,394	101	532

Table 1 (Cont'd)	Total	Adult* Males	Adult* Females	Area in Sq. Km.	Population Density/ Sq. Km.
South Maragoli Location	49,661	9,438	12,497	92	542
Isukha Location	72,262	14,695	17,403	242	301

* The category of "adults" includes all persons 16 years of age or older.

Source: Kenya Population Census 1969, Volume I, 65-68. Statistics Division, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Nairobi.

One of the major factors hindering the emergence of African-owned enterprises in the rural areas of Kenya has been the domination of the commercial and industrial sectors of the economy by Indian and Pakistani artisans and entrepreneurs. Asian traders were well entrenched in the small towns of Western Province (notably in Kakamega, Bungoma, Butere and Broderick Falls) prior to Kenya's independence in 1963. Relatively few, however, set up shop in the small trading centers located off the main roads. But in Kakamega town, even in mid-1972, there were more than a dozen Asian-owned businesses along the main street, several of them run by non-citizens. Since 1967, the Kenya Government has pursued a policy of gradual Africanization in commerce and industry, and in June, 1972 four African applicants received approval from the Kakamega District Trade Licensing Committee to buy businesses owned by Asian non-citizens. Although notably less drastic than the approach taken by President Idi Amin of Uganda, Kenya's Africanization policy has a similar purpose and rationale.

The gradual departure of Asian businessmen does not, however, automatically generate new African enterprise. Kenyans planning to start new commercial ventures meet a variety of obstacles; most frequently they cite the lack of capital as their principal difficulty [2] particularly where they want to take over enterprises whose Asian owners have been given notice to close down their businesses. And although capital shortages may be less important than other problems in starting new businesses, Western Province entrepreneurs consistently maintain that the growth (and in some cases, even the survival) of their enterprises hinges on acquiring loan capital.

Proposals submitted to PFP by potential loanees reflect the distribution of enterprises already operating in the province. (PFP sees its managerial advisory role as at least as important as its loan operation, and does not wish to be thought of primarily as a lending agency. Nevertheless, the majority of new clients first seek capital assistance. Staffers usually attempt to cultivate a close advisory relationship before moving to negotiations for a loan.)

The loan application is a simple one-page document on which the applicant describes the enterprise he has started or intends to start, and lists his cash needs. Because of the many demands on their time, the staff has not been able to respond to many of these requests. In 1971, PFP made 10 loans to its Kenyan clients. During the summer of 1972, staff members were servicing those loans, collecting monthly repayments, and offering management advice and consulting services to about 20 other clients. Loan applications on file from January, 1971 to January, 1972 appear in Tables 2 and 3:

TABLE 2

Loan Applications to PFP: Service Industries

January, 1971 - January, 1972

Retail and wholesale traders	128
Bars and hotels	7
Maize traders	5
Butchers	5
Houses to rent (to be built)	4
Petrol operators	3
Fertilizer dealer	1
Cattle trader	1
Textile shop	1
Commercial college	1
	==
Total	N=156

Source: Partnership for Productivity files.

TABLE 3

Loan Applications to PFP: Manufacturers

January, 1971 - January, 1972

Maize-grinding mills	17
Dressmaking and tailoring	5
Carpentry workshops	4
Timber and saw mills	3
Building contractors	2
Poultry processing	2
Shoemakers and shoe repairers	2
Tannery	1
Bakery	1
Knitting factory	1
Cement-block maker	1
Bicycle repair	1
Tin and blacksmith	1
Soap factory	1
Radio and phonograph repair	1
Total	N=43

Source: Partnership for Productivity files.

These applications suggest that the majority of entrepreneurs seeking loans intend to establish the type of enterprises already common to most towns and trading centers of Western Province. Small retail shops and general stores are in abundance throughout the region; indeed, there seem to be too many. Most of these shops carry inexpensive household items such as soap, matches, sugar, tea leaves, and kerosene. In the small trading centers, there is little variety from one shop to the next, although the better stocked shops may sell cheap cotton cloth, shirts and dresses, or spare parts for bicycles.

The figures in Tables 4 and 5 for tailoring businesses, bars and "hotels" at two market centers also correspond closely to the categories of enterprises on loan applications submitted to PFP. Most tailoring operations are one- or two-man ventures employing pedal-driven Singer sewing machines to make uniforms, men's shirts and women's and girls' cotton dresses. Bars sell bottled beer and soda and are to be distinguished from buzaa clubs which sell locally brewed maize beer at much lower prices. "Hotels" sell tea, bread, scones, and simple meals of ugali (the staple food, made from maize flour) with eggs, meat or chicken. At the butcheries, cows are slaughtered on or near the premises and after the meat has been approved by a Government health inspector, it is put out for sale.

TABLE 4

Results of a Business Census at Punda Market, July, 1972

Retail shops	10	Tailors	1
Maize traders	2	<u>Buzaa</u> clubs	1
"Hotels"	3	Bicycle repairers	1
Butcheries	2	Maize-grinding mill	1
Bars	2	Ironsmith	1
Jaggery sugar factory (1/2 mile from market)	1		
		Total	N=25

Also: New buildings under construction but not yet operative:
2 maize-grinding mills, 1 butchery, 1 retail shop.

Source: AHB, 1972.

TABLE 5

Results of a Business Census at Siafu Market, July, 1972

Retail shops	24	Tailors and cloth suppliers	12
Maize traders	7	<u>Buzaa</u> clubs	1
"Hotels"	4	Bicycle repairers	3
Butcheries	6	Maize-grinding mills (only 2 operative)	4
Bars	3	Charcoal supplier	1
Shoe repairers	2	Watch repairer	1
Hides and skins dealers	2	Cement-block maker	1
Dispenser of drugs and medicines	1		
		Total	N=72

Also: New building or buildings under construction but not yet operative:
2 tailoring shops, 1 retail shop, 1 maize-grinding mill.

Source: AHB, 1972.

The figures in these tables are not exhaustive. A survey of businesses in Kakamega or other larger towns in the province would turn up other categories, including booksellers, furniture stores, shops specializing in footwear, agricultural tools and supplies, and gasoline stations. Maize-grinding mills, the principal form of mechanized small industry in rural Kenya, are known more commonly as "posho mills" (posho being the common term for maize flour in Kiswahili). Such mills require sizeable capital investment: anywhere between 15,000 and 30,000 Kenya shillings (roughly \$2,000 to \$4,000).

It is important to emphasize that PFP is not the sole supplier of loan capital in the province, and is small in relation to other sources. The project was designed to be a supplemental source of funds and to stimulate the effective use of funds from other sources. Although PFP made only 10 loans between its inception and August, 1972, many potential clients believed it was operating a much more extensive loan program. In fact, other loan sources (mentioned below) have substantially larger assets. Exaggerated perceptions of the scale of PFP's lending operations may be traced to the novelty and high visibility of the project, to the energy of its staff and their skill at public relations, and to the project's association with the East Africa Yearly Meeting of Friends, which has a large membership in the province.

(1) Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation (ICDC). As of June, 1972, this project was assisting ten large-scale projects in Western Province with loans ranging from 50,000 to 200,000 Kenya shillings (about \$7,000 to \$28,000). ICDC operates nationally in Kenya, and in fiscal 1970/71 made small commercial loans worth \$2,616,180 to 651 traders, and property loans valued at \$3,662,400 to 227 traders.* The relatively small number of loans extended to Western Province, together with reported long delays while applications are being processed in Nairobi, has made many Abaluhya entrepreneurs pessimistic about the prospect of obtaining loans from ICDC.

(2) District Joint Loans Board. Each district board meets under the chairmanship of the District Commissioner (the highest ranking civil servant and central government representative in the district). The board may allocate loans up to Ksh. 15,000 (\$2,140) to African commercial traders with the average being about Ksh. 5,000 (\$715). The Western Province Board generally meets once a year and according to the Western Provincial Trade Officer, an ex officio member, approves about ten per cent of the 200 applications it receives.

(3) Commercial Banks. Two banks, The Standard Bank and the Kenya Commercial Bank, have offices in Kakamega and a third, Barclays Bank International, Ltd., has an office in Kisumu, 32 miles to the south. These banks can make loans to traders and businessmen, but interest rates are high (more than 15 per cent in some cases), and arrangements for collateral are stringent in comparison with those specified by other sources.

The PFP Concept: Design and Rationale

The originators of PFP envisioned an approach that differs from that of economic development agencies in most of Africa and the Third World. The decision to base a new project, backed by major overseas financial support, in a rural area more than 200 miles from a capital city was a departure from the norm. In part, this decision came in response to requests from the East African Yearly Meeting leadership that a business assistance project be established in Western Kenya. A further consideration was the need to redirect the focus of development efforts to the so-called "grass-roots" level. In Kenya, as in other African nations, industrial development has been concentrated in a small number of urban centers, with the result that the small-scale rural entrepreneur has been largely forgotten. His plans and problems became the central concern of PFP.

* Source: Files at the ICDC office, Kakamega, June, 1972.

In raising funds and recruiting staff, PFP's American sponsors have stressed three features which they feel are unique to their project:

(1) The unified provision, by a single agency, of a variety of services -- managerial and entrepreneurial advisory assistance; limited technical assistance; and inputs of loan or equity capital.

(2) The utilization of experienced expatriate personnel under contracts of sufficient duration (generally two years) to permit them to learn about the social and cultural context in which they are working.

(3) The commitment to go beyond classroom instruction and offer advice at the project office, following through intensively with client enterprises to see how services and capital are being used.

The basic advisory relationship originally envisioned, and to a large extent still practiced, involved one expatriate advisor working intensively with perhaps five or six clients. Advisors study a business operation, observe production processes, discuss distribution, perhaps do some market research and make recommendations. For new clients, the service might involve substantial amounts of time for the first few weeks, especially if a loan were being considered. After a few months, the client enterprise would be largely on its own. Consultation would, however, still be available, and results would be reviewed quarterly by the PFP advisor.

The combination of these functions within the project has meant that PFP complements but does not duplicate the work of other sources of capital assistance in Kakamega. Neither ICDC, the provincial Trade Office, nor the commercial banks have field staffs able regularly to visit loan recipients or to follow up on responses to advisory efforts. The provision of adequate transport facilities has enhanced PFP's first hand knowledge of its clients' day-to-day operations and difficulties. It is this body of experience which may prove to be the greatest resource PFP will pass on to other institutions in the Western Province economy. PFP's sponsors have explicitly stated that the project will be phased out once the services it offers can be made available through other agencies. In short, they intend to work themselves out of a job.

PART II.

Analysis of PFP Activities

I. ADVISORY AND TRAINING SERVICES

A. Business Clinics:

Early in 1972, PFP's senior staff member at Kaimosi began a business clinic, based in his home, where client entrepreneurs could come for private consultations and advice on specific problems. A similar clinic was begun at the Kakamega PFP office in April, 1972. The clinic in Kaimosi is open one day every week, depending on when the staff member has arranged to be available at his home. The clinic at Kakamega has no fixed hours, but staff there usually meet with clients during normal working hours -- from 8:30 to 12:30 and from 2:00 to 4:30.

The clinic projects have been undertaken for the following reasons:

- (1) To act as an advisory service, as distinct from the loan function that most potential clients associate with PFP.
- (2) To offer advice to the client who comes on his own initiative with a problem and receives specific instructions to take action on his own.
- (3) To reduce the cost of frequent staff visits to clients throughout Western Province by centralizing each clinic in a PFP office.

Cards on file at the Kakamega office of PFP show that by mid-August, 1972, 39 businessmen had consulted with staff members there. Of this number, however, only six had visited the office more than twice, and 23 had come only once.

Figures from the Kakamega card file suggest that most clients either misunderstood the clinic's purpose (assuming it would help get a quick loan) or were reluctant to implement the advice they received. However, no concerted effort has been made to recruit participants so that the response of these clients may not indicate the true potential of the clinic concept. The location of client enterprises, many 20 miles or more away from Kakamega, may also account for the infrequency of visits to the PFP office. The Kaimosi-based clinic appears to have a more consistent attendance pattern because its participants come from the immediate area.

The following recommendations should help improve the effectiveness of the clinic program:

(a) Greater efforts should be made to publicize the clinics and the services they offer. Contacts with the Kakamega Chamber of Commerce, the Provincial and District Trade Officers, chiefs and sub-chiefs in the various locations, and market committees could be utilized for publicity purposes. A brochure, in English and Swahili, describing the clinic, could be written and mailed to potential participants.

(b) Clients who appear only once or twice at the clinic should receive follow-up, e.g. letters urging them to visit the clinic again.

(c) To facilitate contact with clients outside the Kakamega area, PFP might set up storefront offices at several rural market centers by hiring a duka (shop) and using it as a clinic office, perhaps one afternoon per week, when one or two staff members would be available for consultations.

B. Keveye Village Polytechnic:

With financial support from USAID, PFP provides training services to the Keveye Village Polytechnic in the Vihiga Division of Kakamega District. Since 1970, the Polytechnic has been training youths who have completed primary school to find wage or self-employment in the surrounding, predominantly rural area. As of mid-1972, the Keveye VP offered training in tailoring, motor mechanics, carpentry, leatherwork and tanning, general business matters and bookkeeping. The school's local management committee includes the manager of the Polytechnic, the chief of South Maragoli Location, and a representative of the Ministry of Cooperatives and Social Services. Since 1971, Keveye VP has received financial aid from the National Christian Council of Kenya (NCCCK) and the Kenya Government.

The Keveye VP falls under the purview of the Special Rural Development Program/Vihiga because it comes within the Vihiga Division. USAID, the principal donor to the SRDP/Vihiga, requested PFP to assist Keveye VP early in 1972. This assistance takes the following form:

(1) Management advice and assistance to the VP Management Committee, including auditing financial records as required.

(2) Expenditure of funds granted by USAID for Keveye VP equipment (Ksh. 13,500 (\$2,100) for teaching equipment and Ksh. 14,800 (\$1,930) for training materials).

(3) Instruction, training and demonstration in motor mechanics four mornings per week by a mechanic who also is in charge of the acquisition of spare parts and other materials.

(4) Instruction and training in general commerce and bookkeeping, four afternoons per week.

(5) Active encouragement of trainee projects; e.g., a trainee-run shop selling inexpensive retail goods.

PFP and the Polytechnic agreed that PFP is not expected to control or manage Keveye VP. Training in motor mechanics, general commercial subjects and bookkeeping, were scheduled to be taken over by Kenyans before the end of 1973. PFP's advisory role to the local management committee will end after a maximum of six years.

Although PFP staff members contribute effectively to their components of the training program, several points were in need of attention in mid-1972:

(1) The local management committee was not functioning effectively. At least once, a meeting was missed because only the manager of the Polytechnic and a PFP representative were present.

(2) In April-July, 1972, PFP's expenditures at Keveye VP included payment for labor and building materials. This was not in the original agreement and should have been borne by the VP itself. (PFP is seeking reimbursement for these costs.)

(3) Inadequate communication between PFP and the manager of the Polytechnic led to confusion over cancellation of scheduled instruction. In one case, a PFP instructor had gone on local leave, and in the other, an instructor did not teach at Keveye for two weeks because of lack of transportation. The manager claimed he had not been informed of the reasons for the absence of the instructors.

(4) The structure and operation of Keveye VP raise a number of even more significant issues. In too many respects, the Polytechnic resembles a formal school. The curriculum includes examination and grades; trainees must pay fees; and many of the trainees believe they are attending a substitute secondary school. A trainee in the second year class wrote "Form II" on the door to the building where classes in bookkeeping and commercial subjects are held. An instructor's survey of trainee attitudes showed that all expected to seek salaried jobs outside the local area and that the average anticipated starting monthly salary was Ksh. 595 (\$85)--a most unrealistic expectation.

Guidelines for village polytechnics, as formulated by the National Christian Council of Kenya and subscribed to by Keveye, are not being met by the VP. According to these guidelines, instruction is supposed to enable trainees to establish local businesses. Thus far, this orientation has not been made clear to the trainees and there are few signs that the project's goal will be met for most trainees.

Keveye is still a relatively new institution, and as with all village polytechnics, its approach is experimental. Several steps might ease some of the project's recent difficulties:

(a) To avoid loss of training time, PFP instructors should coordinate their local leave with scheduled vacation periods at the Polytechnic; the VP management committee should set dates for these vacations well in advance.

(b) Trainees should be encouraged to visit small enterprises within the local area. Contact with the operators of posho mills, cement-block businesses, cloth printing operations and tailor shops would be more valuable than trips to large industries such as the Kisumu Cotton Mills or the Coca-Cola bottling plant.

(c) The management committee and staff of the Keveye VP should visit other village polytechnics in Western Kenya to see alternatively styled institutions in operation.

(d) Efforts should be made to secure small local contracts which trainees could undertake as part of their instruction, and which could generate income for the Polytechnic, for example, repair of local vehicles in the Polytechnic's motor mechanics workshop.

C. Special Courses for Entrepreneurs:

Although group instruction is a departure from PFP's original emphasis on one-to-one consultation, PFP staff have, on several occasions, helped or have participated in specially organized conferences and courses for businessmen in Western Province. Between 20 and 30 businessmen assemble for several days of intensive instruction in business methods and concepts. Attendance is by invitation, or in some instances through application. Participants usually pay for food and accommodation.

In July, 1972, PFP's motor mechanic specialist and a Kenyan assistant conducted a course in tractor repair and maintenance at the Lugari Farmers' Training Center. PFP had previously noted that many tractors, purchased by Kenyan farmers with loans from the Agricultural Finance Corporation, were out of operation and rapidly deteriorating. The Lugari course was conceived as a first step in creating service and repair capabilities in Western Province. A possible next step is the establishment of a Kenyan-operated tractor repair service, which may also include facilities for leasing tractors to small farmers.

In August, 1972, four PFP staffers and the wife of one staff member lectured at a ten-day traders' course at the Government Training Institute, Maseno. The course, sponsored by the Rotary Club of Kisumu, included 15 participants from Western Province and an equal number from Nyanza Province. PFP arranged lectures on trade licensing requirements and demonstrations of shop displays and organized, during recreation time, a football game with rules rewritten to illustrate business ethics and accounting procedures.

PFP's involvement in such courses represents an efficient use of staff time and allows for concentrated training for large groups. But because of the size and nature of its operation, PFP cannot easily undertake all administrative arrangements, though organizing a course of this type is in itself a useful management exercise and has instructional value for those who have requested it.

Recommendations:

(a) PFP should continue to make available its staff and other resources to the organizers of courses of this type.

(b) PFP should explore the possibilities of staging new courses, not necessarily residential, on subjects of wide applicability. A course on posho milling, the most common industry in Western Province, would be a promising possibility. Another course might involve the jaggery sugar business (this is the making of crude sugar by boiling cane juice and setting the residue to dry). Such a course could include bookkeeping, business planning and costing, and the legal aspects of various types of ownership (sole proprietorships, partnerships, cooperatives and limited liability corporations).

D. Legal Services:

In April, 1972, PFP hired a Kenyan law graduate as legal advisor to PFP staff and clients. Subsequently, in July, 1972, she was sworn in and licensed as an advocate and may now represent PFP and its clients in court. Her presence on the staff allows PFP to provide the following services:

- (1) Assisting clients with the collection of outstanding debts.
- (2) Informing clients about requirements for trade licenses from central and local governmental authorities.
- (3) Drawing up agreements and documents relating to the formation of new enterprises, including partnerships and cooperatives.
- (4) Advising clients about payment of taxes (a subject on which there is widespread misinformation among Western Province businessmen).

The legal advisor also teaches a class in business law one morning per week at Friends' College, Kaimosi.

The addition of a legal advisor to the project has meant that PFP no longer must rely on lawyers in private practice. More importantly, PFP's clients, who could hitherto not afford such a service, may now consult with an expert in Kenyan law. This new resource may prove to be one of PFP's greatest assets in recruiting a larger clientele in Western Province.

Thus far, PFP has offered free legal services, but this could cause resentment among the small number of licensed advocates in Kakamega and Kisumu; perhaps it might be as well for the project to distinguish between simple consultation and cases where the client requires representation in court. A nominal fee might be charged for the former. Where court cases are involved, PFP might consider referring a client to a private advocate, depending on the nature of the case and the client's ability to pay.

Recommendations:

(a) Because of the absence of a suitable research facility in Kakamega, PFP should endeavor to build a modest library relating to Kenyan law and local government by-laws and resolutions. A filing system should also be set up, to keep track of information on cases relevant to PFP's work, involving licensing, taxation and bankruptcy.

(b) PFP must anticipate that clients or potential clients will approach the project for help in cases where their businesses have failed. (In fact, one client in 1972 was facing bankruptcy.) The legal advisor should conduct research on bankruptcy laws to prepare for such contingencies.

(c) Further research should be undertaken on the exact rates of taxation for various types of businesses, particularly partnerships and corporations.

E. Shinyalu Market Project:

In April, 1972, PFP began a comprehensive team project to develop commercial and industrial enterprises at Shinyalu market, about nine miles south-east of Kakamega. The idea for this project originated with the Shinyalu market committee, which sent a delegation of 10 members to the PFP office. The delegation suggested three large enterprises that PFP might help start: a textile mill, a soap factory, and a wholesaling concern.

Although the PFP staff did not regard any of these requests as immediately practicable, they organized a meeting in the central square of the market. After the meeting, a senior PFP staff member briefly visited each of about 50 operating enterprises in the market. The chairman and secretary of the market committee then joined him in conducting an "open house" in a tea room, where more than a dozen businessmen discussed their plans and problems.

In May, 1972, PFP sponsored a trip to Kisumu Cotton Mills for members of the Shinyalu market committee in order to illustrate the massive capital investment required in starting a textile mill, and to encourage the members toward solving their more immediate problems. After the trip, PFP staff made weekly visits to Shinyalu and maintained close contact with six retail shopkeepers and traders. Several other businessmen from the market have visited the business clinic at PFP's Kakamega office. In addition, a PFP business adviser and motor mechanic specialist have visited four grain mills in the area.

After a promising and enthusiastic beginning, the Shinyalu project slowed to a rather uncertain pace by early July, 1972. Apparently, many businessmen at Shinyalu had seriously misunderstood the nature of PFP's plans and efforts. Some assumed everyone at Shinyalu would automatically qualify for a loan. Interviews with these businessmen indicate that the majority regard capital shortage as their most pressing problem, and see loans as the most obvious solution. When PFP attempted to emphasize its other skills and facilities (specifically bookkeeping instruction), many businessmen lost interest. Several members of the market committee, who were quick to label many of their neighbors as lazy and undeserving of assistance, apparently expected that they themselves would obtain loans. Apparently, loans are regarded as prestige items and tend to enhance the recipients' social status.

A second problem facing the Shinyalu project was the lack of a concrete PFP plan. From the start, it was assumed that PFP could stimulate business in Shinyalu in numerous ways. It was expected that regular contact between staff and Shinyalu entrepreneurs would produce favorable results, and those men of Shinyalu who responded most eagerly to PFP's advice would stimulate their neighbors by force of example. But no definite goals were set, and although the project was conceived as an experiment, there was no conception of what specific methods and approaches were to be tested. The project's consequent lack of direction left the vast majority of businessmen in Shinyalu unaffected by PFP's involvement.

Recommendations:

(a) Specific goals and target dates for the various PFP contributions to the Shinyalu project should be set.

(b) PFP should rent a duka (shop) at Shinyalu and use it as an office one morning or afternoon per week.

(c) PFP should strengthen its liaison with the market committee of Shinyalu, and staff should meet with committee members at least once each month.

(d) Shinyalu could be used as the site for a course of several days' duration (though preferably non-residential) on the various elements of posho milling. Recent experience at Shinyalu indicates that there are severe stresses involved in the formation of partnerships; this might be one of the major items in the course.

(e) PFP, through its loan and investment arm, WKPI, should set aside a special fund, between Ksh. 10,000 (\$1,430) and 20,000 (\$2,850) from which small loans could be made to Shinyalu entrepreneurs. The maximum loan available might be on the order of Ksh. 2,500 (\$350) with some loans as small as Ksh. 500 (\$75) to 750 (\$100). Each loan could test a specific concept, e.g.: (1) Does a loan of Ksh. 2,500 prior to the maize harvest boost the turnover of a licensed maize trader who has sizeable capital needs and a short (three-month) trading season? (2) Can a hotel/tea room attract a larger clientele by offering a greater variety of foods if backed by a loan of Ksh. 600?

(f) PFP should try to increase contact between Shinyalu businessmen and bankers, provincial and district trade officers, and representatives of the Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation (ICDC). PFP might help to arrange visits by officials from these other agencies to Shinyalu market, so that businessmen could be instructed on how to apply for loans.

II. LIAISON AND STAFFING

A. Liaison with Governmental and Para-Statal Agencies:

Since its inception as a privately financed program, PFP has attempted to build effective working relationships with other organizations assisting African enterprise in Western Province. For long-range planning, PFP's efforts are closely coordinated with those of the Rural Industrial Development Center (RIDC), established in Kakamega in 1972. The RIDC, a branch of Kenya Industrial Estates, Ltd. (a government-sponsored industrial development scheme in Nairobi), has offices and training facilities in Kakamega. Its Kakamega staff consists of a Kenyan director and a technical advisor provided by DANIDA, the Danish aid agency.

In May, 1972, visiting officials from USAID/Nairobi and AID/Washington raised the possibility of integrating PFP within the RIDC/Kakamega; it appeared to them that the two projects might err in duplicating rather than complementing one another. It was agreed that discussions would take place between the two agencies in Kakamega as to future relationships between the two bodies.

These discussions were held during June and July, 1972. In a proposal for coordination of the two programs, PFP's acting general manager wrote:

"PFP is primarily an importer of business skills that are not readily available in Kenya and its object is to develop those same skills in Western Province commerce and industry. It thus cannot become a permanent part of the economy in its present form because, if successful, it will work itself out of a job. Imported skills would no longer be necessary."

This brief PFP proposal emphasized the basic differences between the two organizations and suggested that the likelihood of duplication was less than originally anticipated. Subsequently, PFP and RIDC spelled out a more detailed arrangement of cooperation, emphasizing PFP's role in developing methods and techniques that might be used by RIDC.

PFP has also attempted to strengthen cooperation with the other two major local sources of loan capital outside the banking sector: the Kakamega office of the Industrial and Commerce Development Corporation (ICDC) and the District Joint Loans Board. This cooperation has entailed advising and preparing potential applicants to ICDC, holding consultations with the Provincial Trade Officer who supervises the Joint Loans Board, and agreeing to pool information on recipients to facilitate screening for each loan body. PFP has also teamed

with the Provincial Trade Officer in recruiting participants for special courses of the type described in Section I of this chapter.

PFP's sponsors did not intend that PFP/WKPI should be the sole source of capital for any enterprise. Close cooperation with the other loan suppliers enhances the possibility of joint financing for new enterprises. With its staff and transportation capabilities, PFP could offer follow-up services and continuous advice to loan recipients, services the other loan agencies cannot provide.

Recommendations:

(a) PFP should offer specified skills and services to RIDC as soon as the latter requires them.

(b) PFP should commit itself to recruiting a number of entrepreneurs (for example, four motor mechanics, two cement-block makers, and two posho millers) to receive training and capital assistance from RIDC.

(c) PFP should maintain its identity as an experimental and innovative pilot project, and should not be merged with RIDC. Although PFP should anticipate eventually phasing itself out, such a move is not likely within the next two years.

(d) PFP should prepare a list of all WKPI loan recipients and the current status of their loans. Copies of this list should be forwarded to the Kakamega representative of the ICDC and to the Provincial Trade Officer. These officials have promised to prepare similar lists of their own loan clients.

B. Recruitment of New Staff:

Recommendations:

(a) PFP must continue as an agency providing specialized technical skills. Experience and expertise in business methods are essential for anyone in an advisory post on the project staff. For expatriate staff, prior residence in Africa or other areas of the Third World is equally important as adjustment to life and work in Western Kenya may not be easy. Previous exposure to similar situations tends to facilitate a new staff member's transition into PFP's work.

(b) The language skills of expatriate staff should be improved. In 1971, an attempt was made to schedule weekly evening instruction in Kiswahili for staff members, but the class was eventually dropped. Without free communication, it's impossible to get a true picture of a situation, and the likelihood of obtaining frank answers, of tapping local opinion and gossip, and of developing a relaxed relationship with potential clients is greatly increased if Kiswahili is spoken. It appears that the language barrier has deprived PFP of certain vital information (e.g., a loanee's credit status and reliability).

If expatriate staff come to Kenya to work for two years, then they should have a concentrated period of language instruction at the start of their tour. Two to three hours every morning during the first month of residence in Kenya should be set aside for language training, and PFP should enlist the services of a language instructor.

(c) Importing volunteers with expertise and advisory skills remains one of PFP's most significant capabilities, but the demands (housing, and transportation, orientation) are onerous. Several current staff members commented that it took them from three to six months to develop a productive working routine. PFP should therefore avoid frequent arrivals, departures, and replacements as far as possible. The practice of recruiting management and technical advisors on contracts of two years and longer should be continued.

(d) PFP should consider employing several young Kenyans as field assistants to senior expatriate personnel. (A secondary-school leaver worked capably as my research assistant during July and August, 1972. His duties included occasional translation, when interviews were conducted in the vernacular, and the recording of information from visits to small enterprises at Siafu and Punda. More importantly, he was a knowledgeable informant on many aspects of his culture and society to which an outsider is often rather insensitive.)

(e) The recent employment of two Kenyan university graduates in senior staff positions has enhanced PFP's credibility and performance. Continued efforts should be made to attract similarly qualified African staff. Expatriates should only be hired when the particular skills being sought are not available in Kenya. As far as possible, PFP must try to strengthen its identity as a Kenyan organization with roots in the local community.

III. LOANS AND NEW ENTERPRISES

A. Loan Activities: West Kenya Productivity Investments, Ltd. (WKPI)

The loan and investment arm of PFP, West Kenya Productivity Investments, Ltd. (WKPI), is legally separate from other elements of the project. The PFP Service Foundation is incorporated under Kenya law as a nonprofit advisory organization. WKPI, which charges interest on loans and also invests in selected enterprises in Western Kenya, is incorporated under different statutes.

WKPI received a certificate of approved enterprise from the Government of Kenya in May, 1971. During the next four months, WKPI made loans to 10 enterprises, in the following amounts (there are seven Ksh. to the dollar):

- (1) Ksh. 12,500 to a textbook and stationery supplier.
- (2) Ksh. 25,000 to a bakery.
- (3) A bank overdraft guarantee of Ksh. 15,000 to a clothing manufacturer.
- (4) Ksh. 20,000 to a greengrocer.

- (5) A fixed-term bank deposit of Ksh.15,000 to a retail clothing and textile shop.
- (6) Ksh. 6,000 to a motor repair garage.
- (7) Ksh. 10,000 to a licensed maize trader and retail shop.
- (8) Ksh. 10,000 to start a craft shop in Kakamega.
- (9) Ksh. 1,020 to a women's knitting society.
- (10) Ksh. 35,000 to start a silk-screen cloth printing firm; Ksh. 5,000 was invested as equity capital.

WKPI did not fix a single interest rate for all these loans, but adjusted its rates to fit each client's ability to repay. Within the group, interest rates varied from six per cent to about 12 per cent. The usual term for each loan was one year; in most cases, a grace period of three months was scheduled before repayments were to begin.

As of August, 1972, WKPI had a creditable record in securing repayment of its loans. In two cases (6 and 9 above) the loans had been entirely repaid. In four cases (2,3,4 and 7) repayments were being made on schedule. Cases 8 and 10 had not yet repaid any money to WKPI, but it was recognized that after one year of operation for the cloth printer, and only six months for the craft shop, neither was in a position to begin repayment. In the two remaining cases (1 and 5), the clients were far behind schedule in repayments. The respective locations of three clients (one was situated 25 miles to the south of Kakamega, and the other 30 miles to the north) made supervision and servicing of these loans extremely difficult. To make matters worse, client 1 was on the verge of bankruptcy, for in addition to his outstanding WKPI debt of Ksh. 11,000, he had five suits against him in court for nonpayment of debts to suppliers. A Kakamega bank had closed the account of client 5 due to his erratic performance; the client had used most of the funds pledged by WKPI to build a new shop and bar at a market center several miles from the site of his original clothing and textile shop.

These ten loans and investments tied up all of WKPI's original loan capital. As of December, 1971, the staff and WKPI board decided to grant no new loans for six months so that the impact of the initial group of loans could be reviewed. During June-August, 1972, the loan function of PFP/WKPI had been deemphasized in favor of the project's advisory and training services. The comments below thus reflect the views and experience of PFP staff during the period before the research was undertaken.

Generally, the loans helped build a reputation for PFP as an active assistance program. Many potential clients still come to PFP seeking financial support. Invariably, PFP staff members then try to recommend their other services, stressing the fact that a loan is not the answer to every business problem. Although many of these potential clients are hazy about the aims of the project, the 1971 loans did create considerable goodwill and stimulated much interest in PFP. Files in the PFP office include 156 loan applications from the period January, 1971 to January, 1972. The reputation of PFP/WKPI as a source of loan capital, even though exaggerated, has greatly facilitated

recruitment of new clients.

However, a review of the 1971 loans reveals the project's lack of an adequate system for screening potential recipients. In the case of the two major defaulters, the recipients' goals differed sharply from those of PFP. Client 1 had several court cases pending against him at the time he received money from WKPI, but this was not discovered until later. Client 5 had previously operated a bar, but was locally regarded as an uncertain credit risk. This, too, did not become clear until after the loan had been made, when the client's difficulties prompted "I-told-you-so" comments from several other Vihiga businessmen. Client 7, a partnership which has perhaps put its loan to the most effective use, was almost unknown to the PFP staff until the application was put forward by two members of the board. This case is reviewed later, in Part III of this report.

A second difficulty that became apparent was the heavy time commitment by PFP staff to secure collection. The remote locations of the two defaulters underline this difficulty. One staff member made seven fruitless visits to Broderick Falls in search of client 1, who each time was reported to be in Nairobi or at home on his farm, and even once was erroneously reported to have sold his bookshop. When the costs of gasoline, vehicle depreciation and the pro-rated salary of the staff members are taken into account, these expenses greatly exceed anticipated interest on the loan.

Several questions arise in assessing the impact of these loans. In what ways, if any, has an enterprise improved or expanded as a result of a loan? Has the loan helped the client achieve a specific target in increased production or turnover? Is the client repaying the loan out of increased profits, or is he forced to draw on capital? Has the loan provided the client with a service that a loan from other sources could not provide? What concept has been tested in this particular loan experiment, and has this concept been proven valid? At present, it is difficult to answer such questions. The initial pressure to put WKPI into operation (after several months' delay in being certified by the Kenya Government) may explain the absence of precise targets and planning. But the resultant loan experiments lack comparability, and each of the ten is perhaps best understood as a separate case.

Two broader questions affecting loan policy also bear serious consideration. The first of these concerns the consequences of combining loan and advisory functions within a single organization. Recipients of loan capital may perceive a basic contradiction in such an arrangement, believing that stringent repayment regulations are at odds with their plans for expansion.

As of mid-1972, only ten projects, all of fairly large scale, had received ICDC financing in the province. Many persons I interviewed told of unsuccessful visits to the local banks, or of letters to the Joint Loans Board that had gone unanswered. Failure was generally attributed to favoritism of one sort or another. Many informants told me, for example, that PFP only grants loans to Quakers, that bank managers only approve applications from traders who live in their own home locations, and that ICDC was only for Kikuyu. The facts of loan distribution do not support these allegations. (In PFP's case, although several members of the East African Yearly Meeting have received assistance, five of the original ten loans went to men who belonged to other churches.)

Of course, it is true that successful loan applicants are often able to exploit personal ties and relationships, often through intermediaries and sponsors. A high rate of defaulting and delayed repayment and the lack of strong measures for repossession of collateral characterize most loan programs in Kenya. In strictly financial terms, the lender is likely to be cautious, thus, the intervention of a sponsor to vouch for an applicant can assume major significance.

The flavor of wheeling and dealing affects the entrepreneur's perception of the loan itself. As mentioned earlier, several members of the PFP staff concluded that businessmen often see the acquisition of a loan as an end in itself, approval of one's application leading to increased social status.

A second policy issue concerns the size and number of loans. In WKPI's 1971 group of ten businesses, all but two of the loans involved amounts of Ksh. 10,000 or more. The capital needs of a business are often much smaller than this, and loan terms could be more flexible. For example, a licensed maize trader, who trades during a season of only three or four months, could be required to repay his loan at the end of that period. A tailor might stock his shop for the busy months of October through February with a loan of Ksh. 2,000. The major seasonal fluctuations in business make repayment during the slower pre-harvest months difficult. When monthly installments of Ksh. 500 or more are involved, adherence to a uniform repayment schedule may place intolerable constraints on a small business. Furthermore, in my opinion, the overall impact of PFP/WKPI loans would be much greater if they were allocated in smaller amounts to more, say 25 or 30, enterprises.

Recommendations:

(a) PFP/WKPI urgently needs a systematic screening process for loan applications. One member of the staff and two members of the Council/Board could meet regularly as a committee to review applications and interview potential recipients.

(b) Strict eligibility criteria need to be drawn. These might include a minimum period, say six months, of prior close association with PFP; location within a certain radius, say 20 miles, of the PFP office; presentation of detailed information on all previous loans from other sources; preparation by the client of a detailed plan of expenditure for any loan funds received.

(c) PFP/WKPI needs to strengthen its ties with other sources of loan capital. This includes sharing information with the District Joint Board, ICDC, and where possible, commercial banks, on loan recipients and their repayment records. Unbeknown to PFP, one of its clients had an outstanding

debt to the Joint Loans Board for a 1970 loan, and was attempting to divert funds from his enterprise to pay his debt.

(d) Developing links with other capital sources would permit greater emphasis on PFP/WKPI's role as a referral agency that could assist and support loan applicants who wish to negotiate with banks, ICDC and the Joint Loans Board.

(e) A more flexible repayment schedule should be devised. Monthly installments need not always be uniform, particularly where a business has negligible profits in the months immediately preceding the harvest.

(f) Smaller loans of shorter duration could be considered. These loans should be experimental but the result should be visible within a specified period.

(g) The Shinyalu market project offers an opportunity for controlled experimentation with small loans. As suggested earlier, a separate fund of between Ksh. 10,000 and 20,000 could be established to finance loans to a selected number of enterprises there.

B. Creation of New Industries

PFP's efforts to start new businesses grew out of its commitment to generate new employment in Western Kenya. One technique for job creation involves recruitment of Kenyans to operate new ventures, and provision of large amounts of capital and advisory assistance. The goal is to place each new business on a profit-making basis under Kenyan ownership and management. As of August, 1972, three major projects of this kind were actually in operation: a silk-screen cloth-printing company, a craft shop located in Kakamega, and a cottage industry scheme at Kaimosi. In addition, several other projects were in the planning stages, including a tannery, a rock crusher, and a tractor repair and leasing service.

In many respects this type of activity requires more time and attention from staff than a program of assistance to an existing enterprise. For more than a year, the cloth-printing business required the full-time participation of a junior staff member. PFP's general manager also devoted a considerable proportion of his time to the project, and a total of Ksh. 35,000 (\$5,000) in direct capital assistance was supplied to the company by WKPI. The craft shop and cottage industry scheme together occupy most of the time of another senior staff member.

In each of these three cases, the new business is geared to Kenya's rapidly expanding tourist market. The craft shop and cottage industry have stimulated production of pottery, woven baskets, wicker furniture and beaded jewelry by Abaluhya women at their homes in the Kaimosi area, and by Turkana women near Lake Rudolf. The cloth-printing factory has developed a modest trade in Western Province, but relies principally on sales to clothing and craft shops in Nairobi and Mombasa.

Up-Country Crafts, the Kakamega venture, had a monthly sales volume of about Ksh. 1,500 as of August, 1972. The shop was being supervised by a young Kenyan (on a salary) who will probably find permanent employment there once the enterprise becomes self-sustaining. No sales or production figures were available for the Kaimosi-Tiriki cottage industry project, but membership in that organization continued to grow during the months June to August, 1972.

By nature a more ambitious and complex enterprise, the cloth-printing company has encountered several major problems, including the scarcity in Kenya, due to import restrictions, of poplin and sailcloth, two essential raw materials. Strict cash requirements for the purchase of dyes has presented another major hindrance and, in some cases, lack of ready cash has delayed production. Erratic sales performance, and several bad checks from customers, one for Ksh. 4,600 (\$657), compounded the firm's problems. The company, burdened with major debts to its suppliers, faced recurrent financial crises in mid-1972. The direct loan of Ksh. 35,000 (\$5,000) from WKPI has been matched, and probably exceeded, by other PFP expenses on the company's behalf (transportation, support of sales trips, pro-rated staff salaries, etc.). As of July, 1972, printing activities at the factory were curtailed until the return of the PFP general manager from his overseas leave.

These difficulties do not necessarily presage the company's imminent collapse. The product, printed cloth in more than a dozen color combinations and five silk-screen patterns, has been enthusiastically received by customers and retailers. There are several ways in which PFP can learn from its experience with this venture:

(1) One result of PFP's heavy commitment to the project was that nearly all decisions affecting the cloth-printing company have been made by PFP staff. Officially, PFP/WKPI is only a one-third shareholder in the company, but in practice PFP has been responsible for every major policy decision.

(2) In several instances, policy decisions appear to have been made on an ad hoc basis. Assignment of a young expatriate volunteer (skilled in silk-screen printing, but with no substantial business experience) to supervise the company's operations proved unsuccessful. The Kenyan manager and part-owner had ten years' employment experience in banking and insurance but was supposed to take direction from an inexperienced volunteer.

(3) Cash control and the maintenance of accounts were inadequate. The fact that the company was faced with difficulty in obtaining cloth was used to justify unorthodox business practices, including a personal loan from one of the share holders and frequent failure to issue receipts to customers.

(4) The same considerations that arose in the screening of loan applicants (see Section II (A) above) are equally relevant here. PFP did not know enough about the prior debts and other financial obligations of one of the shareholders. His unsatisfactory handling of company affairs resulted in part from these other commitments.

(5) Sales trips to shops in Nairobi and Mombasa, where the company's major clients are located, were often haphazard and extravagant. The absence of management personnel for as long as two weeks disrupted production routines and planning at the factory.

Recommendations:

(a) The cloth-printing company is in obvious need of reorganization. The first priority is settlement of debts and imposition of cash control measures. These steps were taken by an accounting advisor paid by PFP, and were scheduled for completion in early September, 1972.

(b) Future production must be matched with incoming orders. In the past, the factory salesroom has built up a large surplus of printed cloth for which no orders had been placed.

(c) Recent difficulties must not be allowed to destroy the optimism and imagination that have characterized the cloth-printing project from its beginning. The company still has a promising future and it turns out an attractive product of high quality.

(d) PFP staff should draw up a timetable that details plans for turning the craft shop over to Kenyan ownership and management. A target date should also be set for repayment of the shop's Ksh. 10,000 loan to WKPI.

PART III.

Case Studies

CASE #1: A POSHO MILL PARTNERSHIP

This case study deals with the unanticipated result of PFP's efforts to reestablish a defunct enterprise whose ownership was disputed by several claimants. The business was a posho or maize-grinding mill located about 1 1/2 miles from Siafu market in Kakamega District. Seven men had originally pooled cash, in varying amounts, to purchase a 16-horsepower engine and grinding equipment. They also agreed to rent land from Shamala, an old man whose farm adjoined a primary school. The machinery was placed in a mud-and-thatch building, and the mill began operating in the mid-1950's. In about 1967, however, the engine broke down. None of the partners was willing to put up money for its repair, so the mill closed. In May, 1972, one of the partners asked for help to get the mill running again.

PFP first became involved in the project when the PFP mechanic, an expatriate, accompanied other staff members on a visit to Siafu market. The mechanic inspected the four posho mills in the vicinity, including the one on Shamala's land. Martin, one of the partners and a tailor by trade, suggested that if the mechanic could repair the engine, the partners could reopen the business. A senior management advisor from PFP explained to Martin that the partners should pay for the work if they were really serious about starting afresh.

In late June, 1972, Martin and three other men accompanied the PFP advisor, the mechanic and myself to the mill. Thick weeds had grown through cracks in the mud walls, and the mechanic noted that the area around the engine would have to be thoroughly cleaned before repairs could begin. The PFP management advisor suggested a meeting of all the partners during the following week.

When we returned to Siafu market, a man named Frank was waiting near the shops to see the senior PFP advisor. Frank owned a pork butchery at another market a few miles away, and was also co-leaseholder of a 700-acre farm near Kitale in Rift Valley Province. He had already impressed several PFP staff members as an energetic businessman, and a progressive farmer. When the subject of the posho mill came up, Frank declared that his father had been one of the original partners and that he had inherited his father's share. "I had forgotten all about it, because the mill has not been running since before my father died," Frank explained. The advisor then invited him to come to the next meeting of the partners.

The partners' meeting took place on Wednesday of the following week. Shamala's wife was standing with the old man outside the building when we arrived, insisting that he have nothing to do with the mill. "Tell them to get the engine out of here—they won't ever pay you," she said several times in a loud voice. When the meeting finally began, 11 men were present, in addition to two PFP staff members (one expatriate and one Kenyan), and myself in the role of observer. Shamala was sitting on a stool near the door; the others were standing.

Each man identified himself, and after several minutes' heated discussion in Kiswahili and Kiluhya, Frank, Martin and two other men—Andrew and Thomas—announced that they were "full partners"; the others (except for Shamala) admitted they were present as "observers". The latter group included Frank's brother and two of Andrew's brothers. Martin explained that two other partners had been unable to come, and that there were six in all. This provoked another heated discussion. Frank finally explained in Kiswahili that a seventh man had been involved in the original partnership, but that his widow had inherited his share. No one had notified her of the meeting.

The PFP advisor then asked Frank to name each of the original partners. The list included Frank's father; Martin; Andrew's father; Thomas; the two absent men; and the man whose widow had inherited a share in the mill. Shamala had been muttering under his breath for several minutes, and the others now turned to look at him. After questioning the old man in Kiluhya, Frank reported Shamala was complaining that he had never been paid any rent for the use of his plot. If they would not pay now, Frank said, Shamala wanted them to get off his land and take the engine elsewhere.

At this point, the PFP advisor suggested a compromise—to let Shamala be considered a full partner in the mill; his capital investment would be the accumulated unpaid rent and the land on which the mill was located. According to the plan, there would be eight full partners in the mill. The advisor asked Frank whether all would agree that each partner should have an equal share in the mill, regardless of their original investments. Frank spoke with the others in Kiluhya, and then announced that they had agreed to equal ownership. The advisor then proposed that PFP commit Ksh. 400 if the partners raised an equal amount; that is, if each of the eight contributed Ksh. 50. The total, Ksh. 800, would be placed in a new account at the Standard Bank, Kakamega, in the name of the partnership. All checks would be drawn on the firm's name, and would be signed by an appointed representative of the partners and by a PFP representative. This capital, and any other funds the partners might invest, would be used to repair the engine and reopen the mill.

The advisor further suggested the partners elect a salaried manager to run the mill. One of Andrew's brothers volunteered for this job, and the others concurred. The two PFP representatives then announced they would have the legal advisor at their office in Kakamega draw up a partnership agreement. They urged everyone to attend another meeting a week later, and

to inform those who had not been present of the arrangements that were made.

During the next few days, events took an unexpected turn. The engine and grinding equipment were removed at night from the hut on Shamala's land, and taken by lorry to Kisumu. Frank, I was told, was very angry and reported the matter to the chief of the location. Martin, who had the only key to the building, was busy at his sewing machine when I went by, and said he knew nothing of what happened.

The chief (a civil servant for the Government of Kenya) was sympathetic to Frank's complaint. After a visit to the market (but not to the mill site), he asked Frank whether he should call the police. Frank said he would think about it. Several days later, though, Frank announced he had decided to drop the whole matter: "They are bad people, I can't do business with them." Besides, he claimed, he had more pressing problems with his butchery and his Kitale farm. Although Martin had evidently known something of what was going on, he would not talk about the mill: "My tailoring business gives me enough worries. I want to forget about the posho mill."

From PFP's point of view, what had gone wrong? The fortuitous entry of Frank into the affairs of the mill generated suspicion and resentment among the others. Frank learned of the efforts to reopen the mill by accident: prior to that time he had given the mill no thought and hardly considered himself a partner. Martin, Andrew and the others had never mentioned his name, just as they had left out the widow who by rights belonged among them. Frank was a successful farmer and small businessman, far wealthier than any of the other partners. His father had been dead for more than four years, and suddenly, the others thought, he was trying to activate his inherited share. Although Martin had originally taken the lead in approaching PFP, Frank had usurped his position, conversing freely with the PFP representatives in English, something none of the other partners could do with much ease.

The same qualities that made Frank an ideal participant from PFP's perspective made him unwelcome to the other partners. In taking charge of the meeting, he had been able to channel information back and forth between the outsiders and the partners. Frank responded eagerly to each suggestion the senior PFP advisor made; the other partners did not voice open dissent, thinking Frank to have the backing of the PFP personnel. Meanwhile, Andrew and his brothers (and quite possibly, Martin) bided their time and arranged to eliminate any further involvement by Frank or the PFP staff by removing the engine.

The plan to reconstitute the partnership and get the mill running again proved to be deceptively difficult for PFP. At issue was the question of who would be entitled to share the profits if the mill resumed operation. To propose equalization of shares, as PFP did, provoked a negative reaction when Frank aligned himself with the outsiders. His persistent questioning led to the inclusion of Shamala and the widow, as well as himself, making a total of eight partners instead of the five Andrew, Martin and Thomas had originally named. Thus PFP worked against the interest of the group that had made the initial approach.

As of late August, it was rumored that the engine was almost ready and that Andrew and his brothers would bring it back soon. By this time, however, Shamala had forbidden them to use his land because they had ignored his plea for the back rent. (The chairman of the market committee said the engine repairs had cost almost Ksh. 2,000 at an Asian-owned machine shop in Kisumu -about three times what the PFP mechanic had estimated for the same work.)

This experience serves to underline the need for staff to examine carefully the sociological context of problems on which they are asked to help. In this case it proved naive to assume that each participant had identical interests. A careful inquiry into all claims of ownership suited Frank, just as an airing of Shamala's rent complaints suited the old man, but these procedures alienated the others. Perhaps the principal lesson to be drawn from this case is that what appears to be silent acquiescence to outside initiatives may be a form of passive resistance. By overplaying its own hand, an outside agency may set off a series of reactions that effectively curtail its ability to influence the course of events.

CASE #2: A MOTOR REPAIR GARAGE

One of PFP's earliest clients was a garage owned and operated by three men from the Wanga area, about 25 miles west of Kakamega. It was opened in Kakamega town by Isaac and Musumba, a mechanic and a body repairman, at the end of 1969. They were joined in 1970 by William, who now serves as managing director. The enterprise is registered as a limited liability company, and each of the three owners holds 10,000 shares. In mid-1971, PFP staff members estimated the company's worth at Ksh. 31,500 (\$4,500). But of this amount, Ksh. 14,000 (\$2,000) consisted of accounts receivable, including several unpaid bills of long standing.

In addition to repair service, the garage also sells spare parts and accessories for several makes, including Volkswagen and Opel. As of late 1971, the business employed ten people, including the three directors, a woman secretary, and six apprentices. In mid-1972, only two apprentices were working under Musumba, the body man, who explained that "business had gone down." The garage is housed in a corrugated building on the main Kakamega-Busia road, but the owners have been instructed by the Kakamega Municipal Council to relocate in a newly created industrial estate elsewhere in the town. The owners also plan to open a second garage and body shop near their homes.

William was one of the first local entrepreneurs to meet PFP's general manager when the project opened in 1970. And the general manager and other PFP staff members devoted considerable time to the garage over a 15-month period. The following are among the major problems they sought to resolve:

(a) Reducing a large backlog of accounts receivable, several of which were owed by prominent local citizens, with referral of debts to a lawyer.

(b) Improving the record-keeping system to keep better track of cash and stock flow.

(c) Obtaining a loan to finance purchase of spare parts from suppliers in Britain and Germany: PFP's loan arm, WKPI, supplied Ksh. 6,000 for this purpose and the loan was repaid with interest in February, 1972.

(d) Providing advice and support in the owners' negotiations with the Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation (ICDC) for a major loan of Ksh. 30,000, which was granted in February, 1972.

(e) Upgrading the quality of mechanical and body work at the garage.

PFP also assigned its own mechanic, an expatriate volunteer, to work with William and the other owners several days each week. This arrangement continued for about four months, beginning in October, 1971. By February, 1972, however, the volunteer found that the owners expected him to supervise most of the work, and to assume responsibility for the cash box: in short, his presence was required every day. With the approval of the PFP general manager, the mechanic reduced his involvement at the garage, and since that time his assistance has been confined to specific problems.

Association with PFP appears to have benefited this business. The loan enabled William to build a stock of spare parts, even though one order from Germany had been delayed at the port of Mombasa for eight months (as of June, 1972), tying up more than Ksh. 12,000 of the company's capital. Regular stocktaking and cash books were also introduced. On the other hand, the quality of repair work at the garage continued to be uneven. One man who had left his car unclaimed for three months had accused the owners of adding to the original damages. In addition, William's efforts to collect a cash deposit from customers to cover the cost of spares were not always successful. (This policy had been suggested by the PFP general manager.) As a result, many cars had been left at the garage on the understanding that no work would be done until the vehicles' owners paid these deposits; some lay untouched for more than three months.

Many of the garage's problems stem from tensions between the partners over other business interests. Recent developments in Wanga have increased the value of the agricultural land each of the three men owns there. A government-sponsored sugar refinery was completed in mid-1973, and smallholder farmers have begun planting sugarcane on contract to the company that manages the refinery. Cash-cropping of sugarcane on such a large scale is new to the Wanga area, and the contracts promise a high rate of return per acre. William reported that on some land, net return might exceed Ksh. 3,000 per acre. Although William's estimate was probably too high, all three men had great expectations for their new agricultural venture. Isaac planted four acres of sugarcane in North Wanga Location in June, 1971 and expected to harvest it in early 1973. William planted three acres in South Wanga in April, 1972, and added four more acres in August. Musumba, whose land in North Wanga was located near Isaac's plot, planted seven acres in August, 1972.

During the time he was closely involved with the three men, the PFP motor mechanic specialist found it impossible to control the garage's cash flow. At William's request, he had been given a key to the cash box, but all three owners also had keys to the box, and whenever the PFP volunteer reported that funds were missing, each man protested his own innocence. William blamed the others, telling the PFP volunteer in private that Isaac had probably removed money from the box at night. The other two insisted that William, as managing director, was responsible for all funds and must bear the blame for their disappearance.

There were other signs of tension that at first puzzled and eventually annoyed the PFP mechanic. Several customer complaints about job tickets were traced to the secretary, a young woman. These tickets were often filled out by several persons: the addition of charges was frequently incorrect, and labor fees for identical work were sometimes recorded at widely divergent rates. Both William and the volunteer concluded, after examining the account books, that the secretary had been taking money from the enterprise, but William was unable to persuade Isaac and Musumba that she should be fired.

A second problem arose from William's investment in a new building in Kakamega. William said he had spent about Ksh. 3,000 on the building, which was located about 100 yards behind the garage and was only half-finished. Both Isaac and Musumba told the PFP volunteer that they suspected William had been diverting money from the garage to pay building costs.

Beginning in May, 1972, Isaac began to spend less time at the garage in Kakamega, and more time at his home in North Wanga. Both William and Musumba (who was not a mechanic) appeared disgruntled over Isaac's absence; without Isaac's supervision, the mechanic apprentices worked slowly and there was little new business.

As this account shows, the interests of each owner were not confined to the garage itself. Although they criticized Isaac for ignoring his duties at the garage, both William and Musumba also made frequent trips to inspect their landholdings. Meeting the cost of agricultural labor before the harvest (at which time the refinery would pay a lump sum to each cane grower) presented a major problem for each of the men. Their urgent need for funds to pay laborers may explain the frequent disappearance of cash from the till. Isaac had planted his cane almost a full year earlier than the other two, and his cash needs were more pressing because he had to pay laborers to weed and spray his crop. By June, 1972, William had similar needs, and admitted that he was unsure of how to raise money to pay these wages.

The draining of cash from the garage by at least one owner and possibly by all three was a "solution" that PFP staff have frequently encountered -siphoning assets from one enterprise to support another.

PFP's reduction of its participation in the garage was understandable in terms of the project's need to allocate staff time more efficiently, but recognition by the project staff that they were subject to exploitation and manipulation by their clients also played a part. What began as a limited advisory role spiralled into a much more time-consuming, and ultimately frustrating, set of responsibilities for PFP. The future of the garage, it seems clear, directly depends on the success of the Wanga sugarcane harvests. In the short run, the draining of funds to support these agricultural enterprises has been detrimental to management of the garage. Yet in the long run, high cash returns from the sale of sugarcane may be reinvested in the garage and facilitate its expansion. Whether the owners will pursue such a course remains to be seen.

CASE #3: A MULTI-FACETED ENTERPRISE: RETAIL SHOP,
BAR, AND MAIZE-TRADING

This case study deals with the activities of two brothers, Sam and Philip, who are partners in a complex enterprise. Starting with a retail shop, they branched out, opening a bar and engaging actively in maize trading. All these ventures are based near their homes at a market I call Punda, about 15 miles from Kakamega. Most of the activities of the two brothers predate their association with PFP, which began in mid-1971. Nonetheless, they have had a fairly close relationship with the project staff since that time, and were able to repay the loan granted to them by WKPI when it became due.

In 1962, Philip and Sam built the cement-block shop where their retail shop and maize storeroom are now located. They rented the building out until 1968, when Sam's wife Anna began operating the retail shop. Philip, who had been working in Nairobi, later became an active partner in the shop and in 1972 was spending most of his time there.

The retail shop, named "Punda Traders," is the core of the brothers' operation. Anna opens the shop every morning except Sunday at about 8:30. Philip may relieve her for short periods during the day, but she can usually be found behind the counter until sunset. The store carries soap, matches, tea and the general items available in most such shops in the small market centers of Western Province. Most of the stock is obtained from wholesalers' vans that visit Punda market once or twice a month. A bakery van from Kakamega town stops in the market three times a week, and Anna usually buys about ten loaves of bread at wholesale prices.

Sam and Philip often cite the heavy competition they face as one of their greatest problems. There are nine other retail shops of the same type at Punda. Four of the competitors are young Kikuyu shopkeepers who have moved into Punda in the past three years and are renting shop space there. Three of the four shops are better stocked than "Punda Traders" and carry fairly large selections of ready-made cotton shirts and dresses.

A second problem is variability in monthly turnover. The incomes of most customers are dependent on the sales of agricultural crops, mainly maize and sugarcane, and to a lesser extent on money sent home by labor migrants working outside the sub-location. Table 6 shows the fluctuation in net monthly sales for the "Punda Traders" between July, 1971 and June, 1972. These figures, from Sam's cash book, show a sharp increase in the last months of 1971, after the maize harvest, and a gradual falling off in the first six months of 1972. Customers' purchasing power, these figures suggest, drops off during certain months of the year, and Sam and Philip suffer accordingly.

This has encouraged Sam and Philip to devote increasing attention to maize trading. The brothers received a license from the Maize and Produce Board in 1969, entitling them to buy maize from local farmers at a fixed price and to receive a commission for each 90-kilogram bag they deliver to the board. The nearest Maize and Produce Board depot is at Broderick Falls, about 22 miles north of Punda. Sam and Philip have no truck, and usually arrange with a Somali transporter in Kakamega town to carry 80-bag shipments to the depot in his lorry. The board's depots are open for only three months following the maize harvest, generally from October to December.

TABLE 6:

Net monthly turnover for "Punda Traders," July, 1971 - June, 1972

(1971)	<u>Ksh.</u>	(1972)	<u>Ksh.</u>
JULY	1,779/35	JANUARY	4,339/30
AUGUST(*)	7,255/10	FEBRUARY	3,465/65
SEPTEMBER	3,389/85	MARCH	2,514/20
OCTOBER	2,814/15	APRIL	3,462/95
NOVEMBER	4,245/65	MAY	2,971/95
DECEMBER	5,045/95	JUNE	1,869/60

- (*) In August, 1971, Sam and Philip received a loan of Ksh. 10,000 from Partnership for Productivity. The circumstances under which they got the loan are discussed below. Sam explained that "business was very good" immediately after they obtained the loan, and that he and Philip had stocked the shop with items they had never carried before. Some farmers harvested their maize early, in August of 1971, and this may account for part of the increase in business at that time.

The rates fixed by the Maize and Produce Board allow the licensed trader only a modest commission of Ksh. 1/15 (\$0.16) per bag. It is therefore important for a trader seeking sizeable profits to buy as much maize as he can and arrange for its prompt delivery to the board. Most small farmers insist on being paid when they bring their maize to the trader's storeroom. If a trader cannot assemble 80 bags quickly and arrange for delivery to the board's depot, he will tie up much of his operating capital. Rapid turnover, which permits an uninterrupted flow of cash from one transaction to the next, tends to eliminate this difficulty, but the critical problem for most traders is to mobilize sufficient cash at the start of the harvest to secure a large volume of business.

Due to a cash shortage during the 1970 harvest, Sam and Philip arranged for only nine deliveries (about 720 bags) to the Maize and Produce Board depot at Broderick Falls. Profits on the transaction were limited because the brothers had to pay one employee, Ajabu, to help Anna pack the maize, and had to pay "tea money" (bribes essentially) to insure that the maize was unloaded at the depot. The timely distribution of a few shillings for chai (Kiswahili for "tea") is an accepted means of getting routine jobs done without undue delay in many areas of East Africa. The practice is certainly not restricted to the maize industry, although the system there is tailor-made for those who "thirsty." There are four points in the maize delivery process where chai may have to be paid:

(1) In the early weeks of the harvest, as many as 30 or 40 lorries may be lined up outside the depot and a busy transporter may insist on paying a small bribe in order to gain a place near the head of the line.

(2) When moisture content is checked, a shilling or two may help convince an inspector that the maize is fully dried (otherwise he may reject the whole lot).

(3) The produce inspector who checks the age of the maize and tests it for insects may also require some persuasion.

(4) The unloaders may also ask for chai before they take the bags off a lorry.

Sam and Philip made two important decisions in the wake of their disappointing experience in the 1970 harvest. First, they decided to switch deliveries to another depot at Butere, about 37 miles west of Punda. Sam and Philip knew they would have to pay some chai at Butere, but tea money ranged between Ksh. five to ten per shipment at the new depot instead of the Ksh. 30 required at Broderick Falls.

The second decision was to apply for a loan to finance expansion of their maize-trading operations. With a large supply of cash at the start of the harvest, they could buy more maize and make more frequent deliveries.

After obtaining a loan of Ksh. 10,000 from PFP in August, 1971, Sam and Philip did manage to increase their maize deliveries. They made 18 deliveries to Butere in the last two months of 1971, as opposed to only nine in the previous year. The smaller chai payments actually meant that the brothers' net profit more than doubled.

Sam and Philip approached PFP after an unsuccessful attempt to borrow from a local bank. "We didn't know what PFP was, at first," Philip later said. "We heard the name from Friends in the East Africa Yearly Meeting (EAYM). They said it was a new project to help Africans with business. Later we heard that they were giving out loans and we became eager to know more about it."

The two partners used their EAYM contacts to approach PFP; they did not visit the project office until after two members of the council/board had suggested their names to the staff. WKPI loaned the brothers Ksh. 10,000 at 11 per cent interest, with the final installment due in December, 1972. The partners were given a three-month grace period at the beginning (September-December, 1971) in which no payments were required.

The handling of this particular application is not a typical PFP/WKPI method of evaluating loan requests. Sam and Philip are both active members of the EAYM, and this served them well. Information flowed through this network regarding PFP activities and the plans of the project staff to make loans available to small enterprises in Western Province.* The close identification of PFP with the Yearly Meeting (notwithstanding the avowedly nonsectarian conduct of the project's operations) legitimized the request made by the two board members who represented Sam and Philip.

The brothers' three ventures -- the bar, the retail shop and the maize-trading business -- are linked together in specific ways. The retail shop is the core, and its respectability is unchallenged. The bar, located in the adjoining building, sells beer and soda and has been a steady money-earner since it opened in July, 1971. But since EAYM members are not supposed to drink liquor, the operation of a bar in an area with a large following of Friends invites possible disapproval from church elders. Several Friends drink publicly at the bar, however, and the enterprise does not appear to have complicated the partners' relations with other EAYM members. Sam and Philip built the bar (at a cost of Ksh. 16,000) with profits from the retail shop and the maize trade, and with money Sam had saved from his salary when he had been a teacher. The close association between the bar and the other

* Not all of this information was accurate, however. The general manager of PFP complained that many would-be loanees had approached him, claiming they had been told all members of the EAYM were automatically eligible for loans. Many apparently assumed that PFP's loan fund was much larger than the Ksh. 125,000 that was allocated in 1971.

two enterprises has permitted capital to flow from one business to the other. Sam and Philip recently formulated a plan to reinvest profits from the bar in the retail shop, and even more intensively in the maize business.

The maize operation is the riskiest of all three businesses. The short season set by the Maize and Produce Board, and the diminution of profits caused by chai payments, tend to increase incentives for doing "private" business. Private transactions involve different risks than official maize trading, but potential profits are substantially higher. Sam and Philip recently began to trade maize unofficially in informal "black market" transactions.

The mainspring of the informal private trade is the timing of maize harvests in different areas. Maize ripens more slowly in the cooler climate of the Nandi plateau above the escarpment than in most parts of Kakamega District. Punda farmers harvest their crop in September and October. Many of their counterparts in Nandi must wait until December or January to complete their harvest. Thus when maize is being sold below the escarpment, the open market price rises in Nandi. Early in the year, when Nandi farmers have surplus maize available, the price in Punda and surrounding areas starts to rise as food supplies from the last harvest gradually diminish.

The open market price, arrived at through a bargaining process between buyer and seller, varies over a range of about Ksh. 10 per bag, whereas the official price set by the Maize and Produce Board does not vary at all in any given year.

In the densely populated areas of Vihiga Division, in the southern part of Kakamega District, many farmers plant two maize crops a year, harvesting the first in late July and the second (if sufficient rains fall in September and October) at the end of the year. But maize production in the area is insufficient to meet subsistence needs in the period between harvests. Consequently, in the months immediately preceding the harvests, maize is imported into the area, commanding a high price on the open market.

The demand for maize in Vihiga provided an incentive for Sam and Philip to move into private trading. Beginning cautiously in 1971, they explored the possibilities of acting as middlemen, buying maize cheaply from traders at Punda and transporting it to Vihiga, where it could be sold at a much higher price. In their private maize trading, the brothers relied heavily on Anna, Sam's wife, and an employee, Ajabu, a master of bargaining and discreet negotiations. Sam and Philip were careful not to involve themselves too visibly in this off-season trade.

Anna is a knowledgeable judge of the quality of maize. She buys maize from Punda farmers during the official season, and bargains with the traders who bring maize down from Nandi between March and July. The shop also serves as an information center: a visitor can find out from Anna which traders have brought maize down in the past day or two, and who has just left on a trip up the escarpment.

To transport maize between Punda and Vihiga, Anna and Ajabu have an agreement with Kuria, a Kikuyu trader at Lubao market who owns a Datsun pickup. The vehicle can carry ten bags at a time. Kuria charges Ksh. 40, or four shillings a bag, for the 30-mile haul to Vihiga.

According to Anna and Ajabu, Kuria's status as an outsider (being a Kikuyu in an Abaluhya area) works to their advantage. They explained that many of the traffic policemen stationed along the main Kakamega-Kisumu road are Kikuyu, and that Kuria is well known to them. Although the police frequently stop commercial vehicles, especially small pickups, to check their loads, Kuria had never been stopped as of August, 1972. It is illegal to transport maize for sale across a provincial boundary. The same applies to the movement of more than ten bags by road within a province, unless the shipment is destined for a Maize and Produce Board depot. Loads of ten bags or less are permissible, provided the maize is intended for consumption and not for sale. These restrictions are not uniformly enforced, but they do add an element of risk to private trading.

Arrangements for the sale of the maize in Vihiga depend on several links which Ajabu selectively exploits with persons from his own universe of kin. During the time I was in the field, Ajabu put these and other links to instrumental use, each time with a specific goal in mind. Elijah, who is Ajabu's father-in-law, runs a small lumber shop, and when Kuria's Datsun arrives, Ajabu stores the ten bags of maize in the rear of this building. The store-room has a capacity of about 20 bags. If the delivery is made late in the day, Ajabu may leave the maize there and ride back with Kuria, returning the next day to find buyers.

Ajabu's search for customers, on the day I observed it, was deceptively casual. He proceeded on a slow circuit of the market, greeting perhaps a dozen people by name. He spent about 15 minutes inside the barbed-wire enclosure where more than 100 petty traders, mainly women, had gathered to sell millet, maize, vegetables, secondhand clothing, and other items. Then he walked slowly back towards Elijah's shop, stopping to greet the two askari (guards) who were watching the gate to the enclosure. "People see me and they know why I am here," Ajabu explained. "They know where to come if they want to buy some maize."

Ajabu and the askari have devised a simple system which works to the advantage of both. They are supposed to collect a fee of Ksh. 3/60 for every bag of maize sold at the market. Instead, Ajabu gives them half a shilling each as chai every time he sells a bag, and the coins go directly into their pockets. Since they issue no receipts for these small favors, they have a useful supplement to their salaries from the County Council.

For Ajabu, the savings of Ksh. 2/60 on every bag sold assumes increasingly greater importance as the bargaining price for maize in Vihiga begins to fall off from its peak, with the onset of the July harvest.

Ajabu is linked with two women, Mariamu and her daughter Rheba, through his mother, who was a member of their clan and originally came from Vihiga. On the day I accompanied him there, Mariamu and Rheba came into Elijah's shop and bargained with Ajabu for a bag of maize. They immediately complained that Ksh. 45 was too high a price, and that in any case, none of the five bags he had was full. This seemed to be a standard negotiating tactic, for after about 25 minutes they picked out one of the bags and said they would buy it, but only if Ajabu filled it up all the way. He added two small basketfuls of maize, sewed the top of the bag up again with twine and a long needle, and accepted one five-and two 20-shilling notes from Mariamu, closing the deal.

The two women are regular customers who buy one or two bags a week from him during the months of May to July. Generally they do not consume the maize, but transport it to Kisumu, 17 miles away, on top of a public bus. With a price of Ksh. 60 or more in the open-air market there, they are able to make a net profit of Ksh. 5 or more per bag, depending on how much they must pay Ajabu for the "Rift Valley maize" he brings from Punda.

A provincial boundary intervenes between Vihiga and Kisumu, and it is against the law, in theory, to transport maize across it to sell. Mariamu and a number of other women circumvent this by dividing the maize into half-loaded bags. If the bus should be stopped by the police, they can then claim vociferously that they are only taking maize "to hungry relatives" in Kisumu. It is my impression that the aggregate amount of maize moved across the Western-Nyanza provincial boundary on the tops of buses is considerable. Certainly the price level of Ksh. 60 (and sometimes higher) in open market bargaining at Kisumu serves as an enticement to enterprising petty traders such as Mariamu and her daughter.

In conclusion, several points about Sam's and Philip's activities merit emphasis. First, their simultaneous involvement in several types of commercial ventures takes a discernible pattern. They built up the three commercial ventures, beginning with the retail shop and then adding on the licensed maize-trading operation, and more recently, the bar. The main limitations facing each of these are fixed price schedules and minimal profit margins. Licensed maize trading appears at first to offer substantial gain where large volume sales can be arranged, but the need for large amounts of capital, the variability of harvests due to erratic seasonal rainfall, and the erosion of profits through chai payments create major constraints.

The three conventional enterprises are not merely elaborate covers for the partners' private maize transactions. Private deals permit expansion of maize-trading operations when the avenues for extending conventional transactions are partially blocked. The two partners seemed determined to expand their private maize sales further in the near future, if possible by obtaining a vehicle of their own. To do so would almost certainly require getting a new loan (the 1971 loan from PFP has now been repaid). But the brothers would not be able to obtain the loan on the basis of their plans to expand their private maize trading operations; instead they would have to demonstrate the potential utility of a van for their retail shop.

Their conventional enterprises are necessary to attract new loan capital, which in turn may be used to build up private ventures. But income from private trading may be reinvested to stock the retail shop or possibly to enlarge the bar. Sam and Philip have arranged their enterprises to ensure flexibility and permit circulation of capital among them. Each enterprise sustains the others and each business' capacity for growth is related to the success of another business in the chain.

The partners are deliberately discreet about their private maize trading. Their reliance on Ajabu suggests that they do not wish to make themselves vulnerable to the risks involved.

Finally, the fact that Sam and Philip have maintained a successful partnership is itself worthy of comment. In numerous cases, including one at Punda itself, partnerships begun by brothers or close kin had dissolved amidst bitter mutual accusations. Persons raised in the same household or compound may begin a joint venture on the basis of familiarity, shared experience and trust, but these factors alone are not sufficient to hold a partnership together.

Sam and Philip may work well as partners because each brings something different to the arrangement. Sam cultivates contacts with other teachers and with political leaders in Kakamega town, 15 miles away, whereas Philip tends to mix more frequently with members of the local Friends' Meeting and with the owners of small farms around Punda. Although their respective networks of association are not entirely discreet, each partner mobilizes different kinds of support for the enterprise. Neither partner has thus far developed economic interests outside the enterprise that might place him in direct competition with the other for the control of its profits. And Sam and Philip do not vie with one another for increased social status within the same spheres. The partnership does not work "because they are brothers" but because different kinds of relationships in the enterprise have served the interests of both men, without generating discernible tensions between them.

PART IV.

Summary and Conclusion

The research on which this report is based was not intended to generate a comprehensive "evaluation" of Partnership for Productivity. Neither, in its present form, does the report resemble an anthropological monograph, although the methods and concepts I employed were drawn from the literature of social anthropology. Brief reference to certain theoretical trends in anthropological studies of social change will indicate the framework in which the study was conceived.

Because the role of the entrepreneur as innovator and pacesetter is significant in the process of social and economic change, numerous scholars have studied the phenomenon of entrepreneurship.[3] Of these, Fredrik Barth has provided perhaps the clearest basis for examining the concept of entrepreneurial behavior as an operation and analyzing its consequences. Barth has noted that profit may take diverse forms, and is not restricted to monetary gain alone. Power, rank, experience and skills may accrue to the successful entrepreneur, and these may be converted into other kinds of resources. The following criteria are applicable to conditions in Western Kenya, and are largely derived from Barth's essay on entrepreneurship in Northern Norway (1963):

(a) The entrepreneur perceives an unsatisfied demand for goods or services and attempts to meet it.

(b) He seeks information on price differentials in separate economic spheres and seeks to profit from them.

(c) His efforts are to some extent innovative and speculative, and he exposes himself and his investment to risk.

(d) He continually seeks to maximize his profit and expand his enterprise.

A definition of this type provides a basis for categorizing various clients who deal with an organization such as PFP. Although the staff of the project have tended to employ the term "entrepreneur" to describe all Kenyan businessmen in Western Province, a large proportion of the small businesses in the Kakamega area require few of the qualities listed above. Systematic consideration of these qualities, however, can provide a means for identifying existing enterprises that may respond positively to innovative suggestions by the PFP staff.

On the other hand, defining entrepreneurial qualities is of no help in determining which persons, say among a group of secondary school students, are likely to attempt new entrepreneurial ventures. The criteria specify

performance, rather than reveal motivation, and the latter is of particular importance to an organization such as PFP which seeks to promote new enterprises.

The identification of different kinds of ties between individuals, including those of kinship and "personal network," is naturally of interest to the theoretically inclined anthropologist, but this is also of potential relevance to the work of development personnel such as the members of the PFP staff. The real importance of examining interpersonal ties, especially those of kinship, lies in enabling PFP personnel to anticipate certain difficulties and if possible avoid them.

In Cases 1 and 2, clients sought to exploit their own connections with the project and to manipulate these relationships to advance their own ends. Frank and William each tried to capitalize on close personal contact with PFP staff and to draw on this contact as a resource in their respective struggles with other partners. Recently, the staff has shown signs of becoming sensitive about manipulation. The following statement is quoted from the section dealing with Siafu Market in a recent PFP progress report. "Although we are continuing to work closely with the traders' committee and plan to continue our relationship with them in the future, it is important that PFP/WKPI does not become too closely involved with a single group within the market. Attempts are now being made to broaden our contacts outside of the committee."

It has become an anthropological commonplace that "strangers" or outsiders are more likely to succeed in certain kinds of enterprise than their locally based competitors. Outsiders are not subject to the claims of kin, and neighbors who demand generous credit terms or ask for special favors. As a result, they can recruit a clientele on the basis of precise contractual arrangements. In addition, whatever profits accrue to the enterprise are theirs alone; these may be remitted to the strangers' home areas where they are reinvested in land or other property. In contrast, locally based entrepreneurs frequently are unable to protect their assets from grasping kinsmen, who may regard all cash as divisible profits, especially when these kinsmen have contributed to the capital formation of the enterprise.

In Kenya's Western Province, it is useful to distinguish between two categories of strangers engaged in small enterprises: Abaluhya operating away from their traditional home, and members of other tribal groups, particularly Kikuyu. The pattern for many of the more successful Abaluhya businessmen has involved relocation of their enterprises in Kakamega town. A large bakery, for example, which originally began in a trading center in Idakho Location, now stands in the industrial area of the town, and its owner resides in a newly built cement-block house nearby. Such moves put distance between the enterprise and one's kinsmen at home; this could explain a decision to relocate.

By virtue of its status as a municipality and as the administrative center for the province, Kakamega town has grown considerably in recent years and now has a population in excess of 8,000. Representation of all the Abaluhya "sub-tribes" in the town has lent it a somewhat cosmopolitan air. Many Abaluhya claim that the town's Kikuyu retailers own a lot of property in other parts of Kenya, especially Central Province. They are reputed to make huge profits running shops in Western Province, and to send all of these earnings to their relatives at home. Many Kikuyu operating retail shops are recent arrivals, and as a consequence are highly visible in their ascriptive status as strangers. Their numbers are increasing, and they now constitute a sizeable minority in Western Kenya. The 1969 Kenya Census listed 4,630 Kikuyu residents in Kakamega District and a total of 10,945 in the province as a whole.

Data collected in the course of interviews and frequent informal contacts with 11 Kikuyu retail traders at Siafu and Punda markets suggest that the common stereotype is exaggerated. Only two of the 11 men owned any land at all, and the amounts were two and one-half acres. However, such categorization, regardless of the facts, is one of the liabilities of the stranger's position, and these Kikuyu businessmen cannot escape it.

This problem is of potential concern to PFP, since the project is committed to aiding clients regardless of religious, ethnic or tribal affiliation. As of August, 1972 only two Kikuyu businessmen had contacted PFP. Both were shopkeepers at Siafu, and it did not appear likely that either of these relationships would grow into a major PFP advisory commitment. Although several Kikuyu traders and mechanics are active in Kakamega town, none had approached PFP during its first 18 months. The project's close identification with Abaluhya leaders, and particularly with the East Africa Yearly Meeting of Friends, may have discouraged such approaches. Inadvertently, PFP appears to be insulated from those considered outsiders in the Western Province context. The initiative for remedying this situation must come from the project staff because, under present circumstances, small businessmen who are not Abaluhya are unlikely to make the first move.

For many aspiring entrepreneurs, a business venture is not an end in itself, but a means of acquiring long-term security in the form of fixed property. Instead of reinvesting profits in their enterprises, many businessmen divert these profits into other types of economic activity. In some cases, a shop may be closed for several hours of the day, or even for several days at a time, while the owner attends to other business. While frustrating to a technical advisor, the fact is that the economic circumstances confronting a shopkeeper, posho miller or tailor may compel him to conduct business in this manner. The potential net income from small enterprises often does not exceed Ksh. 100 or 200 per month. By itself, this may not be enough to maintain the owner's household. Almost invariably, business owners also depend on the produce of their family's agricultural land. Subsistence and cash crops are not merely a supplement to business income, but in many cases the family mainstay.

The vulnerability of cash to claims lodged by family members, friends and creditors tends to affect entrepreneurial strategies in Western Province 2 whereas land can be much better protected from such claims. Many men express an interest in purchasing land as soon as funds become available from their businesses. Data from 84 interviews at Siafu and Punda revealed that every landless businessman in the two centers intended to buy land the first possible opportunity.

Buildings, particularly houses, within Kakamega town, have recently emerged as another attractive possibility for long-term investment free from the demands of kin groups. The construction of even one house ties down large amounts of capital, but this enables the owner to justify renting the premises rather than allowing relatives to live there free.

The housing business is made further attractive by the influx in the past few years of civil servants and expatriate personnel to Kakamega. One man even arranged to rent his still unfinished house to PFP for use by a staff member and his family. PFP financed part of the cost of completion in exchange for a rent reduction. Recognizing the advantages of real estate ownership, several other PFP clients have erected modern houses in the town, including William, whose plans are described in Case 2. As of mid-1972, at least three other PFP clients were inquiring about the possibility of obtaining loans to undertake similar ventures.

To sum up, the primary goal of potential entrepreneurs in the rural Kenyan economy is to establish a secure economic base. In Western Province, this base is most often found in the ownership of land, or in some instances, for men who have relocated to town, in the ownership of buildings. Where PFP is engaged in short- and long-term planning discussions with its clients, this factor must be considered.

Three remaining questions provide a focus for future research. First, this report has found no ready solution to the problem of predicting which individuals are likely to become entrepreneurs. In a sense, this problem is at the core of PFP's work, for the project is designed "to stimulate undeveloped human potential." One technique for identifying highly motivated individuals in certain settings involves the use of psychological tests. But the predictive value of such tests must be assessed empirically in each setting where they are applied. Many anthropologists continue to view such testing with skepticism, arguing that so many subtle biases are built into them that the results are likely to be unreliable.

As a social anthropologist, my inclination is to attempt, despite the enormity of the task, to develop another type of predictive model. Familiarity with a single community over an extended period, probably a minimum of nine to 12 months, would permit a researcher to construct a profile documenting links between individuals and institutions although the amount of time required raises serious questions for a small project like PFP. In addition, the power of situational analysis and related techniques has been amply demonstrated in interpreting and "retrodicting" (theoretical prediction validated in subsequent behavior) prior events, but in rural African economic systems, none of the social sciences can yet demonstrate an impressive record of "second-guessing." To

further complicate matters, social anthropologists have yet to master the task of assigning relative weights to different kin and network relationships--a task essential to predicting behavior.

A second consideration for further research involves the impact of PFP's activities on income levels in Western Province. By promoting small enterprise, does PFP help to raise income levels across the board, and thus improve conditions at the so-called grass-roots? Or, does PFP strengthen the position of a small number of relatively wealthy and enterprising individuals, while the peasant farmers and labor migrants who make up the majority of the population remain unaffected? The either-or phrasing here is intentionally over-simplified, with a view to singling out a major theme for empirical investigation. The problem necessarily can only be tackled over a fairly long period, possibly three to five years. The routinization of PFP's activities, beginning early in 1972, and the greater emphasis on setting targets and ensuring comparability of service to clients, should provide a basis for studying this difficult question.

Finally, the likelihood that PFP affiliates, or perhaps branches, will be established in other areas of Africa raises many new questions. A PFP-like project in Botswana would have to adjust to ranching and stock-rearing, rather than cash-crop farming. Operations in a much less densely populated rural area, such as one of the districts adjoining Kenya's Indian Ocean coast, would meet different problems than those encountered in the Kakamega area. Careful prior examination would seem to be essential first steps in the establishment of PFP affiliates in new areas. The former general manager of the PFP/Kenya project is currently undertaking a study of this nature in Liberia. The inherent flexibility of the PFP concept is evident in the diverse political and ideological postures of the four African nations--Tanzania, Liberia, Botswana and Malawi--that have expressed interest in replicating the project, and the concept appears to have a promising future in sub-Saharan Africa.

Notes

1. David Scull, George Butler and Renault Beakbane of Partnership for Productivity made every effort to discuss the project's goals and operations with me, and offered invaluable assistance throughout the research period and during the preparation of this report. The Provincial Commissioner for Western Province, Mr. Boit, the District Commissioner, Mr. Okech, and the District Officer, Mr. J. Tiampati, have all taken an interest in PFP and their cooperation is gratefully acknowledged. The Provincial Trade Officer, Mr. Shem Obondi, and Mr. Moses Lihemo of the Rural Industrial Development Center, Kakamega, were also most helpful. Mr. Peter Marris of the Institute of Community Studies, London, and Mr. Anthony Somerset of the Institute for Development Studies, University of Nairobi, offered instructive advice based on their own research experience on entrepreneurship in Kenya. Dr. Edward Fei and Mr. Clinton Doggett of USAID, and Peter and Joyce Moock of Teachers College, Columbia, were of great assistance in arranging the study. My teachers at Columbia, especially William Dalton, Lambros Comitas and Joan Vincent, have done much by their encouragement and criticism to make this first fieldwork experience a valuable one. My greatest obligation is to the many Kenyans who patiently answered my numerous questions and who confirmed my expectations that the study would be rich in human interest.
2. Marris and Somerset (1971) have argued that the seriousness of the problem of capital shortages has been overestimated. Using questionnaire responses, they cite life histories of successful African entrepreneurs which reveal a pattern of high achievement and expansion from a negligible initial capital base. My own findings tend to support Marris and Somerset's conclusion. The case studies in Part III of this report document situations where capital scarcity per se is subsidiary to other problems of a sociological nature.
3. Among the more significant writings are: Barth 1963 and 1966; Belshaw 1955; Geertz 1963; Hagen 1962; Kilby 1971; Long 1968; McClelland 1961; Schumpeter 1942; Weber 1930 and 1947. Marris and Somerset's (1971) study of Kenyan businessmen was especially helpful to me in developing a framework for this research and has provided a useful body of data for comparison.

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ABSTRACT

In this report on the Tutume Community College, an experimental secondary school in Botswana, James R. Sheffield picks up this volume's overall theme--connecting development programs to the needs and expectations of rural Africans. In his study, Sheffield suggests a variety of extension programs that could help the Tutume school make itself a more integral part of its surrounding community, a task that Sheffield sees as vital since the Tutume school is a major institution in a remote area of a mostly rural country. Despite the poverty and general resignation of people in the local community, Sheffield discovered that there are several local institutions that represent viable partners for Tutume's extension work, particularly the churches, primary schools and women's clubs.

TUTUME COMMUNITY COLLEGE

A RURAL SCHOOL AND ITS ROLE IN COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

A Case Study of Tutume Community College, Botswana

by

James R. Sheffield

Background

Tutume Community College (TCC) consists of a secondary school, a builder's brigade and an extension division responsible for adult education. Since it was taken over by the Botswana Government in 1971, TCC has concentrated primarily on developing the secondary school; the brigade has been building the physical plant of the school. A health center and mobile health unit, which were part of the original project, have used TCC's water, electricity and other facilities, although they are now under the jurisdiction of the Central District Council.

The African-American Institute, with a generous grant from the McConnell Foundation, has assisted with the capital costs of TCC and has been represented on the Tutume Board of Governors. The AAI supports the Ministry of Education's plan to maintain and extend TCC's role in serving the community needs. This report, done on behalf of the African-American Institute, suggests possible extension programs that TCC may develop and explores the implications of such developments.

The writer was fortunate in having an escort/interpreter who was a respected local resident, fluent in Kalanga and known and trusted by the local leadership. He was very effective in setting up interviews with 35 persons in the Tutume area. These meetings took place on farms, under trees, in stores or in people's homes. In a remote rural area with a rather hierarchical society, most people were unable to suggest specific ways in which the College could better serve the community. When asked what they felt needed to be done, many respondents noted that such matters were none of their business; several local leaders mentioned projects they probably knew were not feasible. A number of persons, for example, minimized the usefulness of hand pumps or health clinics and called for Government to provide expensive boreholes and a hospital. Such comments may have been prompted by the feeling that development in the Bokalanga area was not proceeding as rapidly as in other parts of Botswana and perhaps by the hope that this report would bring forth dramatic new infusions of outside aid.

The observations in this report were based on just three days of interviews in the Tutume area and on several meetings with Ministry and University officials in Gaborone, Botswana's capital. The writer also drew heavily upon a recent paper on Tutume by Ross Kidd, resident director of the Division of Extra Mural Services of the University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (UBLS) in Francistown, and upon various other materials provided by the TCC staff. Because a great deal of thought has been given to the question of school-community relations and extension programs in Botswana, and the College was awaiting the arrival of a vice-principal for extension and an adult educator on the staff fairly soon, observations and suggestions in this report were not intended to conflict with present plans or to second-guess those responsible for developing programs.

The Tutume Area

Tutume is the name given to six small villages in a Kalanga-speaking rural area in Northern Botswana. From Sebina in the south (on the Francistown-Maun road) to Maintengwe in the north is a distance of some 65 miles, and the total population of the six villages is about 8,000 people. Because houses tend to be scattered throughout the area, and people spend much of the year at the "lands" or "cattle posts" (agricultural and ranching areas up to 16 miles away from the villages), primary schools and small shops are practically the only evidence of village life. Livestock forms the basis of economic activity, with the collection and sale of the edible phane worms. (Pronounced pa-ney, the worms are caterpillar-like in appearance. They are eviscerated, dried in the sun and eventually eaten like popcorn.) As in other poor, rural areas many men work outside the district in mining or other wage employment.

Because of its central position in the Bokalanga, Tutume has become a sub-district headquarters for some Government departments, specifically agriculture, veterinary and community development. There is also a post office and police post at Tutume. Although Tutume looks to Francistown, capital of the North-East District, for practically all its supplies, the area lies within the Central District. Because Tutume has no telephone service and the road is very poor, communications with the Central District Council (CDC) are difficult and present a serious problem to development of the area. In recognition of this difficulty, the Ministry of Agriculture covers the Bokalanga area through its office in Francistown; it has been suggested that other ministries do the same.

In addition to their geographical isolation from the district capital, the Kalanga people are conscious of their ethnic differences from the country's Setswana majority and frequently express their belief that the Government is not doing enough for the area. It was partly in recognition of such feelings in the Bokalanga that the Government took over Tutume Community College.

Local Leadership

Each of the six villages that make up the Tutume area has a Village Development Committee (VDC) consisting of a headman (usually a traditional leader) and other popularly elected members. VDCs are expected to identify community needs and to decide upon appropriate steps to achieve them. Building, equipping and staffing primary schools is the most frequently expressed need. The division of responsibility between local VDCs, the Tutume Central VDC, the Central District Council and the Central Government is rarely fully understood.

As in other developing countries, the transition from traditional to modern institutions is fraught with uncertainties and these are reflected in the role of the headman in the Bokalanga. Except for the senior headman, who is paid by government, headmen lack a clear status or authority within the modern bureaucratic system. They have also lost much of their traditional authority. Headmen still convene Kgotla meetings in which various matters of local concern are publicly aired, and they play a role in settling certain disputes, but these functions are more traditional than developmental.

The more important local body concerned with the area's development is the Central VDC, composed of representatives of the six local VDCs. The two principal projects of the Central VDC have been badly bogged down in communications difficulties between the VDC and Central District Council. Several years ago when the father of an American volunteer who was killed at Tutume wanted to contribute something to the community, the Central VDC decided on a Community Center. The money was to be used to buy materials; the community was to provide the labor. Acting on the assumption (no plans were ever drawn up) that the money (about \$1,350) was not enough, the chairman of the Central VDC wrote to the Central District Council in Serowe requesting additional funds. After two years there had been no response, although there was some disagreement over whether this is because the CDC never received the request or because community centers are not considered priority items by the CDC.

The other project that has been greatly delayed by lack of coordination between the Central VDC and the CDC is construction of the health dispensary, which is to be located across the road from the TCC campus. The CDC was responsible for providing a truck and some materials while the community, through the Central VDC, was responsible for providing labor and getting sand for bricks. Because there is no telephone link with Tutume, communication with Serowe is slow at best. Apparently there have been times when the villagers were ready to work on the dispensary but the truck was not there, and on other occasions, when the truck arrived from Serowe, most of the villagers were away at the lands. These problems not only prevent specific projects from being completed, but they make future cooperation between the community, the VDC, the CDC and the Central Government that much more difficult.

Despite the poverty and general resignation of the people, there are a number of other local institutions with which TCC (and other Government programs) might work. Although information as to their number and size was not available, the most viable local institutions appear to be churches, primary schools (especially their PTAs) and women's clubs. Many persons interviewed were active in two or more such organizations and served on VDCs as well. Although the roles of these institutions have been limited to date, their leadership and their membership networks clearly represent important avenues to be explored by the TCC extension division. The leaders of both churches and women's clubs, for example, expressed interest in the possibility of their organizations' being used in functional literacy programs.

In most of Africa, small businessmen, traders and craftsmen constitute a useful starting point around which to develop training programs. Although the chairman of the Central VDC is the area's largest shopkeeper, there is practically no trade in the Bokalanga. In such a depressed local economy, the newly established Phane Producers Association seems an excellent attempt to capitalize on one of the area's few resources albeit a somewhat unreliable resource in times of drought. A member of the TCC staff has played an important role in the phane producers group and in a proposed buyers cooperative.

A Community School

If the Tutume Community College is to serve the Bokalanga area, it will have to work closely with the institutions described above and with other Government departments in the area. Despite the considerable rhetoric addressed to the problems of education and community development, few programs are effectively integrated with community institutions. The reasons for this are numerous and complex, and simplistic attempts to assign blame to the overly academic curriculum of the school or the white-collar aspirations of students fall wide of the mark. Several factors are important: because of the incentive structure in most other developing countries (high wages in the urban sector), parents and students inevitably try to use schools--even agricultural and technical schools--as a means of escaping rural poverty and attaining wage employment. Furthermore, although the problems of development cut across whatever lines bureaucracies create, the institutions and programs created to deal with these problems are inevitably administered by a number of separate departments.

Simply put, schools cannot accomplish everything, and if they try to achieve more than they are able to, both they and the communities they serve may suffer. This is not to imply that schools should remain as isolated from the communities in which they are located as they have been. Both the content and structure of most schools need to be reoriented toward the rural realities that await most students instead of the university syllabus that only a tiny fraction will ever see. But schools by themselves cannot significantly redirect the aspirations and expectations of the community, and they cannot command the expertise or resources required to train an entire population in all necessary skills. For these and other reasons, schools usually limit themselves to providing academic training to a portion of the population between ages six and 16 while other government departments take the responsibility for training in other skills.

In an isolated rural community like Tutume, however, such a division of responsibility would be a tragic waste of resources. For some time, TCC will remain the largest facility in the Bokalanga area; imaginative use of its staff and physical plant can have an important impact on the area. Several warnings contained in the paper by Ross Kidd are important in this regard:

- (1) Because TCC is a powerhouse of organizational ability and initiative, it must consciously avoid destroying local leadership.
- (2) TCC staff must be patient with the slow pace of community development; if they speed the pace or take over a project it will no longer be a community effort.
- (3) TCC should work with existing institutions before creating new ones.
- (4) The college should concentrate on doing a few things well rather than trying to do too many projects at once.
- (5) The college should avoid jurisdictional conflicts with other Government departments. Specifically TCC should supplement and facilitate the work of the Agricultural Demonstrator, the Veterinary Officer, the Community Development Assistant, etc.

The suggestions outlined below are not intended to be exhaustive, nor is each suggestion meant to imply a need for a separate program. Rather, these suggestions represent an effort to develop a strategy for school-community cooperation.

1. Women:

Women in the Tutume area not only outnumber men but are mainly responsible for the health and nutrition of the family and do much of the farming at the lands. In many rural communities, women have been more receptive to change than men and are more likely to utilize newly acquired skills effectively, perhaps because the immediate problems of their families' health is involved.

Because the wives of two TCC staff members are qualified in home economics/ domestic science and dressmaking/needlework, these areas seem the most logical starting points for developing programs. Over the longer run, however, funds for established posts and properly equipped classrooms should be provided; experience has shown that many programs developed by expatriate volunteers die when the volunteers depart. Conversations with several members of the local women's club made it clear that they would welcome the opportunity to mobilize their membership for almost any kind of training. The functional literacy program currently being developed by the Division of Extra-Mural Services of the university might be extremely useful. This program integrates health, nutrition, agriculture, child care and other services.

2. Water:

The lack of water in Botswana is such a common problem that it is frequently overlooked. TCC must assist the community in the collection and storage of water. An important gesture would be for the college to place water taps at three or four places along its fence so that the community can save the walk around the perimeter of the campus to the river and back. The Water Development Department and others in Botswana have accumulated considerable expertise on the subject of water storage, pump construction and maintenance.

TCC ought to explore these issues with the appropriate persons and develop an extension program in water technology either in the form of a brigade, or as part of a broader agricultural training and extension program.

3. Agriculture and Animal Husbandry:

TCC must become more closely involved with the predominant occupations of the Bokalanga people--cattle raising and farming. Aside from making its facilities available for weekend and vacation courses, TCC might send its students out to learn and help on community projects. Such field projects would require rescheduling of some classes because the normal 40-minute period would not permit students to travel far from the campus.

As TCC and the local agricultural and veterinary staff develop coordinated programs, the college may serve as a center for experimentation. TCC might have demonstration plots for testing different drought-resistant crops, and if progress is made in the area of water technology, TCC might also play a key role in the development of fruit and vegetable farming for the areas.

4. Mechanics Brigade:*

There is currently great demand in Botswana for trained mechanics, particularly in the mining sector and in automobile repair and maintenance. Although a decision to offer brigade training in basic mechanical skills would have to be carefully coordinated with the Botswana Training Center and the Government Advisor on Technical Education, such training is badly needed. Because of the bad condition of the road through Tutume, one or more of TCC's vehicles are frequently broken and getting them repaired by the Public Works Department in Francistown is time consuming. If TCC had a small brigade capable of doing basic maintenance and simple repairs it is likely the college would get more use from its vehicles. The brigade would probably also get quite a bit of business from the lorries that supply shops in the area.

5. Phane Producers Association:

The proposed association to market the edible phane worm so as to eliminate middlemen seems an excellent scheme to capitalize on one of the Bokalanga's few resources. Unfortunately the current drought has meant that there may be no phane crop this year.

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Brigades are training programs for youth in Africa. The term was first used in connection with Ghana's builders brigades, founded by Kwame Nkrumah in the late 1950's. Brigades in Botswana, less ideological than those in Ghana, provide vocational training to school-leavers at little or no cost to the Government.

6. Community Newspaper:

Although rural newspapers have made significant contributions to community development in many areas, the low level of literacy and the lack of cohesive village life in the Bokalanga make it difficult for Focus, the TCC paper, to become a genuine community enterprise. The newspaper provides an excellent forum for students to become more involved in community affairs, but is not likely to have much impact on the community unless it can be integrated within a functional literacy program with strong links to the women's clubs, churches, etc.

7. Health Center:

Although it does not fall under the jurisdiction of TCC, the health center has been the only aspect of the college's program that has directly served the needs of the Bokalanga area during the past few years. Because of its mobile unit which travels throughout the area, the clinic has reached a broader range of the community than any other institution or program. Unfortunately, however, the health center has fallen short of its potential because its mobile unit is on the road less than half of the time. This implies that the health center needs more staff in order to spend time in the field.

8. Mobile Services:

Because of the highly scattered population in the Bokalanga area and the lack of adequate transportation, other extension programs will have to be mobile in order to reach a meaningful number of people. At least one of TCC's vehicles will need to be on the road much of the time, and the College may need another vehicle. (The need for additional transportation would in turn create further demand for mechanical skills as mentioned above.)

9. Further Program Possibilities:

The above suggestions are by no means intended to be exhaustive. I have deliberately avoided repeating many of the excellent suggestions contained in Ross Kidd's paper, but some Kidd's suggestions are listed below for consideration:

- (a) A Community Library and Resources Center for collection of materials on the Bokalanga area and for distribution of Government publications should be established.
- (b) Present courses for upgrading primary teachers should be continued and new courses added in fields such as accounting, literacy, etc.
- (c) Weekend and vacation courses for teachers and farmers, run in cooperation with the Francistown Teacher Training College and the proposed Rural Training Center, should be given.

- (d) Workshops and seminars on development aimed both at Government staff in the area and local residents, might be conducted.
- (e) Community activities for TCC students should be developed as the field or practical component of Development Studies and Agricultural Science.
- (f) As TCC develops programs, it will have to work within broader regional and national frameworks. For example, the Francistown office of the Division of Extra-Mural Services may support a newspaper for the northern region that might affect plans for the Tutume paper. Literacy projects, of course, need to be coordinated with the national program as it develops.

Conclusions

As the Tutume Community College develops its extension program, it should focus its efforts rather than dissipate its energies and raise aspirations in areas where it cannot be effective. The areas I have identified as likely starting points might be characterized as women, water and worms (with the Phane Producers Association requiring relatively little support from the College). If programs for women and for water technology are developed they will inevitably lead into the related areas of agriculture, functional literacy, mechanical training, and transport. Integration and coordination of these activities is at least as important as the separate programs themselves.

Such programs will require considerable supporting services, and the administrative and financial implications of such extension programs must be faced as soon as possible. Present local government arrangements are clearly unsatisfactory. Because it is unlikely that communications between Tutume and the Central District Council will improve in the near future, it seems highly desirable for the Bokalanga to fall under the jurisdiction of the North-East District, based in Francistown. At the very least, there should be a local education officer and a sub-district officer posted to Tutume, as well as a health office.

If the college becomes involved in water development or agricultural projects other Government departments will need to be brought in. Although TCC is fortunate to have the potential services of qualified staff wives, it would be a mistake to rely on such volunteer help over the long term. The role of highly motivated and skilled expatriates has been crucial in developing some important programs in Botswana and elsewhere, but many of these programs die out as soon as the expatriate leaves, if there has been little or no local involvement. This does not mean that programs relying on expatriate staff should not be started; in fact their availability may be essential in the early stages of program development. But provision must be made for support of local personnel (both through training and establishment of paid staff positions) for the long-term viability of the program.

In addition to staff, the extension program will also need classroom space and equipment (for home economics, for example) and the principal and vice-principal for extension may need to revise schedules to allow students to work in the community and to allow adults to use TCC facilities. In these efforts, there will be competing demands for space, vehicles, staff time and other resources and it will require considerable skill on the part of the principal and the Ministry of Education to ensure that extension programs do not slight the academic program. This will not be an easy task, but it is the challenge that has concerned those involved with Tutume since the beginning of the project.

ABSTRACT

Brigades are designed to be self-sustaining skill-training programs that cover their operating costs through their own labor. Because they are low-cost, brigades have attracted much attention from development planners in Africa and in international aid agencies. In the following study, Gardiner P. Pearson takes a look at brigades in Botswana.

Pearson's report is divided into three parts. The first part examines links between brigades and the national government, examining organization of local government, the responsibilities and interests of various ministries and departments at the national level with respect to brigades, and coordination between brigades and the government. The second part of the report looks at each brigade in Botswana and its relations with the community it serves. A third section draws conclusions and offers tentative suggestions for improved brigade effectiveness.

Pearson notes that brigades are still a small-scale program. He says that so long as demand for technical skills remains strong, brigades will continue as a viable alternative for primary-school leavers who cannot continue in secondary schools. He cautions, however, that it is too early to judge their success by any general criteria, and that brigades cannot yet be considered a solution to the school-leaver problem in Botswana. He contends that if brigades are to become more effective, they must develop more solid links with the communities that support them.

BRIGADES IN BOTSWANA

by

Gardiner P. Pearson

Introduction

Brigades in Botswana constitute a unique attempt to provide skill training outside the formal education system to primary-school leavers. Operating on the principle of "cost-covering," brigades attempt to pay their recurrent (non-capital) costs through their own labor. In theory, therefore, brigades are cheaper to run than vocational schools and provide a form of on-the-job training. In addition to receiving theoretical and practical instruction in skills, brigade trainees take "Development Studies," a course that seeks to instill awareness of the development process and the value and dignity of manual labor.

The first brigade was started in 1965 in Serowe, as an integral part of the Swaneng Hill School. Its capital was raised abroad by Patrick Van Rensburg, and the Botswana Government played no part in its founding or administration. Since that time 12 additional brigade centers have been founded throughout the country. Three were started by the Government and another one is now under Government administration.

Much has been written about brigades in the past few years and readers seeking further background on the topic are referred to the Anthony Martin report, Report on the Brigades in Botswana or Non-Formal Education in African Development by James R. Sheffield and Victor P. Diejomaoh (New York, African-American Institute, 1972). Because of the heavy involvement of expatriates during the establishment of many brigades, there has been considerable concern that brigade survival depends on volunteer staff, outside funding and freedom from governmental bureaucracy.

The purpose of this study, conducted between June 6 and August 13, 1972, was to examine relationships among the brigades, the communities in which they are located and local and national government. Some of the questions it attempts to answer are: to what extent do brigades fit into a nationally coordinated plan for an alternative to secondary education and how are brigades viewed at the various levels of government and by the people they serve. The report also attempts to identify the significant factors contributing to a brigade's accomplishments of its aims.

In compiling this report, I visited all brigade centers and spoke to many people involved with brigades as trainees, private administrators or public servants. To these individuals, who gave me their time and the benefit of their insights, I am grateful. I would particularly like to acknowledge the invaluable cooperation and assistance of James Molefhe, Permanent Secretary to the Minister of Education, Washington Meswele, Commissioner of Community Development, Mrs. H.C.L. Hermans, and Mr. Ross Kidd.

The National Brigades Coordinating Committee

Brigades in Botswana are ostensibly coordinated by the National Brigades Coordinating Committee (NBCC) in the Ministry of Education. The NBCC maintains a small staff of two or three expatriates, and is supposed to ensure that brigades undertake viable projects that do not conflict with or duplicate Government projects.

The fact that the NBCC, which deals with private brigades not subject to Government regulation, is supervised by the Ministry of Education is the basis for some friction within the NBCC. NBCC staff members occasionally resent what they regard as foot dragging and obstructionism on the part of the Government, while some Government officials have developed strong antipathies to expatriate radicals in the NBCC. And despite the Government's official support of the brigades, some individuals in the Government are not convinced of the efficacy and utility of the brigade concept.

Four Government departments and Ministries are involved in meeting national needs for vocational training and in trying to solve the primary-school leaver problem, the Ministry of Education and the Department of Community Development (CD), both of which operate brigades, the Botswana Training Center, and the Directorate of Personnel.

Community Development

CD, a department of the Ministry of Lands and Local Government, is responsible for starting brigades at Lobatsi and Lekgaba. The agency also administered brigades at Kanye until they were terminated in 1972. CD became interested in the brigade concept primarily as an antidote to what it viewed as a growing problem of juvenile delinquency. Some organization or training program, it was felt, could keep idle young men off the street and constructively employed. These young men were chiefly primary-school leavers who had failed to get into secondary school and who remained in the towns looking for work rather than go back to their parents' farms. The private brigades tend to deride this "keep them off the streets" motivation as self-serving and short-sighted. They believe brigades should teach skills vital to national development, emphasize the dignity of manual labor, and offer an alternative to academic secondary-school education.

Although it adopted some ideas of the original brigades, CD, in a fundamental change of philosophy, rejected the notion of cost-covering; that is, paying for recurrent expenses through brigade labor or production. CD claims that if a brigade is to offer effective training, it cannot spend a great deal of time working to raise funds. Such work, the agency contends, becomes repetitive and time consuming and is not instructive. As a result, CD provides subsidies to cover costs not met by the brigades themselves. Since 1971, however, CD has placed a greater emphasis on brigades covering costs within five years.

Community Development's primary function is to organize villages for self-help programs. In every village or town where a brigade is located, there is also an Assistant Community Development Officer (ACDO) or a Community Development Assistant (CDA). The Community Development chain of command extends upward from CDA at village level to the ACDO at district level to the Community Development Officers in Gaborone. ACDO and CDA form Village Development Committees to cultivate vegetable gardens, build latrines and perform other tasks designed to raise the living standards of the village. There is little cooperation between CDA and the Village Development Committee on the one hand and the brigades on the other. Brigades tend to be pre-occupied with training and gainful employment, while Development Committees are adamant that a self-help project should involve only the people of the village working on a volunteer basis. This conflict presents a philosophical obstacle to the use of brigades in village self-help projects. Nonetheless, villages or areas where brigades exist apparently have a reservoir of technical skill that could be used for community development.

The Ministry of Education

The Ministry of Education has several involvements with brigades. To begin with the ministry is the parent agency of the NBCC. In addition, it runs a formerly private brigade in Tutume in conjunction with Tutume Community College. Most importantly, the Ministry's Department of Vocational Training runs the Botswana Trade Center and is responsible for the proposed Vocational Training Center to be located in Gaborone. It is anticipated that the Center, scheduled for completion in 1974, will offer a series of courses in such skill areas as plumbing, carpentry, bricklaying, electricity, and motor mechanics. The basic objective of the Center will be to train individuals to pass the Class II Trade Test and to meet the national need for skilled workers. Because of financial limitations, the Botswana Trade Center has not trained many people since Independence in 1966. The BTC, however, does administer Class II Trade Tests for all trainees in builders and carpenters brigades. Although brigade trainees rarely pass the trade test, they have had no difficulty thus far in finding a job with mining or construction companies in Orapa, Selibe-Pikwe, Francistown or Gaborone. Aside from its testing function, the BTC has nothing to do with the brigades.

Other Departments

The Directorate of Personnel, concerned primarily with staffing the Civil Service, inaugurated the National Employment, Manpower and Incomes Council (NEMIC) in June 1972. On the Council are representatives from all branches of Government, trade unions and private industry. The Council is supposed to "make recommendations on the important issues related to national policy on incomes, prices, profits, education, vocational training and the allocation of skilled manpower in Botswana." Only recently has a national manpower study been completed, and consequently, no data base has been available for planning.

The Ministry of Works and Communications constructs roads and buildings for the Government through its Public Works Department. Public Works occasionally hires brigades to do construction work and would, according to the department, hire them more often if the quality of their output were more uniform. The relationship between PWD and the brigades is casual and haphazard. When a brigade coordinator feels the brigade needs work, he may go to Gaborone and check with the Chief Architect about the availability of contracts.

The Chief Architect maintains that using brigades on Government contracts presents several problems. Most important, he suggests, is the variation in work quality from one brigade to another and within the same brigade from one year to the next. Inadequate supervision is a constant source of difficulty for brigades particularly when they are operating away from the brigade center. Under such conditions, supervisors must often divide their time between instruction at the center and work at the construction site. In addition, Government building specifications are more exacting than standards learned by most brigades. Still, there is a great potential for the brigades in a relationship with PWD once some of these obstacles are overcome. In 1971, PWD--which has neither the manpower nor time to accomplish all its assigned tasks--subcontracted some R1,500,000 of its R1,880,000 in work assignments.

The Ministry of Agriculture is also interested in brigades, particularly farmers brigades, although these have not been notably successful. Other than being on the mailing list for agricultural extension material, however, the brigades have little contact with the Ministry of Agriculture.

Tutume

The village of Tutume, located about 50 miles north of Francistown, is one of several small villages strung out along a track that runs north through the Bokalanga area in the Northeast District. The Bokalanga, inhabited chiefly by the Kalanga people, is somewhat behind the rest of the country in economic development. The recently founded Tutume Community College contains the first secondary school in the area; the builders brigade has been integrated with this school. Both the school and the brigade are the direct responsibility of the Ministry of Education, although both began as private undertakings. As of July 1972, there were twenty-four brigade trainees, evenly divided between third and second year. No new first year trainees were taken in early 1972 due to the school's transfer from private to Government administration.

Tutume Community College is in the midst of an extensive construction program, but until August 1972 all building at the school was being done by the Public Works Department and a group from the Sashi River brigades. The Tutume brigade, which is relatively small, was not used because the College's student population had outdistanced the building program and the Ministry of Education was attempting to catch up and because the Tutume brigade was without an instructor for six months in 1971 and early 1972. In August 1972, however, the brigade began work on the matron's and master's quarters for the school.

Outside the confines of the school, the Tutume brigade is barely known. Interviews with village residents, the postmaster and the head teacher at the village primary school confirmed that the brigade has had little contact with the village in its two years of operation. The brigade has done no work in the village and since there have been no graduates, villagers are not familiar with its purpose or benefits. Trainees and instructors said parents and others who are aware of the brigade look upon it, naturally enough, as a vehicle for getting jobs for their children. Jobs are also high priorities for the trainees, and, as in other brigades, trainees frequently turn toward the cities and the industrial/mining centers. Most trainees indicated they would like to stay in the Tutume area, if there were jobs to be had. There are a few independent builders in the Tutume area and both the teacher and postmaster indicated that there would eventually be employment opportunities for brigade graduates. The Bokalanga is just beginning to develop a demand for modern housing that would enable brigade graduates to earn a living locally.

The brigade's relations with local (i.e., District) government are virtually nil. The brigade is now run directly by the Ministry of Education; District Government has no jurisdiction over secondary education. Furthermore, the District Council is located at least 100 miles away in Serowe.

The Ministry of Education's plans for the brigade are as yet indefinite. The Ministry wants to expand craft and technical education available at the secondary school and plans to integrate training in animal husbandry and vegetable gardening into the secondary school program. Plans have also been made to start a carpenters brigade, a dressmaking brigade, and perhaps a baker's brigade. Each brigade will train no more than twelve students per year. An effort will be made to recruit from outside the Bokalanga so that the brigades at Tutume will not be identified with a single region.

Ngamiland Youth Training Center (Maun)

Maun, the capital of the Northwest District is three hundred miles west of Francistown at the southern end of the Okovanggo Delta. One of the more remote districts of Botswana, it is the site of a brigade organized in 1970, the Ngamiland Youth Training Center (NYTC). The NYTC was organized in cooperation with the Northwest District Council. According to the current (June 1972) coordinator, training at the center is designed to provide a partial solution to the unemployment problem in the Northwest District and to supply skilled carpenters and builders for both local and national development. It was also hoped that many trainees would remain in the district and set themselves up as small entrepreneurs. Some Council Members say one of the original purposes of the NYTC was to provide trained manpower for the many District Council projects that cannot be handled by the Council building team or the area's one local contractor. Each District Council maintains a small works department or building team to undertake small construction projects.

These teams generally number no more than five men. Others state that the primary goal of brigade training is to make trainees self-sufficient in the hope that they will become employers rather than employees in the Maun area.

The NYTC and the District Council have enjoyed a good relationship. The Council has continuously awarded grants to the center, on occasion providing as much as one quarter of NYTC's financing.* And although NYTC is administered by a private board** and has been formed into a trust, it figures heavily in the District Council's Five Year Development Plan, which will afford many training opportunities for the builders and carpenters brigades.

Current Status

As yet there have been no graduates of the three-year building/carpentry courses or the two-year farming or dressmaking courses, all of which began in 1970-71. Attrition has been minimal. Of 16 trainees who entered the farmers brigade in 1971 only one had dropped out as of June 1972, owing to sickness. There have been no dropouts from the builders brigades.

Farmers Brigade

Prospective trainees in the farmers brigade must demonstrate a desire to learn modern methods. Brigade training emphasizes vegetable production; no training is offered in ranching or dairy farming.

The people of Shorobe, the village where the brigade's lands are located, have minimal relations with the brigade. The diet of the villagers contains few vegetables and they maintain a suspicious attitude toward produce farming. In addition, the villagers distrust some of the innovative agricultural methods employed on the brigade farm. Only three or four youths from Shorobe are represented in the brigade and whatever benefits accrue to the community from brigade activity will be gradual and long term.

* Northwest District is one of the richest in Botswana. The only district with an accumulated surplus from the 1971 fiscal year, its estimated income for 1972 with a population of about 56,000 was R228,730 compared with Central District's population of 242,000 and income of R750,850 and Kweneng's population 86,000 and income of R219,840. Figures from: Town & District Councils Estimates of Revenue & Expenditures 1972.

** The board of governors is composed as follows:

- 1) The Chairman of the District Council
- 2) The Secretary of the District Council
- 3) The Chief of the area (traditional authority)
- 4) The District Commissioner
- 5) A local representative of the town

Builders Brigade

Conversations with trainees in the carpentry brigade indicate that it is highly unlikely many trainees will remain in Maun after graduation. Most trainees hope to find work in the larger towns of Gaborone, Orapa or Selibe-Pikwe. Nonetheless, various individuals in the town, including the chief and members of the District Council felt that there was market within the Northwest District large enough to absorb some five to 10 builders. The importance of the district's tourist trade* and the area's economic growth tend to support this view.

Brigade Community Relations

Relations between the builders brigades and the village of Maun appear to be good. Not only does the brigade do a lot of work in the village, but trainees have done some work on their own for people in the village. Trainees are not recruited exclusively, or even preponderantly from Maun, but from the Northwest District as a whole. This, coupled with the low standard of primary-school education and the consequent small number of students admitted to secondary school from Maun, is a source of dissatisfaction among the people of Maun.

Relations with the Community Development Department (CD) are weak at present, due in part to the self-help philosophy of CD. It would not be consistent with this philosophy for villagers to hire other people (e.g., the brigades) to do construction work. But because trained supervisory personnel are needed for any complicated construction projects, it is anticipated by the Assistant Community Development Officer for the Northwest District (who lives in Maun) that brigade trainees will be utilized.

Recently, the NYTC has been offering a novel kind of instruction in vegetable gardening. An instructor goes to a village and makes it known that he is available to provide instruction in new methods of gardening. NYTC provides seed for the on-site course, which lasts six months. At the end of the course, vegetable gardens are left in the care of villagers and the instructor moves to another village. So far the program has been completed in two villages and is underway in a third.

Lobatse Youth Training Center

The Lobatse Youth Training Center (LYTC) is located in the town of Lobatse, population 10,000, some 40 miles south of Gaborone. The LYTC, composed of a carpenters brigade of 51 trainees and builders brigade of 90 trainees, is operated under the auspices of CD. The center's coordinator is an employee of CD, and the center receives subsidies from the Department. A board of trustees, composed of the mayor, the principal of the Lobatse Secondary School, the education officer of the Town Council, the center's coordinator, a representative from CD and two representatives from the business community, formulate the center's policy.

* Botswana enjoys some tourism particularly in the north where there are game parks and a large resort.

CD is seeking to reduce its financial and administrative involvement with the center as rapidly as possible. The agency's ultimate goal is to maintain a veto power over brigade projects, give advice and assistance when needed and audit periodically the brigade's books. It is hoped the board, rather than acting in an advisory capacity as it does now, will assume responsibility for the center. At present, the trustees are not eager to accept this responsibility, primarily because they fear legal difficulties might arise. They prefer that the Government (through CD) remain responsible.

Community Development's desire to give the brigades more autonomy and the fact that the initiative for establishment of the LYTC came from the town council help make the center's relations with local government excellent. The Lobatse Town Council had two major reasons for wanting a brigade in the town. The first was a concern for what they saw as an increase in juvenile delinquency--a rising number of idle youths hanging about the town. Secondly, they required skilled labor for their town development plan, and in this respect the brigades have been extremely useful. The Council has in turn contributed significantly to the financial success of the center. Until recent and apparently temporary financial and planning difficulties caused the Town Council to curtail its building plans, the Lobatse brigades did as much of the Council's construction work as they could handle.

Though contiguous with Lobatse, Peleng does not come under the jurisdiction of the Town Council, but is administered by the Central Government and the District Commissioner. Peleng is scheduled soon to come under the Town Council's authority, but the degree of social cleavage that exists between the professional people of Lobatse and the villagers in Peleng may persist. The center's coordinator hopes that this gulf can be bridged and has proposed an expansion of the NYTC board to include two additional representatives--one from Peleng and one from Lobatse. Although the Peleng village headman has twice been asked to join the board, he has thus far refused.

Two other factors are relevant to Center-Community relations. First LYTC is not a local training center. Trainees are recruited from all over the country as part of an effort to publicize the Center's program. Second, and of less consequence, is the Center's location on a side road about two miles from the center of Lobatse-Peleng. The Center is thus not easily seen by the people of the area, though perhaps as the town grows its location will become more strategic.

Insofar as vocational training for primary-school leavers is concerned, the Center's impact on the local community is minimal. Furthermore few brigade graduates remain in Lobatse. Indeed, according to the town clerk, out of the brigade classes that have graduated, totalling about 100 individuals, only four or five graduates have remained in Lobatse. These have been employed either by the Public Works Department or by the Town Council on its small building force. The balance of brigade graduates have gone to Francistown, Gaborone, Orapa or Selibe-Pikwe.

Trainees show little sign of dissatisfaction. None has dropped out of the program, though several have failed. As elsewhere, the certainty of excellent employment opportunities upon completion of the course is a tremendous incentive.

Botswelelo Center

Thamaga

The Botswelelo Center in Thamaga, a small town about 40 miles west of Gaborone, was organized by a Roman Catholic priest. Much a grass roots organization, it has as yet no ties with local government though its relationship with the community is strong. The center trains about 20 students, all but three of whom are women; it offers instruction in various forms of needlework. The three men make grass mats.

Upon discovering that between ten and 15 per cent of the primary-school leavers in Thamaga went on to secondary school, the coordinator in cooperation with the chief (who had already started several cooperatives in the village) broached the idea of a post-primary school training program. About 40 young women responded. A workshop was built within the village limits by the women themselves, some of the building material being supplied gratis by a local merchant. Sewing machines were obtained through the Botswana Christian Council, and an instructor was hired.

The center was immediately organized into a cooperative, in an effort to give trainees a proprietary interest in the project as well as management experience. The center's output is sold exclusively to the local populace, though the market is seasonal, owing to the periodic migration of most of the village to the lands and cattle posts. The project's largest income source is the sale to South African curio dealers of mortars and pestles used for pounding corn.

The center plans to expand the number of its trainees, when it can afford to have more instructors, and to add certain other craft skills, such as pottery-making, to its curriculum. Unlike needlework, the pottery manufactured would be sold in South Africa.

Several factors explain the center's good relationship with the community. First, the idea had the support of the chief, who in this isolated village is an important figure. Secondly, expatriate involvement in the project was limited to one man, the only European in the village who speaks the local language and involves himself in village life. And, the ultimate decision as to whether the project should be undertaken was left to the people of the village rather than imposed from above, either by Government or by an outsider. Whether or not the center will be cost covering and will make a permanent contribution to the solution of the primary-school leaver problem remains to be seen.

Mahalapye

Mahalapye is a town on the rail line about 125 miles north of Gaborone. The brigades at Mahalapye are closely integrated with the Madiba Secondary School, which is now under construction. At present Mahalapye has only a builders brigade that divides its time between training in the requisite skills and erecting the school's physical plant. As a result the brigade has done no work in or for the community and maintains no relations with local government. The brigade was begun in 1971 and presently numbers about 75 individuals.

Potentially strong links are being established among the Madiba Secondary School (and thus the brigades), the Government, and the community. First and second form students (eighth and ninth grades) at Madiba do volunteer work within the community twice a week conducting literacy classes in Tswana for children who have been unable to go to primary school. Students also help in the local hospital. In addition, CD has assigned a Community Development Officer (CDO) to the Madiba School as a liaison officer among the school, the community and the Government. Thus far, the CDO has informed the Village Development Committee of the brigade's desire to help with community problems. It is anticipated that when the brigade has time it will do work for the VDC and will make available technical advice and assistance for village self-help projects.

Serowe

Serowe, the capital of Central District and home of Botswana's President, Sir Seretse Khama, is a large village located about 170 miles north of Gaborone. There are three major brigades at Serowe--a builders brigade, a farmers brigade and a textile brigade. Other projects (an electrical brigade, a motor mechanics brigade, a tanning brigade and a machinists brigade) train very few individuals --no more than 15 and sometimes as few as three.

As at other brigade centers, the builders brigades, which include painters, carpenters, brick layers and stone masons, are not only the most popular among applicants, but the most successful in training and placing graduates. Because they are seen as a means of access into the modern sector, the brigades constantly receive applications from all over the country (over 100 per year, of which 30 to 35 are accepted).

Textile Brigade

The textile brigades include a weaving brigade, a dressmaking brigade and a silkscreen printing group that is scheduled to be combined with the Unity workshop (a cooperative formed by graduates of the textile brigades). The weaving and dressmaking brigades each offer two-year courses and admit between 15 and 20 persons per year. As with most textile brigades, the number of trainees fluctuates because some girls decide not to complete their training and others leave as a result of pregnancy.

Farmers Brigade

The farmers brigade at Serowe is being gradually scaled down in favor of the Mabeleapudi program that will provide in situ training to youths and parents in villages that request the program. For several reasons the Serowe Community has little contact with the farmers brigade. Firstly, the brigade is situated approximately five miles from the center of Serowe, off the main road and out of sight of all villagers. Secondly, farming is not viewed as a desirable occupation by youth, or for that matter by many parents who want to see their children participating in the modern sector. Finally, the Land Board and the District Council have thus far refused to allocate land to the farmers brigade. There is also, of course, the problem that the types and techniques of farming taught to trainees are very much at variance with tradition. Indeed, they are not practically applicable by the average farmer. The dairy farming, vegetable gardening and "Savory" method of intensive beef cattle grazing require resources (irrigation, fencing, special breeds of cows, etc.) not available to the average Motswana farmer.

Of these facts the brigade coordinator is aware and it is acknowledged that should the brigade fold up its tents and steal away in the night, it would not be missed by the community or the local government. The purposes of the brigade as it is presently constituted are seen by the coordinator as being threefold. It serves as a private agricultural extension unit, it acts as a testing ground for various agricultural innovations, and it is operated as a demonstration commercial farm. The farmers brigade will concentrate increasingly on these roles as opposed to training primary-school leavers in the future.

Relations with Government

Local (e.g., District) Government has very little to do with the operations of the brigades, for which there are four centers in the Central District; at Serowe, Palapye, Mahalapye and Shashi. At present the District Commissioner is chairman of the District Development Committee and a member of the Swaneng Board of Governors. The Swaneng Board of Governors is concerned primarily with secondary education at the Swaneng Hill School in Serowe, the Shashi River School in Shashi/Tonota and the Madiba School in Mahalapye. It does deal to some extent

with the brigades situated near each of these schools. Although there are no formal ties between the Secondary Schools and the brigades, they have in the past and continue currently to some extent to share management personnel. The informal ties are fairly strong. An effort is now (1972) being made to establish a separate brigade trust to look after the Serowe Brigades. Patrick Van Rensburg, the founder of the brigade movement who has recently turned his energies to other development schemes, has been on the Swaneng Board of Governors, will be involved in the separate Brigade Board of Trustees and is at present an invited member of the District Development Committee.

The stated purpose of the District Development Committee with respect to brigades is to coordinate the various development activities within the district. The brigades are considered an integral part of these activities. Duplication of effort is to be avoided through the implementation of a Five Year District Development Plan, but this plan is still being drawn up.

There is no District Council policy of giving the brigades grants, subsidies or preferential treatment with respect to contracts. The builders brigade is currently erecting offices for the Tribal Authority and the Council has given the Serowe Engineering Brigade (machine shop) a R2,500 contract for metal furniture for the district's primary schools. The Shashi carpentry brigade receives the contract to repair wooden primary school furniture in their area. This, according to the manager of the brigade, is their primary source of income.

St. Anthony's Mission Palapye

Technically speaking, the dressmaking brigade which operates in Palapye's St. Anthony Mission is not a brigade. The 15 or so women who learn sewing, patternmaking and associated skills there, do not learn according to a set timetable or curriculum. They may stay as long as they like. Thus there are only trainees and leavers, but no graduates. The primary goal of the training is to upgrade the sewing skills of the community. Though the Passionist Father who established the sewing group insists that it is not a brigade, the principle that the trainees should cover the cost of their training through their output is an integral part of the program, and the coordinator attends meetings of the Swaneng Board of Governors. There is thus some communication between his program and the larger brigades of Serowe, Shashi and Mahalapye. There is no communication with local government owing, no doubt, to the extent and type of training.

The brigade has been publicized only through its trainees; they are encouraged to bring a friend. There is little or no contact with traditional authority in the area. Although this conclusion was not verified through interviews with other villagers, it would seem that owing to the small size of the program and its identification with the church, it is probably known to a small percentage of Palapye residents.

Kanye Youth Training Center Kanye

Kanye is a medium-sized village, the capital of the Ngwaketse District about 25 miles northwest of Lobatse. There are three brigades at Kanye which comprise the Kanye Youth Training Center (KYTC) a builders brigade, a farmers brigade and a sewing brigade. The KYTC was started in the summer of 1971 by a local Board of Trustees and shortly thereafter the Department of Community Development declared that the Board of Trustees had no legal status and that CD was the owner and administrator of the Center. In future the Board was to act in an advisory capacity only. Without specifying the responsibilities of this advisory body, CD declared that the Board should carry on much as before. The Board, feeling that without guidelines for the scope of its responsibilities it could not operate effectively, dissolved itself, leaving the coordinator accountable to no one. This was the state of affairs as of July, 1972 when the writer visited the center. Efforts, however, were being made to give the Board of Trustees new legal status and make them completely responsible for the brigades. This Board would most probably consist, according to CD, of the District Commissioner, a representative of the Ministry of Agriculture, the Chief or headman of the village, a representative of Community Development, and an individual nominated by the District Commissioner. In addition there would be five other members representing various voluntary organizations such as the Youth Club, teachers union and women's group, who would attend meetings and sit on committees. They would not, however, be legal trustees in the sense of constituting an autonomous institution.

CD in the meantime, operating on the principle that the brigades at Kanye should be cost-covering, provides only limited financial support. Owing to apparent prior mismanagement and misuse of funds the center is in serious financial difficulties, and the money received from CD is only a stopgap.

The Ministry of Agriculture is involved in the KYTC's farmers brigade providing the salary for an instructor, fencing and like materials, and a bull for breeding purposes.

Links with the Community

Brigade relations with the community are not extensive. The center, situated several miles from the village of Kanye over a bad road, is isolated, and parents, relatives or villagers rarely see the trainees or their program. The Coordinator is aware of this problem and hopes to move the builders brigade and the home-crafts/sewing brigade into the center of town. According to a representative of the District Council people in the community feel that they do not receive sufficient benefits from the brigades, particularly from the builders. Precisely what they have in mind is not certain, but the community would probably welcome more community building projects and training opportunities for more primary-school leavers from Kanye. Only a portion of the village is aware of the

Center and its function. The brigades have not been advertised or introduced to the village at the Kgotla meetings since the present coordinator took over. This feeling that the brigades were not well known among the villagers was reiterated by the Assistant District Commissioner. There is, in addition, no feeling either among trainees or villagers that the trainees are being trained to serve the community. The Community Development Officer pointed out with respect to the farmers brigade, that parents don't know what their children are doing or learning and are consequently reluctant to give them a free hand when they return to the lands. One proposal is to build dormitories for parents and relatives of the trainees so that at specified times they could stay at the center, see what the trainees are doing, and perhaps undergo some training themselves.

Local Government maintains an on and off relationship with KYTC and the District Council was represented by a member from the area on the Board of Trustees. The District Council has given occasional grants to the Training Center, and has made a used tractor available to the farmers brigade. The Council in the past has let building contracts to the builders brigade, but complaints (1972) about the quality of workmanship have put a halt to this practice until the Council is satisfied that workmanship has improved. The center, however, is doing some building for the District Commission and has a contract from Public Works Department to erect some secondary school buildings in the area. Council claims credit for arranging the current cooperation between the Chinese Agricultural Mission and the farmers brigade whereby trainees gain experience in irrigated vegetable farming on the lands of the Chinese Mission. The vegetables are then sold in the village by trainees, who realize as much as R100 per month.

There have been 29 graduates of the KYTC thus far; twelve girls and 17 boys. Although most of the trainees come from the Kanye area, practically all of the graduates leave to seek work in larger towns. No job placement plans were made for the girls who had completed the dressmaking course and their whereabouts are unknown. The 17 boys were ex-building trainees and two remained in Kanye; the remainder went off to the cities, Selibe-Pikwe or Orapa.

Shashi River School Brigades Tonota

There are four brigades connected with the Shashi River Secondary School at Tonota, which is 25 miles south of Francistown along the railroad. There are a builders brigade, a carpenters brigade, a farmers brigade, and a textile brigade. The farmers brigade has been temporarily disbanded owing to a lack of recruits and the farm is now being operated as a cooperative by the 11 graduates who survived from the first group of 23 enrolled in 1970. The other brigades are continuing to function as training organizations.

There are currently about 140 trainees in the three brigades, about 50 in the carpenters brigade, about 60 in the builders brigade and about 30 in the textile brigade. The builders and carpenters brigades have three-year courses; the textile brigade has a two-year course.

Approximately 25 per cent of the trainees come from Tonota or the nearby area, though the brigades are viewed as catering to the entire country, and what recruiting is necessary is done via the national newspaper, the Botswana Daily News. Since the brigades have 150 applicants for 50 places, they no longer send, as they once did, a recruiting team into the village primary school. Perhaps because of this old policy or because Tonota residents are more familiar with brigade activities, instructors feel that trainees from Tonota drop out of the program less frequently than do trainees from other parts of the country.

Relations with the Community

Despite the policy of serving the nation at large, the coordinator of the Shashi brigades insists that they maintain a good neighbor policy with the village of Tonota. To this end some building, carpentry, etc., is done as requested by the village. However, the brigades are not viewed by residents as an integral part of the community but rather in the same category as the secondary school.

Villagers of some importance, e.g., teachers, major farmers, the principal of the primary school, and the assistant village headman view the brigades as performing a necessary function in absorbing some of those students who do not go to secondary school, curtailing "juvenile delinquency" (their terminology) and providing the boys with a means of getting out of the village and into the modern sector. These older people feel that village life is a dead end and insofar as the building trainees are concerned, no more than one or two builders could work in the village on a regular basis. Migration to the construction sites at Orapa, Selibe-Pikwe and Gaborone is considered the logical solution by both elders and young people. Approximately 90 per cent of the graduates of the builders and carpenters brigades have gone on to such jobs (26 out of 29 graduates.) None of the graduates has returned to Tonota or the surrounding area to set up business on his own. Two stayed as instructors for the brigades and one went to Maun.

The future of the female trainees is uncertain. The 15 graduates of the textile brigade found themselves jobless in 1971 although employment was the understood object of their training. Consequently, six were organized into a cooperative production unit near the brigade site and the other nine apparently returned to their villages. The elders mentioned above feel that opportunities for the young women in the village (primarily as dressmakers) are greater than those for the young men.

Local government relations with the brigades are minimal. The builders have taken over the construction of a primary school in Tonota for the District Council, and the carpenters repair desks and furniture for a number of schools in the area. This work constitutes the brigade's major source of income. Community Development as represented by the Village Development Committee has little to do with the brigades.

One of the major difficulties confronting any effort to establish close ties between the brigades and the village of Tonota is the lack of village cohesion. Because five tribes, the Kalanga, the Bahurutsi, the Ndebele, the Bangwato and the Mazizuru, are all represented in strength within the town's wards, there is said to be little sense of community.

Finally insofar as the brigade-central government relations are concerned, the brigades at Shashi have limited their relationship with government to the granting of contracts to permit the brigades to cover their costs. Any other involvement on the part of the government is seen to be inimical to the efficiency and best interests of the brigades.

Kweneng Rural Development Association Molepolole

The Kweneng Rural Development Association (KRDA) involves everyone of any consequence in the district capital, Molepolole, which is 35 miles northwest of Gaborone. The ideas of rural development presented at Rural Development Conferences, seminars and Kgotla meetings have had widespread publicity. The Board of Governors of KRDA includes the District Commissioner, the Tribal Authority, the Agricultural Officer, the CDO, the Youth Club Chairman, the District Council secretary as ex-officio members and ten elected members among whom are primary and secondary school teachers and Council members from the District. KRDA is located in the center of the village and is well marked. It operates a brickyard which is its primary source of income and it trains some 16 builders and 26 men and women in handicraft. Building trainees are primarily recruited from the Kweneng District, but a small number are admitted from other areas.

No graduates of the KRDA training programs have yet emerged, but the prospects for builders brigade trainees are, as everywhere, excellent. Most are expected to go to Orapa, Selibe-Pikwe or Gaborone. Since there are few good local builders in Molepolole, graduates eager to set up in business for themselves would seem to have opportunity.

The future of the handicraft trainees is less certain. The ultimate aim is to start a small factory turning out goods for the local market but there is some question as to the ability of such a group to compete with cheap articles from South Africa. Currently, school uniforms, for which there is a large market, represent the major source of income.

Those in charge feel that the average villager either does not know about the brigades or is unsure of their function. The District Commissioner attributes this in large part to the small size of the builders brigade, its newness, and the fact that its construction projects have been strictly limited to the few buildings erected on the KRDA site. He felt that it would be inadvisable to further advertise the brigades at this point since there would be insufficient places for the resultant applicants, and the brigade will not be building in the village for another year.

Despite the brigade's failure thus far to sink deep roots in the village, people are interested in vocational training as an alternative to secondary education. Representatives of Community Development in Molepolole said they had been stressing the importance of vocational training to the villagers, and the District Commissioner confirmed interest among secondary school students and their parents in having vocational training taught at the school.

The representative of the Tribal Authority stated that the people of the village need time to see what the brigades associated with KRDA will do. According to him villagers are quite favorable to the brigade idea, but public support and commitment must await concrete results.

The District Council is heavily represented on the Board of Trustees of the KRDA. After some initial misunderstandings as to the brigade's relationship and responsibilities in the community it is now on an amicable footing with KRDA, and is both interested and cooperative. Though it contributes no financial assistance, the District Council is eager to use the builders brigade for some of its anticipated construction projects. The brigade does not, however, feel capable of doing work of the requisite quality. It is, of course, working on its own buildings.

The KRDA is intended to be an integral part of the national development planning process. Any changes in or addition to its program must be approved by its executive board, the District Development Committee, the appropriate sub-committees of the National Brigades Coordinating Committee and appropriate ministries. It remains to be seen how effective or how important these linkages will be.

Tswelelopele Center Ramoutswa

The Tswelelopele Center in Ramoutswa, a small village 15 miles south of Gaborone, provides training for young women of the village in sewing, knitting and similar forms of home handicraft. At this time the Center has 13 trainees and expansion was in doubt owing to a dispute with the Community Development Department concerning the center's autonomy.

The board of trustees of the Center consists of a representative each from the Catholic and Lutheran missions in the village, the principal and a teacher from the primary school, the CDO, the instructor of the handicraft brigade, the Chief of the district, the Education Secretary of the District Council and a Council member. The Council has been maintaining a wait-and-see attitude with regard to its relations with the Center. It has not wanted to commit itself until the question of the Center's autonomy is decided. This question centered around the ownership of the Center building which had been put up with money given through Community Development from an external source. The Board of Trustees was wary of government involvement, preferring to run the Center autonomously. They offered a seat on the Board to Community Development, but CD wanted more than to be informed of accomplished facts. A stalemate of eight months ensued. Finally in August, 1972 the Center was given ownership of the building and thus granted autonomy. However, when the writer visited the Center in July 1972, no decision had been reached and no concrete plans had been made for the future.

Insofar as training is concerned, the women tend to stay at the Center for about a year, though there is no definite training period. Thus far, in the two years that the Center has been in existence, there have been five or six dropouts. The Center does not promise employment, but the women can make money from the work they do at the Center. The main aim is to enable the women to function more skillfully as "homenakers." The Center hopes eventually to start a builders brigade and a mechanics brigade—there is great demand for these skills. Most young men in the area go to South Africa to work on the farms and see a builders brigade as an excellent alternative to secondary school and farming.

People do seem to want an alternative to secondary education. The Deputy Chief of the area said that when support for the Tswelopele Center was solicited at a Kgotla meeting, many people offered to provide water, bricks, labor, etc. How the Center will fare in its relations with the village, and its securing of local and national government support remains to be seen.

Kgatlang Youth Development Association Mochudi

There are four brigades operated under the auspices of the Kgatleng Youth Development Association in Mochudi: a builders brigade with 25 trainees comprising first and second years, a farmers brigade, a leathercraft brigade and a mechanics brigade. There are 16 trainees, about half of them girls, in two classes in the farmers brigade. The six trainees in the mechanics brigade are all in their third year of training—with only one instructor, it was felt advisable that all trainees proceed at the same pace. Next year, following graduation, a new group will be brought in. The leathercraft brigade is no longer a brigade but a cooperative; the seven graduates are now working as a production workshop. There are no plans for further training in leathercraft. Each class of farmers has numbered initially about ten individuals, and the dropout rate has been low. The KYDA only accepts recruits for the farmers brigade when parents agree in advance to supply some cattle, land and a plow. Youths are recruited exclusively from the Kgatleng District to facilitate later follow-up.

Follow-up studies of about 15 graduates so far indicate that half continue farming while the others seek wage employment in the modern sector. Only the sort of farming and animal husbandry which can be carried on under prevailing conditions is taught; thus, there is no training in dairy farming or irrigated vegetable farming.

Relations between the KYDA and the local government appear to be good, one reason being that the brigade center (with the exception of the farmers brigade which is several miles away) is in the village of Mochudi and is closely associated with the village Community Center, a project of the people of Mochudi. But the people seem to be aware of the brigades only as an alternative for children who fail to be admitted to secondary school. Because of widespread recruiting efforts in Kgotlas throughout the Kgatleng District, the project coordinator feels that a relatively large number of people in rural areas are aware that some sort of farmer training program exists.

The Community Center of which KYDA is an outgrowth was proposed and built by the people of Mochudi, with help from Lady Naomi Mitchison and Chief Linchwe. Both KYDA and the Community Center share some common members on their respective boards of trustees, as does the Linchwe II secondary school. Thus the coordinator of KYDA, who is currently (but who need not be) principal of the secondary school, is on the board of trustees of both institutions. At present an effort is being made to form an umbrella board of governors on which will sit not only representatives of the secondary school, KYDA and the Community Center, but also the District Commissioner (ex-officio) and members of the District Council.

As indicated, District Council's relations with KYDA are amicable, but up until recently, neutral. Following prodding by a donor agency the council has taken a more active interest in the affairs of KYDA, but there are as yet no official members of the District Council on KYDA's board of trustees.

The Kgatleng District Council is poor and cannot afford to give much in the way of financial aid or building contracts to KYDA. Work for the Council has consisted of renovations to the Council medical clinic and construction of three classrooms for the Linchwe II Secondary School. These classrooms were then turned over to the Council for use as a primary school. The Council helps KYDA primarily through the maintenance contract which the mechanics brigade holds for the Council boreholes.

Work done by the builders brigade for the Council has created conflict as a reputedly good local builder is a Council member. Though this writer did not hear of such a conflict existing in other districts one would expect Councils to be cautious about giving contracts to programs run by outsiders rather than a local builder, Council member or not. Probably other District building schemes are extensive enough to provide both local and brigade builders with work, or demand work too ambitious for a small local contractor to undertake.

Community Development, in the persons of the local CDO and two CDAs, appears to support KYDA in principle and in practice. The CDO is a member of the Board of Trustees and is kept informed of the plans and problems of the brigades. However, the Village Development Committees, of which there are several in Mochudi have no relations with the brigades. This again revolves around the apparent incompatibility of the village self-help concept of Community Development with the commercial nature of the brigades. Nonetheless the CDO states that he has made a conscious effort to mention the brigades and recommend their services on a private basis to the villagers at VDC meetings. Complaints about quality have recently made him wary of advertising the builders brigade to any great extent in case Community Development's reputation might suffer although some knowledgeable sources say that the brigade's quality of workmanship is certainly no worse, and probably better, than that of some local contractors. Complaints center primarily around the brigade's refusal to do work on a piecemeal basis. It expects to be paid in a lump sum and wants all materials at the site prior to building. Traditionally, individuals hire a builder and supply their own materials as they can afford them, thus stretching the job over a considerable period of time, a method which is not economically feasible for the brigade.

The District Authority has tried to employ the builders brigade but the projects have not yet been approved by the Central Government. The District Commissioner is an ex-officio member of KYDA's board of trustees, and is by virtue of his job, Chairman of the District Development Committee. This would link District development planning and the brigades but planning as yet is in its early stages.

The Coordinator of KYDA described the village attitude toward schemes, such as the brigades, that receive significant outside support. According to him, people see the secondary school and KYDA as the products of a few outside people who are clever at getting great quantities of money from unknown sources. Since the project is apparently successfully financed from another source, villagers see no need to contribute their time or resources to it. However, the traditional leadership of the village, headed by Chief Linchwe II, favors such innovative steps as KYDA and the people may in time follow his lead.

Lekgaba Center Francistown

The Lekgaba Center in Francistown is a brigade program run by the Community Development Department, specializing in training craftsmen in ceramics, working in wood and ivory, carpentry and painting. For girls there is a course in homecrafts such as sewing, knitting and dressmaking. There are currently about 40 trainees in addition to about ten girls who come each morning from their homes in Francistown. Of the male trainees approximately 75 per cent come from Francistown or the surrounding Bokalanga/Northeast District area.

The males are being trained for self-employment. For the females, the training is designed to upgrade their current skills. The center helps independent adult craftsmen as well, acquiring materials which they can buy, and then buying and marketing their finished work. There are about half a dozen of these "freelance" craftsmen.

The first group of trainees graduated at the end of 1972 and their livelihood is a major concern, particularly the potters, for the wheel and the kiln are expensive. The center's Director plans to retain at the center those who cannot make it alone or find employment as ceramics instructors. They will form a production unit which will not only give them an income but will help make the center self-supporting. Their graduate skills will be important in maintaining the quality of the center's output; normally trainees have produced nothing marketable during their first year.

The Lekgaba Center has an advisory board of people from the community. Among them are the Director himself, the clerk of the Town Council, a local member of Parliament, the District Commissioner, the mayor of Francistown, a Councillor of the Town Council, and two local men employed in the town. The stated aims of the advisory board are sixfold:

- 1) To act in an advisory capacity to further the program of the center.
- 2) To consider ways of improving and extending the training programs of the center.
- 3) To assess needs among the young people in Francistown and the North East District which could be met by training programs at the center.
- 4) To encourage interest and support for the center.
- 5) To seek means of raising funds with special emphasis on local support.
- 6) To take necessary steps in consultation with the Department of Community Development for making the center self-supporting.

In practice, however, the advisory board meets only when there are urgent matters to consider. In the period January, 1972 to July, 1972, it met only once. According to the Town Clerk, advice is rarely asked of or given by the board, and the board has frequently had difficulty getting a quorum. Neither the Francistown Town Council, in whose administrative territory the center is located, nor the North East District Council, which represents the area around

Francistown, had, as of July, 1972, supplied any sort of financial or moral support. The center's position with respect to the central government is difficult, also. CD is apparently caught between the desire to have the center become financially autonomous and the desire to control the center's activities. Some observers consider CD's role to be unnecessarily heavy-handed.

The Lekgaba Center is not well known to the people of Francistown. It is too removed from the majority of the Batswana population of Francistown and the predominantly white business district. Also, the skills taught at Lekgaba, i.e., traditional types of crafts with tourist appeal are not those to attract the average primary-school leaver seeking employment in the modern sector. Nor do these skills show much potential for absorbing significant numbers of trainees.

Conclusions

Purposes and Premises of Brigades

There is need for a careful re-evaluation of several basic premises of the brigade concept, in particular the purpose of brigade training. Close examination reveals that there are almost as many purposes envisioned for brigades as there are brigades. Among these are: (a) Controlling juvenile delinquency and keeping idle youth off the streets; (b) instilling a sense of the dignity of manual labor; (c) making good citizens out of primary-school leavers; (d) producing self-employed private entrepreneurs in the rural areas; (e) fostering rural development through (d) and farmer training; (f) providing a semi-academic alternative to secondary-school education; (g) providing direct employment through the cooperative workshops; (h) providing cheap, local skilled labor for district or town building plans.

Too many objectives results in confusion; it's of prime importance that brigades concentrate on a few realistic goals.

As an example, most brigades tend to set up permanent production units, particularly in textiles and handicrafts, thus the brigades become both trainers and employers, and it is possible that both functions suffer losses of efficiency. This step has usually been taken when brigades discovered that there was no market for the skills they were producing. In many brigades where this has happened training has been discontinued. However, in Serowe Shashi River and Thamaga, the brigades continue to train when it is obvious that the only hope of trainee employment lies in the brigade workshops. In this area then, brigades would do well to cut down on their handicraft training and a) improve the quality of the output of those already trained, and b) concentrate on a skill such as building for which there is a high demand, plus a greater likelihood of covering costs and of having a higher training impact in terms of numbers.

In short, brigades should not spread themselves too thin, and should concentrate in areas where they have a "comparative advantage".

Another purpose that needs to be examined is that of instilling civic and social responsibility in the trainees through the Development Studies program. Development Studies attempts to instill an awareness of the development process, and above all a sense of patriotism in the trainees. But the impression one gets is that only lip-service is being paid to these ideals. Most trainees are in the brigades for one reason, to get high-paying jobs in the modern sector. Though they speak of helping the nation develop and of being willing to work in the village, their primary concern is employment wherever it may be found. Few trainees return to the rural areas to assist in rural development; few remain in the small towns where the brigades are established. Almost all brigade trainees, thus far, have gone to the mines and large towns to work in the modern sector for which they have been trained. This is natural given the market forces and could not be reversed even if it were desirable to do so. However, as the brigades are currently organized and run, this migration to the modern sector leaves the villages and small towns with scant profit from the training activities going on in their midst. Thus purpose (e) above is not being accomplished.

Migration to the towns cannot and should not be discouraged so long as there are jobs available. Within five to ten years, however, most observers feel that this labor market will be glutted and trainees will have to find employment in the villages. Developing a job market in these areas will be more difficult. In order for rural villages to begin to grow and be capable of absorbing the output of the brigades, some outside influence such as conscious government development policies must provide the incentives and financial resources. Though government plans for comprehensive rural development are going forward at this time, the role of brigades has not been made clear.

Finally, the premise that the brigades must restore a sense of the dignity of manual labor should be questioned. Most Batswana want their children to go to secondary school and get white-collar jobs with the government or in the private modern sector, and this probably accounts for the tremendous demand for a secondary-school place. But this does not necessarily mean that the Batswana are unwilling to do the hard, manual labor required for development. Indeed, such an attitude is rather arrogant on the part of the brigades.

Batswana parents and children desire white-collar jobs and therefore secondary-school education because they see so many white-collar jobs in the economy. Vocational training in the secondary schools appeals to parents in Molepolole because their primary interest is in modern sector (i.e., remunerative) employment. Young people and parents will be as willing to do manual labor as white collar work when they see such work is available. Naturally, there is a prestige factor involved in white-collar employment, but brigades need not waste their time praising the virtues of manual labor. All they need do is publicize employment opportunities and demonstrate that theirs is a viable alternative to secondary school.

Private Entrepreneurship

It seems highly unlikely that brigades will contribute to the development of a private entrepreneurial class.

1. Brigade trainees in carpentry and building show no inclination to return to their villages for several reasons. They are reluctant to risk setting up on their own, which seems to be the prerogative of the "rich and powerful" and probably also of older individuals. There is demonstrably a limited market in the villages, and traditionally people have built houses in a piecemeal fashion, an uneconomical process for the builder.

2. The communal, cooperative nature of Botswana life militates against the formation of a class of individual entrepreneurs. Historically, as stated by Sekgoma Khama, "the whole structure of the society and the activities of the groups were such as to exclude individualism and encourage the placing of the interests of the group over the interests of the individual..."* Gradually this attitude is being changed, but is the change desirable? Perhaps the cooperative movement, as exemplified by the Serowe Builders Cooperative, would produce faster and more socially healthful results.

Cost Covering

A close look should be taken at "cost covering" from several points of view.

1. If brigades are to play a significant role in the development of the community (it is the writer's opinion that they must do so to survive), then to what extent does the emphasis on cost-covering affect the choice of projects undertaken? Will the brigades undertake remunerative projects such as Council office buildings or teachers quarters, at the expense of latrines or other projects which would affect the people more directly? Naturally there are political implications involved.

2. If the brigades are to function as some sort of community development project, can rural communities cover the costs of their work? Can the villages afford to hire the graduates either as private individuals or as a cooperative?

* Sekgoma Khama "Traditional Attitudes to Land and Management of Property with Special Reference to Cattle," Botswana Notes and Records, Special Edition #1, "Proceedings of the Conference on Sustained production from Semi-Arid areas," October, 1971, Gaborone, Botswana, p. 60.

3. Cost-covering is often defended as a means of teaching trainees about cost estimation and accounting. But at two brigade sites some trainees seemed to think that the seemingly large sums paid by the people for whom the building was being done should end up in their own pockets.

Relations Between Brigades and the Government

As the foregoing description has indicated, brigades are not coordinated by or with existing government institutions at the local or national level. Some potential coordinating bodies exist, i.e., National Brigades Coordinating Committee (NBCC), National Employment Manpower and Incomes Council (NEMIC) and the District Development Committees, but they do not as yet adequately integrate the educational efforts of the nation with the brigades.

NBCC, as presently constituted, is a weak institution. Although all Ministries and many departments are represented on the committee, meetings are regarded by many as a waste of time. Both sides—brigades and government—probably blame each other. An impartial examination would probably disclose faults on both sides. Certainly the existence of a coordinating committee does not seem to guarantee either coordination or efficiency. There may be some uncertainty as to the precise purpose of NBCC and no doubt considerable disagreement concerning the committee's powers. The difficulty of coordinating brigades is aggravated by the existence, side by side, of government and private brigades. A private individual can have no executive power over government brigades, and a government official can have little over the private brigades. As a result the NBCC has no executive authority and is merely an advisory body.

Since the President has emphasized that "the greatest challenge ahead of (Botswana) is undoubtedly rural development";* this will undoubtedly mean that brigades will have to surrender some of their autonomy to the Central Government and the NBCC will have to be given some executive power. Under these circumstances, government representatives would have to have the authority to speak for their ministries or departments.

The problem of coordination is much more easily solved on paper than in reality, and most institutions in any country continually face the dilemma of encouraging local initiative while maintaining a degree of central control. The creation of boards or committees on which the various vested interests are represented is a standard bureaucratic attempt to minimize duplication of effort and encourage national planning. Organization charts often conceal as much as they reveal however, and the effectiveness of the NBCC - like most efforts of its kind - is determined by its membership and its functions within the larger

*

H.E. The President, National Development Plan 1970/75, quoted in "Rural Development in Botswana" - Government Paper #1, Republic of Botswana, Gaborone, March, 1972.

system. In view of the preponderance of expatriates in the brigade movement, it is likely that an experienced Batswana would have more credibility within governmental circles as the Secretary of the NBCC. However, there are very few Motswana with such experience, and the complex jurisdictional issues concerning liaison between different ministries would remain extremely difficult regardless of the citizenship of the NBCC leaders.

To maintain the maximum degree of local initiative and flexibility with minimum control, the coordinating role should probably remain primarily a communications effort (e.g., learning about possible jobs under PWD sub-contracts and notifying appropriate brigades... seeking a bull, seeds or technical advice from the Ministry of Agriculture). By suggesting a greater clarity of purpose and a higher degree of executive authority for NBCC the writer is not advocating tightly centralized control over brigades, but merely more effective communications channels between brigades and other institutions. The use of an accountant who travels to various brigades has apparently been very helpful, and the informal planning/evaluation functions of NBCC might well be expanded.

With respect to NEMIC at the highest level of government, and the District Development Committees at the local level, it is too soon to judge their effectiveness. Certainly, NEMIC is in a position to relay information concerning present and future job markets to brigade coordinators, while the DDCA could play a key role in decentralized human resources planning.

Brigade-Community Relations

One issue dealt with in this study is the relationship of the brigade with the community. The underlying assumption is that a close relationship is beneficial and ought to be promoted. Yet, brigades, as presently organized, do not need the villages and the villages have little to offer them. A good case, however, can be made for close brigade-community relations. Brigades can be instrumental in raising the living standards of the villages by building clinics, public latrines and community centers. They can perhaps help create a demand for their own services and thus a rural building market by demonstrating the advantages of well-built brick or cinder block housing. Equally important is the possibility of brigades showing that a realistic and profitable alternative to secondary education exists, thus relieving pressure on the secondary school system. To do this brigades must make evident the advantages of brigade training.

As stated earlier, brigades are not integrated with or even very visible to the communities in which they are located. Most brigades are located at a considerable distance from the political, social and economic center of the community, and consequently villagers cannot observe their activities. Brigades,

on the whole, rarely advertise their ideas, ideals and objectives at the Kgotla meetings in the villages, or in any other way. They do not need the extra people and they are also afraid of raising false hopes in the community regarding opportunities for training and employment. However, the reluctance of the brigades to orient their activities toward the villages seems to stem from their self-image as national rather than local institutions. Brigades might concentrate on recruiting from the immediately surrounding area. The smaller, dressmaking brigades (Palapye, Thamaga, Ramoutswa, Francistown, etc.) do this but the builders, farmers and carpenters brigades draw trainees from the district or the nation as a whole. Admittedly, determining the precise area of origin of any particular Motswana is difficult. Most Batswana generally have three places of residence, one in a central village, one at their cattle grazing lands (the "cattle post") and one where they grow crops (the "lands"). Each place of residence is lived in for a certain part of the year. The number of people who reside for the majority of the year in a village depends, in all probability on the traditional or modern economic orientation of the village. Despite this mobility, however, there is no reason why recruiting and informational efforts cannot be aimed at the village rather than the district or nation at large, since the village is the focal point of Batswana community life.

Community Attitudes toward Brigades

Brigades are often looked upon as second or third best alternative to secondary school education. Most Batswana want their children to go to secondary school and get white-collar jobs with the government or in the modern sector. Thus people pay little attention to brigades until it becomes obvious that they cannot get into secondary school and cannot find work in the modern sector without a skill. Farming is often viewed as a last resort, since it is completely divorced from the modern sector. Thus farmers brigades are viewed as low-status institutions and can interest and keep few trainees.

Though an obvious point, it is important when discussing the lack of brigade impact on the community to realize that people are interested in the brigades only to the extent that they affect their lives. Thus if the brigades do not build in the village or train a large number of villagers, people are not interested in them.

In the same way, grants of money from overseas sources give the brigades an independent image. The people do not identify with them.

Most brigades are run by expatriates. Even where there are two coordinators and the nominally senior one is a national, the national tends to defer to the expatriate. Yet brigades such as Kanye and Lobatse which are run by Batswana, seem to be no better integrated with the community than those which are run by expatriates.

Brigades on the whole receive little or no support from District or Town Councils and maintain poor liaison with them. The exceptions are significant in only two cases. The Northwest District Council provided R7,000 for the operation of the Ngamiland Youth Training Center in 1972 while the Lobatse Youth Training Center relies heavily on the Lobatse Town Council for building contracts.

Lack of liaison is partly due to Council reluctance to become involved in a new project, and partly to the brigades' desire to go it alone. They want to avoid involvement with government generally, local or national. Where communication does exist, in the form of Council members on the Board of Trustees, it is largely pro forma, and seems to produce few concrete results. Certainly there is little effort at planning and coordinating the goals of the two bodies.

Brigade Training

Carpentry and building trainees have thus far encountered little difficulty getting jobs in the modern sector at the mine construction sites or in the large towns. Few if any trainees return to their villages to work and none have done so as self-employed. Whether or not trainees pass the trade test administered by the Botswana Training Center, they apparently get jobs. This raises fundamental questions concerning the necessity and the nature of training. The unofficially estimated demand for these trainees will continue unabated, given the present rate of supply for the greater part of this decade.

Farming:

Farming is highly unpopular and has had limited success in attracting and holding trainees.

Shashi River has ceased its farmer training activities and the twelve former trainees work on the brigade farm.

Serowe's farmers brigade has been plagued with resettlement problems. 20 per cent of its graduates have come back to work full-time on the brigade farm.

The Ngamiland Youth Training Center's brigade, though apparently more successful in attracting and holding trainees, has not yet completed its first stream of training. It can thus not be properly judged.

The Kgatleng Youth Training Center's farmers brigade has graduated a few farmers (no more than 15), and of these only half have returned to farm their own or their family's lands.

Teaching of farming methods such as dairy farming and irrigated vegetable farming that are possible only under ideal conditions or with large capital inputs not available to the average Motswana has been criticized as having adverse effect on brigades and progressive farmers by raising false hopes.

Handicrafts and Textiles:

Textile brigades thus far have not been successful in placing or setting up trainees on their own.

Serowe and Shashi River had to set up cooperatives to absorb their graduates. Those graduates who did not enter the cooperative workshops were lost track of.

Kanye's dressmaking graduates completed their training with no prospects or arrangements made for their future. They probably went back to their families.

Textile brigades suffer a high turnover rate. Pregnancy is an obvious cause but there are others not generally known.

In order to "cover costs," most dressmaking and textile brigades, with the notable exception of the Botswelole Center in Thamaga, produce for the tourist or export market. A major obstacle is lack of standardization and quality control.

The demand for graduates of the handicrafts brigade at the Legkaba Center in Francistown is extremely limited. It seems most likely that a cooperative workshop will have to be established to absorb these graduates.

Training Methods:

The fact that most trainees fail the Class II trade test administered by the Botswana Training Center and get jobs anyway raises two questions. First, why does anyone bother to take or administer the test, and secondly, are brigade trainees being overtrained? The Class II trade test denotes a level of accomplishment higher than that demanded currently by the nation's building contractors. Brigades should impart the skills that employers are looking for. The implicit assumption underlying a three-year training course for builders or carpenters is apparently that trainees should be equipped to start out on their own as independent entrepreneurs. Since this has not happened thus far, the brigades are undoubtedly overtraining and at the same time limiting their flexibility. If the three-year courses were reduced to two or even one-and-a-half years the brigades could not only train a larger number of Botswana, thereby making a greater impact on the primary school leaver problem, but they would also be able to react more quickly to changes in demand for skilled labor. A study should be made of the extent to which on-the-job training at construction sites duplicates and/or can supplant brigade training.

Other Non-Formal Education Opportunities:

Currently the Central Transport Organization (CTO) is administering a training program initiated by the P-E Consulting Group Ltd. of Great Britain. This program turns out mechanics in ten weeks (50 days) who are qualified to do such tasks as removing and replacing the rear axle, timing the engine or removing and replacing the propeller shaft on Bedford trucks or Land Rovers. Trainees have had no previous experience with engines or automotive mechanics. Though trainees are only qualified to work on Bedfords and Land Rovers, they can easily adapt new skills to any kind and make of vehicle. When it is considered that Botswana's economy will depend increasingly on road transport and that the Botswana Training Center requires several years to turn out mechanics the tremendous importance of this training scheme must be realized. Presently C.T.O.'s program is aimed at satisfying C.T.O.'s requirements for mechanics. It is possible that extra people could be trained in the current stream, or that the course could be continued after C.T.O.'s demands were filled in order to turn out mechanics for private industry.

P.W.D. Training Scheme

The Public Works Department have proposed that they establish an on-the-job training program for some of the remoter areas of Botswana, hiring local labor. P.W.D. would supply a skeleton supervisory and training staff. Though this is only an idea at present, it is possible that the laborers so trained might be able to establish their own building group. Whether or not this is feasible in rural Botswana at the present time is open to question. However, the concept of P.W.D. acting as a training employer of non-P.W.D. workers is well worth further consideration.

A Drop in the Bucket

In view of the considerable attention which brigades have received both in Botswana and in other countries, it's important to keep in mind that the scale of the entire enterprise is still very small. So long as the demand for technical skills remains strong, brigades will present a viable "alternative" for primary-school leavers who cannot continue into secondary schools. Although it is too soon to judge their success or failure by any general criteria, it is clear that brigades - as presently constituted - cannot yet be considered a solution to the primary-school leaver problem. If brigades are to become more than merely a drop in the bucket, they must develop much more solid linkages with the local communities on which they must depend for support.

ABSTRACT

In the following study, James R. Sheffield attempts to determine how rural people feel about development programs and what factors shape their attitudes. In order to identify factors that would help outside programs filter down to the village level, Sheffield administered an operation in which nearly 1,200 people were surveyed. Interviewers attempted to cover between 30 and 50 per cent of all persons over 16 years of age in each village.

Respondents were asked to indicate what they felt were the most serious problems in their villages. Although there was considerable variation both within and among villages, water supply, transport, health facilities, schools and marketing were seen as the most common concerns.

In suggesting actions to deal with these problems, most respondents called for government action combined with local initiatives. Self-help, Sheffield notes, was seen as the least popular course of action, preferred by even fewer than those who did not know which course to choose.

Sheffield goes on to note that data collected in the survey suggest that education, like other vehicles of modernization, is often utilized most effectively by the most progressive segments of the population, thus increasing existing inequities at least in the short run. Education also raises awareness and expectations for opportunities, thereby increasing dependence on government. Sheffield summarizes by noting that people's development orientation, whether they favor government-proposed solutions or self-help projects, is apparently determined by their occupation and social standing within their communities. Entire villages differ sharply in their orientation toward local initiative or government intervention, he notes. Sheffield notes that results of his study may seem discouraging for educators and persons in community development work because village attitudes toward both government services and self-help projects can be described as skeptical.

THE DEVELOPMENT ORIENTATION IN RURAL ETHIOPIA

by

James R. Sheffield

Background:

One of the central issues in rural development programs in developing countries is the balance between the "top down" functions of the government, usually highly centralized, and the "bottom up" or self-help efforts of local communities. Despite considerable rhetoric about self-reliance and local initiative, most community development programs rely heavily on the penetration of centrally supported services into rural areas.

On the basis of discussions with officials in the Ministry of Education and at Haile Sellassie I University, the writer conducted a small pilot survey of nine rural villages in Ethiopia during the summer of 1972. Because this coincided with the Education Sector Review and the report of the Inter-Ministerial Committee for the Third I.D.A. Education Loan Proposal, every effort was made to focus the study on issues of interest to Ethiopian policy-makers.

Rather than studying existing institutions or programs, the writer was urged to examine the development orientation of rural villages in an effort to identify factors which would help outside programs to penetrate the villages or the self-help programs within the villages. In addition, the survey focused on education - both formal and nonformal - and other variables that might influence the development of the villages. Despite severe limitations of time and money, it was decided to conduct a simple base-line survey of attitudes and expectations of the residents of nine villages near Awasa, some 200 miles south of Addis Ababa.

Methodology:

The selection of the villages was entirely pragmatic, due to the presence of the Community Development Training and Demonstration Center in Awasa and the availability of its trainees to serve as interviewers during their holidays. This turned out to be extremely useful, since the trainees had already been posted to many of the local villages as part of their training and were thus fairly familiar with the local language and customs. Thus, although the impact of the Community Development Department was much greater in the Awasa area than in other parts of Ethiopia, the advantages of having such capable interviewers available outweighed the disadvantages of a sample biased in favor of Community Development.

A questionnaire was drawn up with the help of persons in the Government and the University and then translated into Amharic, the language of the interviews. This preliminary questionnaire was then revised after a pre-test by the interviewers in several of the villages to be studied. With the help of several staff members of the Community Development Training and Demonstration Center, the writer trained and supervised the interviewers during their initial fieldwork. Although the villages varied in size from less than 200 to over 1,500 persons, the interviewers attempted to interview between 30 per cent and 50 per cent of all persons over 16 years of age in each village.

With such inexperienced interviewers, problems were bound to occur, and the fact that 81 per cent of the respondents were male may be due to the fact that five of the six interviewers were also male. Nevertheless, the total number of nearly 1,200 respondents constitutes a large enough sample for us to draw a number of interesting conclusions.

In an effort to achieve consistency among the interviewers, a number of practice sessions were held in which the coding of responses was discussed in detail, and the interviewers met each week with their supervisor to transfer the data from their Amharic field questionnaires to the English response forms. After the completion of the field research, the coding and analysis of the data was done at Teachers College, Columbia University, and the College's Computer Center.

Acknowledgments:

Because his time in Ethiopia was so short, the writer is indebted to the many persons who assisted at various stages of the study. In particular Ato Million Neq Niq, Minister of State in the Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, was instrumental in every phase of the survey. Others who were very helpful included Geoffrey Last and Ato Haile Jesus of the Ministry of Education and Fine Arts, Ato Seyoum Selassie, then Dean of the College of Social Work at the University and a former Director of the Community Development Training and Demonstration Center at Awasa. The present Director, Ato Arega Yimam, and a staff member, Ato Geleta Gemechu, who supervised the field interviewers were extremely helpful. The six interviewers who served so capably were w/o Zenebetch b/Selassie, Ato Addis Gelalcha, Ato Kassa Yimer, Ato Mesfin Kasser, Ato Shitta Kassa and Ato Getaachew Mammo. For assistance with the analysis of the data I am indebted to Peter Shaw and Jacob van Lutsenberg Maas. Without the help of these and many other persons, this study would not have been possible, but naturally any errors of fact or interpretation are my own.

Characteristics of the Sample:

Although Awasa is the capital of Sidama Province, it is a rather small town and the nine nearby villages studied are poor, even by Ethiopian standards. Agriculture is the principal activity but few of the farmers own their own land, being tenants to absentee landlords. 84 per cent of the sample population had always lived in their native villages and only 31 per cent had ever been to

school (of these, only one out of six completed primary school). The occupational breakdown of the respondents is given in Table 1 and the relatively low proportion of housewives reflects the male-bias of the sample described earlier.

Table 1

OCCUPATION

	%
Farmer	46
Trader	16
Housewife	14
Craftsman	10
Student	5
Unskilled Labor	4
Government employee	3
Church	1
Unemployed	2
Total	101% (due to rounding)

Respondents were also ranked according to their socio-economic standing in their own community and although interviewers used their own judgment, the results shown in Table 2 indicate the relative poverty of the sample.

Table 2

RELATIVE SOCIO-ECONOMIC STANDING

	%
High	9
Average	49
Low	42
Total	100%

For convenience in handling the data, several villages were grouped together with neighboring villages. Table 3 gives a composite summary of the attributes of the nine villages in five groups.

Table 3

VILLAGE ATTRIBUTES

Village	Estimated Population	Sex: % Female	Woreda District	Education: % Attended School	Migration Stability: % always lived in village	Social Equality: % Average Standing
	(Rank)	(Rank)		(Rank)	(Rank)	(Rank)
Leku & Burka	6300 (2)	21 (2)	Sheba Dino	35 (2)	76 (4)	42 (4)
Medre Genet, Morochu & Gebre Christos	2750 (4)	13 (4)	Sheba Dino	22 (3)	55 (5)	45 (3)
Tulla & Wome	8000 (1)	1 (5)	Tabor	19 (4)	100 (1.5)	55 (2)
Kella	4000 (3)	18 (3)	Tabor	12 (5)	96 (3)	80 (1)
Busa	2000 (5)	37 (1)	Tabor	63 (1)	100 (1.5)	30 (5)

The occupational distribution of the respondents have been somewhat arbitrarily divided into "modern" and "traditional" categories as shown in Table 4.

Table 4

OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION BY VILLAGE

Village	MODERN OCCUPATION				TRADITIONAL OCCUPATION			
	Trader	Government Employees	Student	Farmer	Craftsman	Church	Unskilled	Unemployed
	% Rank	% Rank	% Rank	% Rank	% Rank	% Rank	% Rank	% Rank
Leke & Burka	24 (1)	5 (1)	10 (1)	40 (5)	6 (4)	0 (5)	5 (2.5)	3 (1.5)
Medre Genet, Orocho	19 (3)	2 (3.5)	3 (2.5)	42 (4)	15 (1.5)	3 (1)	7 (1)	3 (1.5)
Medre Christos	20 (2)	4 (2)	1 (5)	60 (1)	13 (3)	1 (4)	0 (5)	1 (4.5)
Ulla & Wome	3 (5)	2 (3.5)	2 (4)	54 (2)	15 (1.5)	2 (2.5)	5 (2.5)	2 (3)
Ulla	5 (4)	1 (5)	3 (2.5)	49 (3)	2 (5)	2 (2.5)	1 (4)	1 (4.5)

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When Tables 3 and 4 are seen together, certain patterns begin to emerge in which Leku and Burka seem the most "urbanized" with a high proportion of educated people, a high rate of migration and a high proportion of modern occupations. Although it would be a mistake to place much reliance on degree of equality as evidenced by the proportion of respondents considered to be average in socio-economic standing, it is interesting that Leku and Burka ranked low on equality.

Village Development Issues:

The respondents were asked to indicate what they felt were the most serious problems in their villages and the opinions are given in Table 5. Since multiple responses were possible, the table indicates each village's ranking of problems and the ratio of problems identified to respondents.

Table 5

MAJOR PROBLEMS IN THE COMMUNITY
(Multiple responses in rank order)

Village	Marketing	Transport	Schools	Firewood	Water Supply	Security	Health	Problem Respondent Ratio
Leku & Burka	5	2	4	6.5	3	6.5	1	507/44 (1.3)
Medre Genet, Morocho & Gebre Christos	3	7	6	4.5	1	4.5	2	276/183 (1.5)
Tulla & Wome	-	4	2	-	1	-	3	349/189 (1.8)
Kella	2	1	3	5.5	4	5.5	-	199/203 (1.8)
Busa	5	2	4	6	1	7	3	1697/1182 (1.4)

Although there was considerable variation both within and between villages, water supply, transport, health facilities, schools and marketing were seen in that order as the most common concerns.

Courses of Action:

The respondents were asked what could be done about the problems identified within four alternatives: (1) government action, (2) local initiative or self-help, (3) a combination of the two or (4) don't know. Table 6 gives the responses as well as the ratio of government reliance to self-reliance in each village.

Table 6
SOLUTIONS TO VILLAGE PROBLEMS

(By percent)

Village	Government Action	Local Initiative	Both	Don't Know	Government Self-Reliance Ratio
Leku & Burka	17.4	14.4	26.6	41.3	70/58 (1.2)
Medre Genet, Morocho & Gebre Christos	36.1	2.2	46.4	14.8	66/4 (16.5)
Tulla & Wome	43.4	13.2	26.5	16.9	82/25 (3.3)
Kella	21.7	34.0	44.3	-	44/69 (0.6)
Busa	7.4	2.5	34.2	5.9	15/5 (3.0)
TOTAL	23.5	13.6	42.6	20.1	

As one would expect, by far the most popular response was a combination of government action and local initiative. What is of greater significance, however is that self-help was the least popular course of action, even lower than the number who did not know which course to choose. The one village, Kella, in which self-help was favored over reliance upon government assistance is also, interestingly, the village with the lowest number of problems per respondent. This apparent positive correlation is strengthened by the fact that the three villages with the highest ratio of problems per respondent were also those which relied most heavily on government action.

What else can be said about the degree of local self-reliance? In looking at other characteristics of Kella, Table 3 indicates that it stands out as having the lowest amount of education and the highest level of socio-economic equality and lowest in the proportion of Traders.

Conversely, Busa, one of the villages ranking high on both perceived problems and reliance on government, ranks highest in educational level and lowest in social equality. When one finds a perfect negative correlation between the rank orders of education and social equality it suggests the following relationships:

1. The greater the extent of education,
2. The lower the degree of social equality,
3. The lower the degree of community self-reliance, and
4. The greater degree of reliance on government.

Although we cannot imply causality in this hypothesis the issues it raises cast doubt on some sacred dogmas of community development and runs counter to much of the rhetoric about educational development. However, these relationships support what many observers have seen; that education, like other vehicles of modernization, is often utilized most effectively by the most progressive segments of the population, thus increasing existing inequities at least in the short run. Secondly, education raises awareness and expectations of opportunities beyond the immediate horizons, thereby increasing dependence upon government.

Moving from village-level characteristics to an analysis of the data by individual preference for self-help or government intervention as the desired course of action reveals further interesting relationships. Table 7 analyzes those preferring local initiative and Table 8 analyzes persons preferring government assistance as the best means of dealing with village problems.

Table 7

PERSONS PREFERRING LOCAL INITIATIVE

(as a means of dealing with village problems)

[by Occupation, Sex, Education, Migration and Socio-Economic Status]
(percentages)

<u>Occupation</u>		<u>Sex</u>	<u>Education</u>	<u>Migration</u>	<u>Status</u>	
Craftsmen	27.0	M- 13.8	none 13.7	some 14.4	High	20.2
Church	26.6	F- 11.8	some 13.5	none 13.7	Average	14.8
Government	15.1				Low	11.0
Student	14.0					
Trader	12.9					
Farmer	12.2					
Housewife	12.1					
Unskilled	8.6					
Unemployed	4.0					

Table 8

PERSONS PREFERRING GOVERNMENT ACTION

(as a means of dealing with village problems)

[by Occupation, Sex, Education, Migration and Socio-Economic Status]
(percentages)

<u>Occupation</u>		<u>Sex</u>	<u>Education</u>	<u>Migration</u>	<u>Status</u>	
Unskilled	41.3	M- 25.1	none 27.5	some 28.3	Low	26.3
Craftsmen	31.5	F- 16.4	some 14.6	none 22.3	Average	22.4
Farmer	25.8				High	16.1
Trader	20.9					
Unemployed	20.0					
Student	15.7					
Housewife	15.2					
Government	15.1					
Church	13.3					

A number of interesting characteristics emerge from these tables. Although their preferences are quite evenly divided, craftsmen tend to be far more outspoken and decisive on the issue than housewives, for example. But while sex has no appreciable effect on preference for self-help, women seem much less

sanguine about reliance on government than men. It is also interesting that government employees have such a high preference for self-help and a low preference for the very programs they are involved in. Perhaps this refreshing honesty is an encouraging recognition of real constraints. More than any other category, unskilled labor looks to government for support but the unemployed have little hope for either local initiative or government action to remedy their problems. The students' lack of confidence in government runs somewhat contrary to the norm in other African countries* (since governments are the principal employers of graduates) but this may be explained by the recent friction between students and government in Ethiopia.

Although education apparently had no effect on respondents' preferences towards self-help, it had a negative effect on attitudes towards government programs. When one looks at this skepticism in the light of the tentative hypothesis concerning education, social equality and approaches to village problems, the picture becomes more complex and other village variables are probably at work.

Despite our concern that the question of relative socio-economic status was subject to the arbitrary judgments of the interviewers, this variable correlates most closely with preference for self-help. High status is associated with pronounced preference for self-help and lack of interest in government assistance. The low status respondents had just the opposite reaction.

In summary, people's development orientation is apparently shaped by their occupation and social standing in their communities, and entire villages differ sharply in their orientation towards local initiative or government intervention.

What Has Been Done?

Although it would have been preferable to get information on local development projects from accurate records of some sort, these simply do not exist, and we once again must rely on the respondents' perceptions on these issues.

*See articles on Eastern African Countries in African University Students and Politics by W. Hanna and S. Martin Lipset (eds.) (New York, Basic Books, in press)

Although responses will inevitably be affected by political factors and "community morale", peoples' perceptions of events are often as important for policy-makers as the actual events themselves. Table 9 gives the percentage of respondents in each village who indicated various activities the community had done by itself.

Table 9
SELF-HELP ACTIVITIES BY VILLAGE
(Percent)

Village	Schools	Roads Bridges	Community Centers	Church or Mosque	Cooperative	None
Leku & Burka	10.4	17.8	11.1	2.0	5.7	64.4
Medre Genet, Morocho & Gebre Christos	19.1	9.3	10.9	26.2	34.4	34.4
Tilla & Wome	25.9	89.9	58.2	-	54.5	0.5
Busa	100.0	1.0				
Total	31.8	25.5	19.2	6.5	19.6	27.4

Note: Percentages per village can total over 100 per cent since multiple responses were possible.

Except for Busa, where the interviewers apparently permitted only one answer, there is remarkably little agreement about self-help projects within villages. Possibly the question "what activities has your community done by itself?" was not understood clearly, but a more likely explanation may be that most community activities are not community-wide in fact, but cater to rather exclusive sub-groups. The low response rate for cooperatives will be discouraging to those responsible for coops, but it is hardly surprising in an area in which production and marketing are rather closely controlled by outsiders. As in many other parts of Africa, schools are the most popular self-help activity for, despite the long odds against continuing through the formal school system, it remains the principal means of escape from the hardships of rural life.

It is perhaps equally significant that one out of four respondents felt that there was no self-help activities in their communities, and that this proportion rose to nearly two thirds in Leku and Burka.

Table 10 presents the responses to the question "Who organized these activities?" The balabat (roughly equivalent to a chief) and government employees posted in the village were cited as the leading organizers of self-help activities by over one third of the respondents. Thus self-help, as perceived by the villagers, does not preclude some degree of governmental assistance.

Table 10 reveals several dramatic variations in the presence (or lack) of leadership among the villages. Even if one assumes that the question was not fully understood in several cases (e.g., Tulla and Wome in particular for example), it is interesting to note the differences in the effectiveness of the balabats or government employees.

Table 10

ORGANIZERS OF SELF-HELP ACTIVITIES

(Percent)

Village	No Answer	Balabat	Chika Shum (sub-chief)	Teacher	Priest	Land Owner	Merchant	Government Employee	Others	All of the above
Leku & Burka	64.6	6.7	2.5	0.2	0.2	1.7	7.2	2.2	0.7	22.3
Medre Genet, Morochu & Gebre Christos	32.2	4.9	3.8	2.7	1.6	24.0	6.0	47.0	14.2	3.3
Tulla & Wome	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	98.9	-	1.1
Kella	-	98.5	1.5	-	-	-	-	65.5	-	-
Busa	-	99.5	90.1	0.5	-	-	-	4.4	-	-
TOTAL	27.1	37.1	7.2	0.6	0.3	4.3	3.4	35.9	2.5	8.3

Government Services in the Villages:

Thus far we have described the respondents, their villages, their principal community problems, and what (if anything) they feel can be done about them. Table 11 indicates the villagers' responses when asked what government services they had had most contact with.

Table 11
GOVERNMENT SERVICES MOST IN TOUCH WITH VILLAGES
(Percentages)

Village	Agriculture	Community Development	Health	Literacy	Other	None
Leku & Burka	39.6	28.2	18.6	1.0	0.7	43.3
Medre Genet, Morochu & Gebre Christos	-	56.3	1.6	-	-	42.1
Tulla	71.4	88.9	36.5	-	3.2	-
Kella	52.7	100.0	47.8	-	-	-
Busa	28.1	90.6	72.4	-	0.5	-
TOTAL	38.8	65.3	33.1	0.3	0.8	21.3

Although the impact of Community Development is undoubtedly far greater in the Awasa area than elsewhere because of the presence of the Training Center, it is interesting that in Leku and Burka its impact was relatively weak. The extreme visibility of the literacy program is also striking since it theoretically had many participants in the area.

When asked which services they considered most useful, the responses were very similar, but with correspondingly lower percentages as shown in Table 12.

Table 12

GOVERNMENT SERVICES CONSIDERED MOST USEFUL

(Percentages)

Village	Agriculture	Community Development	Health	Literacy	Other	None
Leku & Burka	27.2	23.3	4.5	0.7	0.5	43.8
Medre Genet, Gebre Christos Morocho	-	56.8	-	-		43.2
Tulla & Wome	25.4	57.7	16.4	-	0.5	-
Kella	35.0	44.8	20.2	-	-	-
Busa	17.2	35.5	47.3	-	-	-
TOTAL	22.3	39.8	15.7	0.3	0.3	21.7

Cross tabulations of the four principal responses to this question with selected background factors give an indication which target groups are most affected by the government services. As shown in Table 13, women respond more to health services, and men to agricultural as one would expect.

Table 13
MOST USEFUL GOVERNMENT SERVICE BY INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS

(Percentages)

SEX	LOCAL STATUS														MIGRATION	
	M	F	Trader	Gov- ern- ment Empl- yee	Stud- ent	Farmer	Crafts- man	Church	I	O	N	High	Average	Low	Some	None
Agri- culture	25.9	7.2	17.4	15.6	26.7	34.7	5.4	13.3	8.5	4.2	6.0	17.1	22.2	23.8	4.9	25.8
Com- munity Develop- ment	42.0	30.4	37.1	37.5	44.6	41.2	53.1	53.3	29.8	42.5	16.0	40.4	44.2	34.7	34.1	40.5
Health	11.1	36.3	11.4	25.0	12.4	11.4	9.9	13.3	42.6	2.1	16.0	29.2	14.9	14.0	4.9	18.0
None	20.8	25.9	33.8	21.8	16.0	12.5	31.5	19.9	18.9	51.0	68.0	13.1	18.5	27.3	55.9	15.5

Persons with higher socio-economic status apparently benefited more from health services while the lower socio-economic groups felt that agriculture was more helpful. The relative popularity of community development among craftsmen, churchmen, students and the unskilled needs further exploration.

In response to the question "How have government services improved your standard of living?" the replies are shown in Table 14 according to individual benefit, benefit to home, farm or business, all of the above or not at all.

Table 14

HOW GOVERNMENT SERVICES IMPROVED STANDARD OF LIVING

Village	Type of Benefit (Percentages)				
	Individual	Home	Farm or Business	All of Above	None of Above
Leku & Burka	8.4	21.8	25.0	1.2	43.6
Medre Genet, Gebre Christos, Morocho	4.4	7.1	14.2	29.0	44.3
Tulla & Wome	39.7	4.2	19.6	36.0	1.1
Kella	13.8	6.9	35.0	44.3	-
Busa	78.3	4.4	14.3	3.6	-
TOTAL	25.7	11.2	22.3	18.8	21.9

As in other items, two sets of villages saw much less improvement in living standards resulting from government services and Kella, the village previously identified as having the greatest degree of self-reliance and the fewest community problems per capita, also indicated the greatest all-around improvement in living standards.

Looking back to Tables 3 and 4, one can see more clearly a pattern emerging in which the proportion of dissatisfied respondents is consistently high in Leku, Burka, Medre Genet, Morocho and Gebre Christos and among the unskilled and unemployed. Furthermore these villages have the largest proportions of migrants. Although the data probably cannot support more detailed analysis, it appears that the level of village disenchantment with government services is related to the proportion of migrants and of unskilled or unemployed persons.

Conclusions:

What, if anything, can be said about the above information? Generally speaking the results seem discouraging for educators or persons in community development work for the attitudes towards both government services and self-help projects could be described as skeptical. In view of the depressed state of rural development in the Awasa area this is hardly surprising, but it does indicate the difficulty in planning training programs without a considerable effort to integrate these genuine development activities.

ABSTRACT

Equal distribution of educational opportunity is a goal that educational planners in most societies espouse. In the following article, Kabiru Kinyanjui attempts to gauge the progress of Kenya in achieving such a goal. Kinyanjui's study examines disparities between urban and rural areas of Kenya, tracing the historical forces that helped to shape present patterns of inequality in Kenya's schools and demonstrating how such inequities are manifested in qualitative areas such as examination results.

Kinyanjui suggests that competition among Kenyans for educational services has intensified over the past 10 years, and concludes that Kenya's present primary school education is not catering to the majority of its clients, namely rural children who terminate their education after the seventh year. Generally, Kinyanjui notes, current distribution of educational services favors those districts and provinces that are already economically and politically powerful. At the individual level, he finds evidence that the economic capability of parents is becoming crucial in determining what benefits children derive from elementary education and even how far they go in the educational system.

EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR RURAL AND URBAN COMMUNITIES IN KENYA

by

Kabiru Kinyanjui

Introduction

The recent International Labor Organization report on income and equality in Kenya has pinpointed a problem that will be the subject of this paper:

"The tendency of Nairobi and the other urban areas to grow at the expense of the rural, of the richer regions in relation to the poorer, has led to growing imbalances between regions and different groups of the population. Education has contributed to this imbalance and made clear its consequences in intensely personal terms." (ILO Report p 2, 1972.)

The aim of this paper is therefore to analyze the nature and extent of disparities in the distribution of educational resources and opportunities between rural districts and provinces on one hand, and among urban communities on the other. In the context of this paper, educational resources refer to finance, teachers and teaching facilities; while opportunities refer to chances of being enrolled at primary or secondary school. Our study will be limited to primary and secondary school level, because these are crucial levels as far as disparities are concerned, and, secondly, because of the availability of data on these two levels.

An underlying assumption in this study is that equality of educational opportunity is a desirable social goal. Existing educational resources and opportunities should be distributed as equitably as possible to all inhabitants, irrespective of residence. The other assumption is that a strong desire for educational equality exists among the Kenyan people. Unfortunately, people who want equality of educational opportunity do not always realize that there must be changes in the kind of education to be made available. This is perhaps one of the major problems of the educator in Kenya.

Since we wanted to show what was happening at the rural district level, particularly when discussing primary education, 17 rural districts from the rich districts of Central Province to the semi-arid districts of North-Eastern Kenya were randomly selected and stratified by province. For urban comparison, we chose the four main urban centers in Kenya, namely Nairobi, Mombasa, Nakuru and Kisumu. Table I below attempts to give some general information on the rural districts in our sample, and the main urban centers which accommodate about ten per cent of the total population.

Table I: POPULATION AND LAND SIZE OF THE SAMPLED DISTRICTS, AND URBAN CENTERS

Provinces and Rural Districts	Population 1969	Land Area Sq. Km.	Population Density p.sq.Km.
<u>CENTRAL PROVINCE</u>	1,676,000	13,173	127
1. Kiambu	476,000	2,448	194
2. Muranga	445,000	2,476	186
<u>COAST PROVINCE</u>	944,000	83,041	11
3. Taita-Taveta	111,000	16,959	7
4. Kilifi	308,000	12,414	25
<u>EASTERN PROVINCE</u>	1,907,000	154,540	12
5. Meru	597,000	9,922	60
6. Isiolo	30,000	25,605	1
7. Kitui	343,000	29,389	12
<u>NORTH-EASTERN</u>	246,000	126,902	2
8. Wajir	86,000	56,501	2
<u>NYANZA PROVINCE</u>	2,122,000	12,525	169
9. Siaya	383,000	2,543	151
10. South Nyanza	663,000	5,714	116
<u>RIFT VALLEY PROVINCE</u>	2,210,000	170,162	13
11. Keiyo Marakwet	159,000	2,722	59
12. Laikipia	66,000	9,718	7
13. Samburu	70,000	20,808	3
14. Baringo	162,000	10,627	15
15. Olkejuado	86,000	20,963	4
16. Nakuru	291,000	7,024	4
<u>WESTERN PROVINCE</u>	1,328,000	8,223	162
17. Busia	200,000	1,629	123
<u>URBAN CENTERS</u>			
1. Nairobi	509,000	684	745
2. Mombasa	247,000	210	1,177
3. Nakuru	47,000	32	1,668
4. Kisumu	32,000	19	1,456
Whole Country	10,943,000	569,249	19

Source: Republic of Kenya, Statistical Abstract, 1972.

Before concluding this introduction, we insert a few words on the agricultural potential of the districts in our sample. About 80 per cent of Kenya is arid or semi-arid land of low agricultural potential on account of the low annual rainfall, 30 inches or less. The land with more than this annual rainfall is usually regarded as ranging between high and medium agricultural potential. The land in the five districts in our sample, Kiambu, Muranga, Busia, South Nyanza and Siaya is all of high potential. These districts are also among the most densely populated in rural Kenya. Five districts, Nakuru, Samburu, Marakwet, Kitui and Meru have between 50-60 per cent of the land area categorized as good agricultural land, while districts like Kilifi, Baringo and Laikipia have over 60 per cent of their area within the semi-arid or arid category. Most of the land in Taita-Taveta, Olkejuado, Wajir and Isiolo is of low agricultural potential and is mainly suitable for pastoral economy.

A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

At the time of independence in 1963, Kenya inherited an educational system that reflected the colonial socio-political stratification, with Europeans having the best quality schools, followed by Asians and Africans in that order. The inequality in provision of education between the races was manifested in many ways. For European children aged 7 to 15, education had been compulsory from the early days of colonization. Education was not compulsory for the Asian children until 1942, when it became compulsory for all boys living in the urban centers. There were not enough places even for African children who wanted to be in school. The number of schools available for these three groups differed accordingly. While the European had high schools as early as 1915 and Asian had schools in nearly every major town where they had settled by 1923, the Africans had their first secondary school in 1926 and had only four such schools in the 1940's.

In 1963 about 30 per cent of the total secondary school institutions in the country were in the urban areas, and these mainly catered for the Asian and European communities who formed about 3 per cent of the total Kenyan population, but had about 30 per cent of the available secondary school institutions at that time. The assumption behind this allocation seemed to be that "the several communities would remain for long, if not for ever, separate, and the education provided for each should correspond to the social and occupational role its members could be expected to play in national life." The events of the 1950's and 1960's, however, were to shatter this belief.

After the colonial impact came the Christian impact, the second major social force that shaped the pattern of African educational development. With the completion of the Kenyan-Uganda railway, most of the Christian missionaries move into the hinterland of Kenya. The main missionary settlements by 1914 were already inland, in the present Central, Nyanza and Western provinces of Kenya. In the Central Province these settlements were mainly in Kiambu and Nyeri. A few were established in Muranga district. In Western Kenya, the main center was Maseno which catered to Luo and Luhya tribesmen. In Nyanza Province, the northern part - especially that area around Maseno - was the main beneficiary of this early educational effort. The main districts in Western Kenya that experienced an early missionary impact were Busia and Kakamega in Western Province and Siaya, Kisumu and Kisii in Nyanza Province. Some of these districts, and this is also true of those in Central Province that had early contact with missionaries, have contributed a high proportion of the elite in present-day Kenya, and they were still among the leading districts in education in 1973. Although further missionary settlements did follow, especially after the First World War, this early pattern was not fundamentally altered. The main ethnic communities to experience this large-scale penetration by Christian missionaries were Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya, Kamba, Meru and Embu.

The African response to this cultural invasion was another significant force in the development of education in Kenya. This response took many forms. In some areas it manifested itself in the form of independent churches; this is particularly true of Western Kenya. In Central Province the revolt against missionary control manifested itself in the 1930's in the establishment of independent schools; the Kikuyu Independent School Association established schools in Nyeri and Muranga districts, while the Kikuyu Karing'a Education Association was active in South Kiambu, Rift Valley and some parts of Nyanza. The "independent" movement in education served to accentuate the educational disparities between different regions and ethnic groups in Kenya.

In 1925, the colonial government established local government administration with African representation. The Africans seized the opportunity offered by the establishment of the Local Native Councils to tax themselves to finance education and to open up new elementary schools. This policy had two potential dangers in terms of educational equality. Firstly, the relatively rich districts could raise more money and thereby pay for more schools and teachers, while the poor areas could barely maintain the few schools they had. Secondly, the local authorities channeled their educational funds through the existing missionary and independent school organizations so that those areas where these organizations existed benefited more than those areas where missionary or local organizational structures were nonexistent. This policy of entrusting local authorities with the responsibility for primary education continued in the 1950's with establishment of African District Councils; and in the 1960's when county councils were established. It had, however, the same unequalizing effect as we have observed with Local Native Councils. In the 1960's many local authorities were plunged into financial crisis because of the cost of primary education. This was one of the reasons why the central government took primary education, health services and roads from the county councils in 1969.

To sum up, during the colonial period, Africans were competing for education not only with Europeans and Asians, but among themselves, although perhaps this was not realized at the time. This competition has, however, become conscious and intensified in the last ten years of independence, something which this paper will attempt to focus on.

PRIMARY EDUCATION

Our attention here will be focused on primary school education, mainly between 1968 and 1972.

Officially, 64 per cent of Kenya primary school-age population is attending primary schools but with the repeating of classes that goes on in the primary school system, only about 60 per cent of the school-age population is really getting primary education. If dropout rate is considered, it would seem that only a small proportion is completing the seven years of primary education. To sum up, more than 35 per cent of school-age population is not getting any primary education, and another equally sizable proportion is not finishing the seven years of primary education.

Table II: THE PROPORTION OF SCHOOL-AGE POPULATION ACTUALLY IN SCHOOL
IN THE SAMPLED DISTRICTS AND THE MAIN TOWNS - 1970 AND 1971

District	No. of children actually in school		No. of children in school as a proportion of the projected (6-12) age group*	
	1970	1971	1970 %	1971 %
Kiambu	99,728	103,067	102.8	103.1
Muranga	94,613	101,349	102.8	106.7
Taita-Taveta	18,218	19,142	79.2	79.8
Kilifi	20,895	20,998	36.0	35.0
Meru	82,942	89,076	67.0	70.0
Isiolo	2,530	3,112	50.6	62.2
Kitui	42,615	41,443	67.6	63.8
Wajir	930	1,604	5.8	9.4
Siaya	48,213	50,648	63.4	64.1
South Nyanza	60,351	59,758	42.5	40.7
Keiyo-Marakwet	11,673	13,913	37.6	43.4
Laikipia	7,981	9,918	66.5	82.6
Samburu	2,079	2,724	14.8	19.4
Baringo	12,244	13,235	40.8	43.0
Olkejuado	7,627	9,153	44.8	50.9
Nakuru	30,396	36,196	48.2	55.6
Busia	27,813	24,270	66.2	56.4
<u>Urban Centers</u>				
Nairobi	26,164	27,005	65.4	64.3
Mombasa	61,238	67,523	77.5	83.4
Whole country	1,427,589	1,525,488	64.0	66.1

Source: Ministry of Education, Annual Reports 1971 and 1972, and Kenya Statistical Digest, Vol.X No.3, September 1972.

* These projections are made on the assumption that there is no change in age specific fertility rates from 1969 to 1980.

Table II shows the proportion of the projected 6-12 age group that is actually enrolled in primary schools in the sampled districts, and the main urban centers. There are some dangers involved in using the 6-12 age group as the primary school-age population in Kenya. To begin with, in the rich districts and the urban centers, some parents send their children to primary schools when they are under six years of age. In some of the educationally backward areas parents enrol their children in class one when they are well above the age of seven. The situation is further complicated by the repeating problem which is widespread in the whole of the primary school system, and reaching serious proportions in standard six and seven where pupils have to repeat to improve their chances of qualifying for government-maintained secondary schools. In March, 1971, 18 per cent of total primary school enrolment was aged 13 and over. At the same time two per cent of the total enrolment was aged five. This definitely complicates the working out of the enrolment ratio in the country using the projected 6-12 age group figures.

Therefore, it is highly probable that enrolment ratios given above err on the side of high figures. This does not, however, alter the fact that in some districts in Central Province the enrolment ratio is about 90 per cent and the highest in the country. Enrolment in some other districts and provinces, while not as high as that of districts in the Central Province, was well above the national average in 1970 and 1971. Some districts in Eastern and Western provinces fall into this category. The districts of Meru and Kitui in the Eastern Province have about 67 per cent of the projected primary school-age population in schools, while the Isiolo district, in the same province, had in 1970 enrolment only slightly above 50 per cent. Busia district in the Western Province of Kenya had an enrolment ratio which compared favourably with other districts in the province. The intra-provincial differences are more glaring in the Coast Province where Taita-Taveta in 1970 showed an enrolment ratio of 79 per cent while the provincial average was only 44 per cent. Kilifi district is just below this regional average. On the whole, low enrolment figures are to be found in the semi-arid and arid districts of the Coast, Eastern, Rift Valley and North-Eastern Provinces. It is also important to point out at this stage that female enrolment is far below that of males, and has a higher dropout rate. In short, the areas with low total enrolment at primary school level are also areas of low female enrolment. The towns of Nairobi, Mombasa and Nakuru show a higher proportion of females enrolled at the primary school level [Nairobi and Nakuru over 46 per cent and Mombasa 43 per cent]. The national average is about 41 per cent. The rich districts of Central and Eastern Provinces have a higher-than-average female enrolment.

The urban areas of Nairobi and Mombasa, although their enrolment ratio is above the national average and they lead in female enrolment at primary school level, rank behind rural districts like Kiambu, Muranga and Nyeri where the proportion of children in school is concerned. As far as Mombasa is concerned, Coast Province was the first area in Kenya to come into contact with Western education through the early missionaries but the Muslim culture proved resistant. So, with the building of the Kenya-Uganda railway, the missionary and colonial administration interests shifted into the hinterland, leaving the Coast a relatively neglected region as far as provision of western education is concerned.

The Nairobi case is a bit difficult to explain as we would expect the enrolment to be higher than it is at the moment. With its better quality primary school system we would expect enrolment of children from the rural areas, with the city residents proving more education oriented than most of the rural dwellers. The City of Nairobi does not have total school-age population enrolment; one reason may be that some of the urban poor are not sending their school-age children to school, and this may be particularly true of the urban squatters. Secondly, low-income groups with rural households may not be sending their children to city primary schools, but prefer leaving them with their mothers. The predominance of males in our urban areas tend to support this hypothesis, that many men who work in the urban areas prefer to leave their children and close relatives in the rural areas.

Lest the data given in table II may give the impression that the situation is not changing, we shall look into growth of enrolment at the primary school level. Table III below shows the situation is far from being static. In the period between 1968 and 1970 the annual growth rate for standard one class averaged about 12 per cent. But the districts we noticed had low enrolments in 1970 (Wajir, Samburu, Kilifi, Keiyo-Marakwet, and Olkejuado) are also the ones which showed more than average annual growth rates in standard one enrolment. Kilifi, Samburu and Olkejuado show the highest annual growth rates, about 25 per cent. Some of the districts with high enrolment ratios showed annual growth rates between eight and nine per cent. Kiambu, Kitui and Taita-Taveta fall in this category. It is, however, very difficult to trace a pattern in the rural areas, except that districts with low enrolments are trying hard to catch up with the educationally advanced districts of Central, Eastern, Nyanza and Western. It is difficult to say how much of this growth in the low-enrolment districts can be traced to local children, or if this annual growth rate is stimulated by children from the educationally advanced districts of Central, Eastern and Western Provinces who are moving to the educationally backward districts to take advantage of fees remission, boarding facilities and above all to improve their chances of going on to secondary school, as competition for maintained secondary school opportunities in these areas is not as stiff as in the advanced areas.

Table III: THE GROWTH OF PRIMARY EDUCATION IN RURAL DISTRICTS AND THE MAIN URBAN CENTERS

Rural Districts	1970 - 1972		1968 - 1972	
	The Growth of Std. I Enrolment	The Growth of total Primary Enrolment	The Growth of Std. I Enrolment	The Growth of total Primary Enrolment
	%	%	%	%
Kiambu	4.8	12.1	35.2	30.7
Muranga	10.5	15.9	24.5	33.2
Taita-Taveta	25.0	7.3	34.5	24.6
Kilifi	46.9	20.9	105.6	55.0
Meru	19.5	22.6	54.0	45.4
Isiolo	14.4	15.7	37.0	90.2
Kitui	15.5	7.9	32.5	44.5
Wajir	42.5	56.2	69.8	142.4
Siaya	34.9	16.6	22.0	13.8
South Nyanza	4.1	7.6	21.6	27.4
Keiyo-Marakwet	41.2	32.6	73.9	75.0
Laikipia	63.1	48.7	67.5	71.1
Samburu	148.3	55.9	102.5	75.7
Baringo	65.3	40.1	--	--
Olkejuado	55.2	37.1	97.7	72.5
Nakuru	19.8	36.6	12.2	11.7
Busia	15.3	61.5	71.0	46.0
<u>Urban Centers</u>				
Nairobi	19.7	17.2	23.9	30.3
Mombasa	5.8	10.0	17.1	22.2
Nakuru	11.5	15.3	35.3	39.9
Kisumu	1.9	2.1	14.8	14.1
Whole country	20.5	17.4	42.5	38.5

Source: Ministry of Education, Annual Reports 1968-1972.

In the urban areas, the average annual growth rate for standard one class in the period between 1968 and 1972 was about six per cent. This was also the annual growth experienced in some of the rich districts. It is possible that in the urban areas and some of these rich districts, the growth of standard one enrolment has stabilized and is mainly catering for the natural increase of the school-age population.

The caliber of teachers may not be the sole index of the quality of education at our primary schools, but we shall however take their background as a strong reflection of the quality of education available in a particular district or urban center. Table IV shows the distribution of qualified teachers by districts and urban centers in 1971. The urban areas have more qualified teachers than the rural areas. The urban areas of Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu and Nakuru had over 94 per cent of their total teaching force professionally qualified. The rural areas had about 75 per cent qualified. A further advantage of urban areas over the rural areas is shown in table IV where we see about 65 per cent of the urban teaching force in 1971 was of a secondary and above level of education. The rural districts of Kiambu, Siaya and Busia had more than 85 per cent of their staff qualified but the rest of the rural districts had between 20 and 48 per cent of the primary school teachers unqualified professionally. It is important to note, however, that not all of the educationally backward districts have a low proportion of qualified teachers. Another interesting contrast between the urban and the rural areas is the fact that most of the rural schools are manned by teachers with no more than primary education and two years of training. This category of teacher forms more than 55 per cent of the rural teaching force, as compared with less than 40 per cent in the urban area. That the urban areas are attracting more qualified teachers is obvious. Success in obtaining the Certificate of Primary Education is mainly dependent on the caliber of teaching staff in each school and H.C.A. Somerset indicates that a major reason for the inefficiency of this examination in the rural schools may be attributed to the lack of skills and knowledge on the part of teachers.

The shortage of qualified teachers at the unaided secondary schools has drained the rural primary schools of some of their experienced teachers. In 1967 there were 265 qualified citizen primary school teachers (PI's) who were teaching in the unaided secondary schools all over Kenya. These formed about 26 per cent of the total citizen teaching force in these schools. In 1970, this category of teachers formed 18 per cent of the total citizen teaching staff in Harambee and private secondary schools. The numbers involved may be small, but they are important when compared with the large numbers of untrained primary teachers in the rural areas. While the rural areas have been losing qualified teachers, an urban center like Nairobi has been gaining. The presence of large European and Asian communities provide a reservoir of much needed staff while the City Education Department has also been recruiting from overseas. No rural districts have power to do this.

Table IV: THE DISTRIBUTION OF PROFESSIONALLY QUALIFIED TEACHERS IN 1971

District	Graduates and above Secondary Educ.	Primary Teacher P1 & P2	Primary Teacher P3 & P4	Other	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Kiambu	1.3	40.8	57.3	0.5	99.9(2940)
Muranga	0.3	38.6	60.0	1.0	99.9(2320)
Taita-Taveta	-	31.7	65.1	3.2	100.0(410)
Kilifi	-	30.3	68.5	1.2	100.0(489)
Meru	0.1	40.8	56.5	2.6	100.0(2213)
Isiolo	-	32.3	66.2	1.5	100.0(65)
Kitui	-	28.7	71.2	0.1	100.0(794)
Wajir	-	29.6	62.9	7.4	99.9(27)
Siaya	0.1	33.2	66.4	0.2	99.9(1317)
South Nyanza	0.1	34.7	66.9	1.2	99.9(1627)
Keiyo-Marakwet	-	33.0	64.0	2.9	99.9(339)
Laikipia	0.4	36.1	62.7	0.7	99.9(274)
Samburu	-	29.4	67.9	2.6	99.9(78)
Baringo	0.3	32.0	66.2	1.5	100.0(343)
Olkejuado	0.8	22.1	75.0	2.0	99.9(244)
Nakuru	4.6	42.7	52.2	0.5	100.0(898)
Busia	-	26.0	73.3	0.6	99.9(822)
<u>URBAN CENTERS</u>					
Nairobi	11.4	53.1	34.7	0.8	100.0(1879)
Mombasa	2.2	56.9	38.9	1.9	99.9(685)
Nakuru	6.5	65.4	28.1	0.0	100.0(217)
Kisumu	2.0	64.6	32.0	1.3	99.9(150)
Whole country	1.0	37.8	60.2	1.0	100.0(40,000)

Source: Ministry of Education, Annual Report 1971.

Until passing local Government (Transfer of Functions) Act, 1969, the county and municipal councils had substantial responsibility for the financing and development of primary education. The change occurred because of the financial problems experienced by most county councils in providing primary education. While the county councils lost their responsibility for education, health and roads, the major urban centers, Nairobi, Mombasa, Nakuru and Kisumu retained both their responsibilities for these affairs and above all the power to collect Graduated Personal Tax which is a major source of revenue to pay for these services. The introduction of a Sales Tax and the abolition of the Graduated Personal Tax in 1973 meant that the municipalities lost a major source of their educational funds. Whether the promised grants to municipalities will reach a level that will enable these local authorities to continue with the present educational policies and expenditures, is a question that cannot be answered at the moment. We shall here confine ourselves mainly to analyzing what has been happening to the expenditures on primary education.

Rural primary education is in the hands of the District Education Boards (DEBs) established in June, 1971 to, among other things, administer education funds and develop elementary education in their respective areas. The municipalities continued with the responsibility for education in the urban centers though their powers are limited by the fact that the Teachers Service Commission (TSC) established in 1967 is the employer of almost all teachers in the municipalities.

The central government has direct responsibility on primary education through central administration and supervision, running of three high-cost primary schools, and a few teachers that are employed by the municipal authorities. Central control on elementary education is further exercised through Kenya School Equipment Scheme which is responsible for supplying of schools equipment and, ideally, should equalize the expenditure on school equipment all over the country. The funds allocated to this scheme, District Education Boards and Teachers Service Commission form the major public expenditure on rural primary education. Further public funds spent on primary education are those which emanate from the municipalities. Our attention now will turn to how public expenditure by these bodies is distributed in the rural areas and in the urban centers.

Teachers' salaries account for most of the expenditure on primary education and this has recently increased significantly mainly because of the implementation of Ndegwa Commission recommendations and the Teachers Service Remuneration Committee plus the increase in the number of teachers with higher qualifications, and the usual annual increments. The urban areas with more qualified and high-caliber teachers get more money. So do districts which have a high ratio of qualified and experienced teachers. Table IV and our earlier discussion have shown that the distribution of professionally qualified teachers tends to favor the urban centers, and the distribution of funds for teachers' salaries follows the same pattern. The lack of suitably qualified teachers at the moment and the problems associated with posting teachers

away from their own communities are also problems which hinder equitable distribution of educational funds. Notwithstanding these problems, the goal of equal educational opportunity must not be lost sight of. Maximum benefits to Kenyan society can be achieved by pursuing two goals: to obtain a qualified teaching staff and to have equitable distribution of the same simultaneously.

Each child in primary school is theoretically allocated between 15 and 20 shillings per annum for school equipment, to be supplied through the Kenya School Equipment Scheme. Data is not available to determine whether this allocation is carried out as stipulated. Even assuming that the allocation of schools' equipment follows closely the number of children in each rural district, there are still observable differences between urban and rural communities. Nairobi will illustrate these differences. In 1971 the Kenya School Equipment Scheme (KSES) provided 15 shillings per child for school equipment but the Nairobi City Council Scheme provided an extra 13 shillings per pupil that year to buy class library books, teachers' reference books, other books not provided by K.S.E.S., craft and needlework materials. From this brief survey, it is clear that some urban centers are able to supplement what is provided by the national scheme. Most of the schools that can do this are in urban areas, and are patronized by elites.

Under a vote termed "miscellaneous - other charges", the District Education Boards are allocated funds for traveling, organizing inservice training, office expenditure and other charges. Funds for primary boarding schools also come under this vote. Most of the boarding primary schools are to be found in the educationally backward parts of the country. In the financial year 1971-72, the Central Government spent 59.6 per cent of the total allocation to the DEBs under this vote for maintaining these boarding schools. In 1971, 21 districts were receiving funds for boarding primary schools. These are given in the table below.

Table V: ALLOCATION OF FUNDS FOR RURAL BOARDING SCHOOLS 1971 - 1972

Province	District	Amount Allocated	% Total Boarding Allocation
COAST	Kilifi	71,050	2.0
	Kwale	37,730	1.0
	Tana River	140,630	3.8
	Taita-Taveta	9,800	0.3
EASTERN	Embu	70,070	2.0
	Isiolo	166,600	4.5
	Marsabit	225,890	6.1

NORTH-EASTERN	Garissa	24,500	0.1
	Wajir	87,220	2.3
	Mandera	44,100	1.1
RIFT VALLEY	Nakuru	511,550	14.0
	Baringo	145,530	3.9
	Kipsigis	67,620	2.0
	Uasin Gishu	71,540	2.0
	Nandi	184,730	5.0
	Keiyo-Marakwet	5,850	0.2
	West Pokot	460,600	12.0
	Narok	225,890	6.1
	Kajiado	441,000	12.0
	Turkana	367,000	10.0
	Samburu	343,000	9.2
T O T A L		3,701,900	100.0
		=====	=====

Source: Ministry of Education.

As we have shown above, the government is spending a substantial sum of public funds to provide boarding primary schools, and for expenses incurred in traveling, training and office maintenance, in the remote districts of the country. Lack of complete data prevents us from saying whether we are spending more educating the urban child or the child in the remote districts of Kenya. Another point that needs to be borne in mind when interpreting the allocations of this kind and in particular funds for boarding facilities is the fact that the children from these districts may not be the only beneficiaries. As pointed out earlier, the movement of children from the more developed districts to these educationally backward districts is a common phenomenon leading to unfair apportionment of opportunity.

Rural incomes in Kenya are far below those in urban areas. Therefore when rural communities spend about Ksh.60 per pupil per annum, even allowing for differences in cost of living, the sacrifice is far higher than that of an urban worker who may have annual income five or more times the income of the rural peasant, which may not be more than L60 per annum. It is not surprising that some rural families are not sending all their children to school, even when facilities are available, or are forced to withdraw their children from school for lack of money. Girls are the first to be denied an education and they are the first to be withdrawn from school. The urban communities, although linked to the rural communities by family ties and ownership of land, are least affected by droughts and crop failures. The arid and semi-arid parts of Coast, Eastern, North-Eastern and Rift Valley are affected.

The low enrolment figures in these areas may be partially attributed to rural poverty made worse by occasional drought. The government has been giving fees remission (the government intends to provide 20 per cent schools' remission by 1975), and free education in some of the educationally backward districts. At the present ten districts with a total enrolment of about 32,000 pupils are benefiting in this way. These are Tana River and Lamu in the Coast, Isiolo and Marsabit in the Eastern, Garissa, Mandera and Wajir in North-Eastern and Samburu, West Pokot and Turkana in the Rift Valley.

Leaving the differences between districts aside for the moment, there are enormous discrepancies within each district in the way the educational burden is shared by progressive farmers and backward farmers on the one hand and the rural laborers on the other. Recent research on rural development in Nyeri, Migori, Vihiga and Mbere provides much data. Innovative farmers have raised their incomes substantially and can easily provide education for their children. Low-income farmers and laborers on the other hand are usually experiencing difficulties. By way of illustrating this, look at the educational expenditures of farmers and farm laborers of two villages, Gatei and Gaikuyu in the Nyeri district of Central Province.* Agriculturally these two rural villages are not very different, but Gatei is more fertile and suitable for growing food crops, while Gaikuyu is less fertile but suitable for growing tea. The sizes of land holdings are also different, Gaikuyu having small holdings of an average of 6.5 acres while Gatei, more densely populated, has landholdings of about 3.8 acres. The data given below comes from two samples of farmers in these two villages and the laborers employed thereof. The figures below are those of the farmers and laborers who have children in school.

Table VI: THE EXPENDITURE ON EDUCATION BY TWO RURAL COMMUNITIES IN THE
NYERI DISTRICT OF CENTRAL PROVINCE+

	GAIKUYU (mean size holding 6.5)		GATEI (mean size holding 3.8 acres)		TOTAL	
	Farmers	Laborers	Farmers	Laborers	Farmers	Laborers
Average total expenditure per household	N=11 2976.00	N=20 1214.75	N=10 1603.90	N=23 1708.52	N=21 2322.62	N=23 1478.86
S.D.	1813.47	528.0	616.93	756.77	-	-

Average total expen- diture on education	758.00	158.50	409.80	237.13	592.19	200.56
S.D.	606.79	159.59	416.20	358.07	-	-
% of the total expen- diture spent on education	25.5	13.0	25.6	12.9	25.5	13.6

* I am grateful to Mike Cowen for allowing me to use this data from his current study of Differentiation in a Rural Community in Nyeri District.

+ The whole sample was as follows: 15 farmers' and 28 laborers' households from Gaikuyu and 20 farmers' and 39 laborers' households from Gatei. This table shows only the households which had children attending school.

In this sample, farmers are spending more money on education than laborers, 25 per cent of their total annual expenditure. The laborer households are spending about 13 per cent. Possibly, farmers are giving their children more than just elementary education, and we hope, when data from this study is fully analyzed, it will support this hypothesis. Laborers' incomes are such that they cannot easily support secondary education.

This brings us to a stage where we should ask--what social groups in particular areas are benefiting from public education? While it is perhaps safe to assume that the quality of rural education varies little, in Nairobi, and this is also true of the major urban centers, the primary schools are divided into three streams, A, B and C. The so-called C schools are the best in terms of teachers and even C.P.E. results, while B are secondbest and A schools are graded the same as rural schools. Different social groups benefit from these different primary schools in urban areas, and the same is true of some rural areas.

Apart from the school fees which both rural and urban parents are required to pay, rural parents are also required to pay for the building of staff houses, classrooms, maintenance of school buildings and the cost of other necessary facilities in primary schools. The parents in the urban areas are not required to pay for the initial building of staff houses and classrooms, let alone for their maintenance. The rural communities are footing this bill more or less on their own; hence the existence of a school-building committee in every rural primary school. Although this kind of self-help activity is widespread, it does not receive a great deal of publicity as it is not as glamorous as the self-help secondary schools or the now-fashionable institutes of science and technology. The emphasis on self-help secondary schools has deprived self-help efforts at primary school level not only of publicity but also of teachers and an improvement in the quality of school buildings. The Ndegwa Commission, commenting on this problem, acknowledged the role which the rural communities are playing in provision of educational facilities in this way:

".....there has been a very noticeable deterioration in the condition of many primary school buildings both classrooms and teachers' houses during the past four or five years. This is due in no small measure to the fact that many of the better premises have been converted into Harambee Secondary Schools. We appreciate that any improvement in this situation is dependent on local efforts and enthusiasm, but would urge that 'Harambee' efforts in future should also be directed towards the improvement of primary school buildings and teachers' houses (Emphasis mine) (Ndegwa Commission p.151, 1971).

There are other benefits which urban communities are receiving which the rural communities either go without or pay for. In the urban centers, and in Nairobi in particular, the children have a richer curriculum and close supervision. In Nairobi there are cases where children experiencing problems in learning English are given remedial courses. It is also possible that some urban children are receiving better quality pre-school education with stronger emphasis on English than most of the rural communities receive. The urban centers also provide special education for the handicapped. The children in the rural areas are not receiving this kind of help. The point is that urban areas are providing not only high-quality education, but also additional services that are crucial to the improvement of elementary education.

Primary school education tends to be judged by the performances of pupils at the Certificate of Primary Education. Teachers, parents, pupils and society at large judge the quality of each school on how well pupils perform in C.P.E. and how many leavers are given places in government-maintained secondary schools. Parents, particularly rich ones, are going to great pains to provide their children with a head start in English at home, in pre-schools and at high-cost primary schools so that they can do well in C.P.E., which is essentially a test in English. Unfortunately, it is not possible to compare the performance of the urban schools with that of rural schools as there are supposed to be no failures in this examination and the average performance of the districts or schools are not usually published by Nairobi City Education Office. However, it is possible to state that there are enormous differences in performance between the low-cost, medium-cost and high-cost primary schools in Nairobi.

Before we proceed to discuss the distribution of secondary school opportunities, it is necessary to comment on the effect of CPE on the whole question of curriculum reform, and especially attempts to orient the curriculum to rural needs and the African situation. Because of the emphasis on the examination, subjects not examined are usually relegated to second place or neglected completely. Kenneth King has commented on this phenomenon where he says:

There is.....the somewhat paradoxical situation in which the only subjects which have a vocational side to them, and which stand high in the rhetoric of politicians and primary school curriculum experts are those subjects which are least regarded in the schools. It is moreover asserted by some headmasters that pupils have formed the habit of skipping domestic science or handicraft periods, and may be found at home working on the really critical subjects. Equally with Swahili it is a matter of some concern to those who see Swahili taking a more prominent place in national life that the standard of primary school Swahili has probably in fact deteriorated over the last decade. (King 1971).

Another detrimental effect of this examination is the irrelevance of studies to the pupils' daily lives. Pupils grow up regarding learning as cramming for the examination in a parrot-fashion and it is not surprising, therefore, that a good number of primary school-leavers, when they "fail" their CPE, lose all interest in learning, while those who proceed on to secondary education have developed none of the habits of critical thought that is crucial to higher education.

In short, the present primary-school education, with its emphasis on access to secondary education by means of the CPE, is not catering for the majority of its clients, namely the rural children who terminate their education at standard seven. It neither provides the skills nor does it interest most rural pupils in the life that faces them. This psychological disorientation from their true life situations is one of the serious problems facing our school-leavers.

SECONDARY EDUCATION

In this section we shall deal with the distribution of educational resources and opportunities at the secondary school level, particularly at the provincial level and in the main urban centers. The province is used as the main unit of analysis because government opportunities and resources tend to be distributed more or less on provincial bases. Districts within each province do, however, benefit in different measure from this provision.

Secondary schools can be categorized according to their recruitment base. Those that recruit nationally are called national schools. In 1971, these schools provided about ten per cent of the total form one places available in the government-aided schools. The provincial schools, which form the major category of government-aided schools, recruit their form one intakes within their own provinces. These, together with the national catchment schools, provided form one opportunities for about 13 per cent of the 167,000 CPE candidates in 1970. Another 19 per cent was absorbed in the self-help community

Harambee, and privately owned commercial secondary schools. These two types of schools make up the broad category of schools called unaided secondary schools. The Harambee secondary schools have a very limited and localized catchment area, in the main not outside the districts of their location. The profit-oriented private secondary schools are mainly to be found in the urban centers. We shall categorize secondary schools broadly into central government-aided schools, and the mainly self-help unaided schools. We shall start by looking at the distribution of secondary school opportunities, thereafter examine the distribution of secondary institutions, and finally look at the quality of these two categories of schools and the implications this quality has on opportunities for further education, training and employment.

Table VII shows what proportion of the projected secondary school population (13-16 age group) is actually enrolled in our secondary schools. As pointed out earlier in this paper, the projection figures for primary school-age population do not reflect the real school-age population. This is equally true at the secondary school level. The finishing age for primary education is not 12, but between 13 and 15. Consequently, the starting age for secondary education for most pupils is somewhere between the ages of 14 and 16 which means that the age of entering and finishing secondary education varies to some extent from the projected 13-16 age group. If the projected figures underestimate the secondary school population in the country, then we can assume that this underestimation applies to all the districts and provinces equally and we can make provincial comparison without fear of obscuring the regional inequalities.

The proportion of secondary school-age population actually in school in 1970 was estimated to be 6.2 per cent of the projected 13-16 age group. This proportion was not significantly different in 1972 from that of 1970. Because of the possible underestimation of the projected 13-16 age group mentioned above, the proportion actually in school might be slightly less than that given in our table. This clearly underlines, therefore, the limited opportunities for secondary education in Kenya despite the rapid secondary school expansion of the last nine years.

Table VII: THE ACTUAL SECONDARY SCHOOL ENROLMENT AS A PROPORTION OF THE PROJECTED SECONDARY SCHOOL-AGE (13 - 16) POPULATION 1970 AND 1972

PROVINCE	Actual enrolment in 1970	Proportion of the projected 13-16 age group	Actual enrolment in 1972	Proportion of projected 13- age group
CENTRAL	14666	9.2	18336	10.7
COAST	2225	3.5	3057	4.5
EASTERN	8989	5.1	12028	6.4
EASTERN	154	0.6	272	1.2

NYANZA	8134	3.8	9947	4.4
RIFT VALLEY	7477	3.6	9210	4.1
WESTERN	8792	6.2	11600	7.7

URBAN CENTERS

NAIROBI	6495	18.0	6564	16.8
MOMBASA	2743	13.0	2819	12.8

NATIONAL TOTAL	64293	6.2	78199	7.1
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Source: Ministry of Education, Annual Reports 1970 and 1972; and Kenya Statistical Digest, Vol. X No. 3, September 1972.

This limitation of opportunity explains to some extent why CPE has become such an important examination in the Kenyan educational system.

In this respect, the municipalities of Nairobi and Mombasa were well above the national average in 1970 and 1972. In 1970 they had 18 and 13 per cent respectively of their total secondary school population enrolled in school. Central and Western provinces were the better-off rural areas, having respectively 9.2 and 6.2 per cent of their projected secondary school population actually enrolled. As we noticed earlier, some districts within Central and Western provinces had also the highest ratio of primary school-age population in school. Rift Valley and Coast and North-Eastern provinces ranked as the regions with the lowest proportion of the projected secondary school population enrolled in school and they also possessed among the lowest primary school enrolment.

We shall carry this kind of analysis further by showing how form one opportunities are distributed between the provinces and the major urban centers. Table VIII focuses first on the distribution of form one places in government-aided schools, and then focuses on the distribution of opportunities available in the unaided secondary schools for the primary-school leavers who fail to get admission into the aided secondary schools.

Table VIII: THE 1971 FORM ONE OPPORTUNITIES FOR 1970 CPE CANDIDATES

PROVINCE	No. of CPE candidates in 1970	Proportion getting Form I opport. in aided sch. 1971	1970 Std.VII leavers competing for unaided Sec. sch.	Proportion of leavers getting opport. in unaided sch. in 1971	Total index of opport. for Sec. Ed.
		%		%	%
CENTRAL	37,929	12.1	33,344	20.0	29.7
COAST	5,530	15.2	4,690	15.7	28.5
EASTERN	32,551	9.0	29,611	15.2	22.9
N. EASTERN	192	54.7	87	--	54.7
NYANZA	32,103	7.7	29,618	13.8	20.5
RIFT VALLEY	21,756	10.1	19,551	12.7	21.6
WESTERN	25,508	11.1	22,673	15.1	24.6
<u>URBAN CENTERS</u>					
NAIROBI	6,607	46.6	3,527	103.9	98.0
MOMBASA	3,294	28.7	2,349	159.8	73.3
NAKURU	707	37.9	458	100.6	99.6
KISUMU	738	59.3	288	194.4	138.4
WHOLE COUNTRY	166,916	12.4	146,196	19.5	29.8

Source: Ministry of Education, Annual Reports 1970 and 1971.

From Table VIII it is clear that there exist enormous differences between rural and urban communities in the provision of secondary form one places in aided as well as unaided secondary schools. The relationship between 1970 CPE candidates in the provinces and urban centers with the available form one opportunities in 1971 shows a wide disparity between aided and unaided schools, particularly in the urban centers. But the real distribution of secondary school opportunities is not as reflected in the figures given above. First, there are secondary school opportunities which are distributed nationally in the national schools, most of which are situated in the urban centers. Nairobi City has most of the national secondary schools. These schools are supposed to recruit from the whole country on the basis of CPE merit. As already pointed out, these schools provide about ten per cent of the avail-

able opportunities in government-aided schools.

The opportunities available in the unaided schools in the urban centers are not exclusively for urban primary-school leavers. The unaided secondary schools in the municipalities are mainly privately owned and since profit is the major motive, they recruit from all over the country. So in our towns there is a category of urban migrants whose initial motive for leaving rural areas is to seek educational opportunities. These are the primary school leavers who fill the few places available in the unaided schools in urban areas. The extent of this rural-urban movement in search for education is not known, and it is not known also how many migrants seek opportunities available in Harambee secondary schools.

Table IX: THE DISTRIBUTION OF SECONDARY SCHOOLS BY PROVINCE AND MUNICIPALITIES, 1970 AND 1972

PROVINCE	1970			1972		
	Aided %	Unaided %	Total %	Aided %	Unaided %	Total %
Central	23.3	25.1	24.4	23.7	27.0	25.7
Coast	4.7	2.7	3.4	5.0	3.6	4.1
Eastern	15.0	18.8	17.4	16.5	17.3	17.0
N. Eastern	0.3	0.0	0.1	0.8	0.0	0.3
Nyanza	14.3	17.0	16.0	14.9	16.2	15.7
R. Valley	13.0	11.6	12.1	12.9	10.8	11.6
Western	15.0	12.2	13.3	14.1	14.0	14.0
<u>URBAN CENTERS</u>						
Nairobi	9.3	7.7	8.3	8.0	6.8	7.3
Mombasa	3.0	2.7	2.8	2.5	2.2	2.3
Kisumu	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.8	0.7	0.7
Nakuru	1.0	1.2	1.1	0.8	1.4	1.2
Whole Country	99.9(300)	100.0(483)	99.9(783)	100.0(363)	100.0(585)	99.9(948)

Source: Ministry of Education, Annual Reports, 1970 and 1972.

Table IX illustrates once again the disparities existing between the provinces in the distribution of secondary schools. In 1970, Central Province, with about 15 per cent of the total national population in 1969, had 23.3 per cent of the aided schools, and 25.1 per cent of the unaided schools, or 24.4 per cent of the secondary school institutions in the country. The reason for Central Province having a lion's share of educational institutions is partly historical and partly political and economic. The proximity of the province to the white settlements and to Nairobi, the early missionary settlement and a strong tradition of self-help in education account historically for the lead it has in primary and secondary education. The agricultural development of the area, plus the political dominance it has maintained since independence, has consolidated this lead.

Following Central Province is Eastern with 17.4 per cent of the total. This corresponds to its share of the national population in 1969. Nyanza Province had the third highest proportion of secondary school institutions in the nation; the percentage did, however, fall short of its share of the national population, 19.4 per cent in 1969. Western province had 13.3 per cent of the institutions in 1970 though its share of the population was only 12.2 per cent in 1969. These four provinces had a head start in western education because of missionary activities in the early days of colonization, and since the achievement of independence, they have been very active, and at times very successful, in lobbying for central government resources. This has not been the case for North-Eastern, Coast and some of the districts in the Rift Valley which have some political and economic difficulties to contend with if they are to catch up with the advanced areas. The urban areas, on the other hand, are doing pretty well. Nairobi, for instance, had 4.3 per cent of the total institutions in the country, while its share of the national population in 1969 was only 4.7 per cent.

Between 1970 and 1972 there was no significant change in the pattern of distribution we have observed above. Central province continued its lead in 1972 with 25.7 per cent of secondary school institutions. This shows that mere increase of educational institutions, without underlying changes in the pattern of their distribution, will not necessarily alter the basic regional disparities. In the last ten years Kenya has achieved tremendous expansion in education, but regional inequalities have remained the same, and in some cases have become worse.

To illustrate the latter point we shall trace the development of aided and unaided secondary schools from 1963 to 1973. Table X attempts to show the development of government-aided schools. From this table we can compare the pattern distribution of aided secondary schools in 1963 and 1973. In 1963 Nairobi and Mombasa had 28 per cent of all the secondary school institutions in the country; in 1973 only 10 per cent. During this period the

city of Nairobi had an increase of seven aided institutions; in Mombasa the 1963 number did not increase at all. The rural provinces in 1973 had 90 per cent of total number of institutions in the country as compared to 72 per cent in 1963. This shift is due to the attention which the rural communities have given to provision of secondary school opportunities, a need that was keenly felt in the early 1960's.

Table X: THE DEVELOPMENT OF AIDED SECONDARY SCHOOLS DURING THE INDEPENDENT DECADE

PROVINCE	No. of sec. schools in 1963	% school increase 1964-1968	% school increase 1969-1973	Total No. of aided schools in 1973	% Total increase 1963-1973
Central	24	112.5	78.4	91	279.1
Coast	3	266.6	90.9	21	600.0
Eastern	12	158.3	112.9	66	450.0
N. Eastern	0	--	200.0	3	--
Nyanza	17	94.1	8.2	63	270.6
Western	16	100.0	68.7	54	237.5
R. Valley	15	140.0	61.1	58	286.6
<u>Urban Centers</u>					
Nairobi	22	31.8	0.0	29	31.8
Mombasa	11	0.0	0.0	11	0.0
Whole country	120	95.8	68.5	396	230.0

Source: Ministry of Education.

The point we have raised on regional inequalities remaining unchanged, or becoming worse becomes obvious when we compare the distribution of institutions in 1963 and 1973. In 1963 Central Province had 20 per cent of the available government-maintained secondary schools while in 1973 its share had become 23 per cent. The rate of increase was highest in Kirinyaga district, followed by Nyeri district. The Coast Province had 2.5 per cent of secondary schools in 1963 and about 5 per cent in 1973. Most of this increase was in Taita-Taveta district which had one secondary school in 1963 but had another 7 by 1973. The proportion of schools in Eastern province

increased from ten per cent in 1963 to about 17 per cent in 1973. This increase was mainly in Meru and Masaku districts; Isiolo and Marsabit districts had each only one secondary school. Nyanza, Western and Rift Valley showed no significant change.

Our figures also show the rate of increase of secondary schools between 1963 to 1973. The Coast Province had the highest increase, followed by Eastern Province, with Rift Valley taking a third place. While some districts had an increase as high as 700 per cent, others had no secondary schools at all. The unplanned expansion of self-help Harambee schools and the government takeover of existing self-help schools accounts to a large extent for the uneven development.

We have no complete figures to show the development of unaided secondary schools from 1963 to 1973, but we do have figures for 1968 to 1972. Table XI below shows this development.

The development of unaided schools from 1968 to 1972 shows the same regional inequalities as in the provision of government-aided schools. The areas with the highest share of government-aided secondary schools also had the highest share of Harambee self-help schools. The same pattern is maintained with the Harambee institutes of science and technology. Central Province has four institutes, while Eastern, Rift Valley, Western and Nyanza have each three proposed institutes. Coast Province is building only one institute. Godfrey and Mutiso (1973) have pointed out the danger these institutes pose of accentuating inequalities between regions and between social groups within the provinces. Kiambu and Muranga districts of Central Province, two of the richest and most politically influential areas in the country, are also the two areas which have been able to raise the largest amounts locally. This phenomenon is not at all new. It is the wealthy and politically influential areas that have been able to establish self-help schools without major problems, and it is these same areas which have been able to influence government takeover of the established Harambee schools. Hence, self-help movement in education has been a critical arena for political competition between politicians, regions and the main ethnic groups. Educational planning has therefore become a very difficult problem, something which has unfortunate implications to the elimination of regional inequalities in provision of education.

Table XI: THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNAIDED SCHOOLS 1968 - 1972

PROVINCE OR URBAN CENTERS	1968	1970	1972
Central	25.5	25.1	27.0
Coast	6.0	2.7	3.6
Eastern	15.7	18.8	17.3
N. Eastern	0.0	0.0	0.0
Nyanza	17.9	17.0	16.2
Rift Valley	12.2	11.6	10.8
Western	13.0	12.2	14.0
<u>URBAN CENTERS</u>			
Nairobi	9.7	7.7	6.8
Mombasa	*	2.7	2.2
Nakuru	*	1.2	1.4
Kisumu	*	1.0	0.7
Whole country	100.0(369)	100.0(483)	100.0(585)

Source: Ministry of Education, Annual Reports 1968-1972.

* The figures for these municipalities are included in the provincial figures: Mombasa-Coast, Nakuru-Rift Valley and Kisumu-Nyanza.

The financing and maintenance of self-help schools in the rural communities can give rise to inequity. When a Harambee is to be established, the local communities are required to contribute in cash and kind, but sometimes coercion has been employed. In some cases, rural co-operatives have been required to pay a levy that goes for self-help projects. Social pressure has also been strong. Contributions seem to have become a form of rural taxation although the benefits of these institutions are not accessible equally to all rural people.

The parents with children in Harambee secondary schools are required each year to pay school fees which range between Ksh. 450 - 1200 per pupil as compared with Ksh. 200 - 450 paid in government-aided schools. (Only in the high-cost government-assisted secondary schools are fees more than 500 Ksh.) It is clear, therefore, that parents with pupils in Harambee or private secondary schools are shouldering a heavier burden than those with children in government-aided secondary schools. Apart from paying school fees, parents are required to contribute annually to school building funds, and toward the costs of providing extracurricular programmes. To meet financial needs of this kind, parents in the rural areas have been under strong pressure to sell land, cattle and even divert funds for farm improvement to educational projects.

But the quality of the education offered (plus the rising rate of unemployment among secondary-school leavers) does not seem to merit such parental sacrifices. Lack of laboratories means that the teaching of science is impossible, while lack of well-stocked libraries gives pupils little chance of widening their knowledge. Although some of the schools have had very devoted staff, the limited facilities and the high turnover have tended to erode the morale while some of the teachers are of low caliber. To get an inkling of the quality of teaching staff in Harambee schools, we give in table XII comparative figures on the distribution and background of teachers in government-aided and the unaided schools.

Table XII: THE DISTRIBUTION AND QUALIFICATION OF TEACHERS IN AIDED AND UNAIDED SECONDARY SCHOOLS - 1970

<u>PROFESSIONALLY QUALIFIED TEACHERS</u>	AIDED	UNAIDED	TOTAL NO. OF TEACHERS
Graduate Teacher	50.2	38.2	1750
Secondary Teacher ONE (SI)	42.3	18.7	1366
Primary Teacher ONE (PI)	2.7	34.1	354
Other	4.8	9.0	211
TOTAL	100.0(2868)	100.0(813)	3681
<u>PROFESSIONALLY QUALIFIED TEACHERS</u>			
Graduates	68.0	21.3	776

Higher School Cert.	25.6	35.6	718
E.A.C.E.	3.9	36.9	594
Other	2.4	6.2	112
TOTAL	99.9(759)	100.0(1541)	2200
NATIONAL TOTAL	3527	2354	5881

Source: Ministry of Education, Annual Report 1970.

This table also shows the extent of inequality in the distribution of teachers between these two categories of secondary schools.

In the aided schools, 50 per cent of the professionally qualified teachers were graduates, while in unaided schools it was 38 per cent. Of the total of 1750 professionally qualified graduates teaching in Kenya secondary schools in 1970, 82 per cent taught in aided schools while only 18 per cent were employed in Harambee and other unaided schools. Graduate teachers together with qualified secondary school teachers (SIs) made up more than 90 per cent of the qualified teaching corps in the aided schools, while in unaided schools they made up only 57 per cent. The primary school teachers (PIs) made up 34 per cent of the qualified staff in unaided schools while they made up only three per cent in the aided schools. These facts are undoubtedly related to the poor performance in the East African Certificate of Education by the unaided schools.

The unaided schools are attended by primary school leavers who fail to be admitted to government-aided schools. These pupils clearly see themselves as either "failures" or second-rate students and with the quality of education available in Harambee and private schools, their perception is not entirely inaccurate. One writer on Harambee schools has recently observed that society tends to view Harambee institutions as inferior and capable of turning out only inferior products. This attitude is manifested by the jobs which Harambee school-leavers aspire to, and by the way employers and heads of higher education and training institutions treat applicants from these schools. Harambee pupils do a great deal of manual work which is needed to maintain them in school whereas in the aided schools, some of the manual work is done by paid workers. Pupils attending these schools therefore grow up disdaining manual work. In this way Harambee schools are better than aided schools in orienting secondary-school pupils toward self-reliance but it is difficult to say whether this engenders any permanent positive attitude towards practical work, or it is seen as a necessary evil which must be

forgotten once school is left. Research on school leavers who finished school in 1968 indicates that a few Harambee school leavers are moving self-employment and jobs which in the past were unacceptable. The number involved in the 1968 sample is too small to warrant any general conclusions in this respect. It is also difficult to say how much of this is attributable to attitude gained at school or whether the attitude is changed by the lack of opportunities in the formal sector due to the rising unemployment. We hope this is a sign of a more positive attitude among our Harambee school leavers, but it could be possibly due to a negative attitude of seeing themselves as products of inferior schools and capable of inferior roles within our society. The latter could pose a serious setback in terms of producing confident and positive citizens of our country.

Exam results of aided and unaided in 1969 (table XIII) shows that while 37 per cent of the pupils in government schools obtained Division I and II certificates, only 11 per cent from unaided schools were able to reach that level. 1970 results showed the same pattern. In 1969 and 1970, more than 63 per cent of leavers in government-aided schools were awarded Division III certificates and above. In the same years more than 70 per cent of form four leavers from unaided secondary schools either failed or obtained passes which merited only East African Certificate of Education.

Table XIII: THE PERFORMANCE OF AIDED AND UNAIDED SECONDARY SCHOOLS IN EAST AFRICAN CERTIFICATE OF EDUCATION (EACE) 1969 & 1970

Category of EACE results	1969		1970	
	AIDED	UNAIDED	AIDED	UNAIDED
	%	%	%	%
Division I&II	37.0	11.1	32.6	8.9
Division III	26.3	17.7	30.9	20.7
E.A.C.E.	27.2	39.6	24.7	33.6
Fail	9.4	31.6	11.8	36.8
TOTAL	99.9(12659)	100.0(4314)	100.0(14449)	100.0(4538)

Source: Ministry of Education, Annual Reports 1969 and 1970.

If we take school certificate results as a measure of the quality of education (it is the popular criterion) in aided and unaided schools then we can say that the unaided schools are producing failures or near-failures.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR SECONDARY-SCHOOL LEAVERS

The East African Certificate of Education strongly determines the future of school leavers. The ablest students in terms of their performance in EACE are usually recruited for higher education, and the second ablest students are recruited for training in both public and private sectors. The remaining school leavers compete for the available employment opportunities. The process in the last few years has become fair and efficient in terms of allocation of opportunities on the basis of EACE merit. The dissemination of employment opportunity information and the examination results required, which are set down in the "Career Information Sheet" of the Ministry of Education, coupled with the use of Form A for computerized selection, has made examination results the crucial factor in allocation of opportunities. This is fair enough; the unfairness lies in the fact that the school leavers have not been exposed to the same quality of education. Performance in EACE depends to a large extent on the school attended. In this way, Harambee school leavers are discriminated against well before the selection process takes place.

But even when their examination results compare favorably with those of government-maintained schools, they still experience further discrimination in the labor market (Kinyanjui and Shepard, 1972). The probability of being unemployed is higher for Harambee leavers even when they have comparable grades and the likelihood of their remaining unemployed for a long time is still higher. If we divided school leavers into whether they attended national schools, provincial catchment schools, or Harambee schools we find that unemployment rates are very different even when performance is the same. The example of unemployment rates in 1968 is very illustrative. In this year 175 school leavers out of a total of 1186 remained unemployed in their first year after school. The unemployment rate for group with division I to III certificates was 6.9 per cent. Unemployment rate among leavers from national schools was 4.5 per cent, 6.7 per cent for leavers from provincial schools, and 28.2 per cent for leavers from Harambee. This pattern is repeated for those leavers who had EACE pass or failed. In the second year after school, the 1968 school leavers from Harambee schools had the highest total of unemployed (86.1 per cent) as compared with 58.5 per cent from provincial schools and 15.2 per cent from national schools.

Table XIV shows the first year after-school opportunities by type of school attended in 1968. The average performance on examinations for the three types of schools was different, the mean grade aggregate being 31.0 for national schools, 35.7 for provincial catchment schools and 43.2 for Harambee schools. So on the basis of performance criteria we would expect the distribution of opportunities for leavers from these three types of schools to be different. But, as we have seen, the Harambee school leavers experience further discrimination even when their performance in EACE is almost equal. Therefore

table XIV should be interpreted with this background in mind. The discrimination in the labor market is not limited to leavers from Harambee schools, but also affects leavers from the less well-established government-aided schools. While more than half of the leavers from aided national schools proceed to higher education or some form of training, and about 42 per cent of the leavers from provincial catchment school, only 16 per cent of the leavers from Harambee schools continued with education or some training. The largest proportion of 1968 Harambee school-leavers (37 per cent) in our sample ended up unemployed in their first year after school; the figures for national and provincial were smaller. In short, most of the rural pupils who attend rural community-supported Harambee schools find themselves unable to compete on an equal basis with pupils who attend government-aided schools. But no one feels the penalty of unequal education more severely than the would-be entrants to the labor market.

Table XIV: FIRST YEAR AFTER-SCHOOL OPPORTUNITIES BY TYPE OF SECONDARY SCHOOL ATTENDED: 1968 LEAVERS:

Type of after-school opportunity	SECONDARY SCHOOL TYPE			
	NATIONAL SCHOOLS	PROVINCIAL SCHOOLS	HARAMBEE	TOTAL
	%	%	%	%
Higher Education	37.8	17.4	4.1	266
Training	21.3	24.2	12.2	265
Employment	24.1	37.8	32.7	394
Other activities	1.1	0.8	6.1	16
Unemployment	9.2	14.5	36.7	175
Not known	6.4	5.3	8.2	70
TOTAL	99.9(357)	100.0(731)	100.0(98)	1186

Source: 1968 Secondary School Leavers Tracer Project.

CONCLUSION

This paper has attempted to analyze the disparities which exist in the distribution of educational resources and opportunities between rural and urban communities on one hand and among the rural communities on the other. Our analysis was aimed at finding out the distribution of educational resources and opportunities at the district level and in the main urban centers. It was not possible to analyze the distribution of secondary school resources and opportunities at the district level, but we did this analysis at the provincial level. The paper has, also, attempted to analyze the provision and benefits of education from a social group point of view, thereby getting the differences that exist in the distribution of educational benefits. What clearly emerges from this analysis is that educational benefits are being distributed in favor of the economically and politically powerful districts and provinces in the country. The case of Central Province districts in this matter should be contrasted with districts in the Coast Province. At the individual level, evidence is emerging which indicates that economic capability of the parents is becoming crucial in determining who is benefiting from provision of elementary education and even how far somebody goes in the educational system.

The other point we have noted in our discussion is the existing stratification of schools in Kenya. This stratification is to be noticed at the primary as well as at secondary school and it seems to be a more serious problem than the differences which exist between rural and urban schools as far as emerging inequalities are concerned. This differentiation of schools is in most cases benefiting the economically powerful groups in the country.

Finally, we have tried to show the implications of unequal educational provision at primary and secondary school level. The quality of education at primary level is closely related to the opportunities gained for secondary education, and the quality of education gained at the secondary school level has a strong influence on whether somebody continues with education, training, employment or ends up unemployed.

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